Verify all references; correct QS08 attribution and QS05 stale draft

README.md

@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ workloads on quantum computing platforms.
 | [QS05](quantum-top-10/QS05_Crypto-Agility-Failures.md) | Crypto-Agility Failures | NIS2 Article 21(2)(h); IETF PQUIP/TLS WG |
 | [QS06](quantum-top-10/QS06_Insecure-Migration-and-Hybrid-Misuse.md) | Insecure Migration and Hybrid Misuse | EU Roadmap end-2030 standalone-classical prohibition |
 | [QS07](quantum-top-10/QS07_Hardware-Roots-of-Trust.md) | Hardware Roots of Trust | NCSC 2028 milestone; CRA Annex IV |
-| [QS08](quantum-top-10/QS08_QPU-Tenant-Isolation-Failures.md) | QPU Tenant Isolation Failures | Li et al. NDSS 2025; Xu et al. CCS 2023 |
+| [QS08](quantum-top-10/QS08_QPU-Tenant-Isolation-Failures.md) | QPU Tenant Isolation Failures | Choudhury et al. NDSS 2025; Xu et al. CCS 2023 |
 | [QS09](quantum-top-10/QS09_Toolchain-and-Compiler-Compromise.md) | Toolchain and Compiler Compromise | Suresh et al. HASP 2021; Chu et al. ICASSP 2023 |
 | [QS10](quantum-top-10/QS10_Side-Channel-and-Control-Plane-Exposure.md) | Side-Channel and Control-Plane Exposure | Mi et al. CCS 2022; Xu et al. CCS 2023 |
 

quantum-top-10/QS05_Crypto-Agility-Failures.md

@@ -29,13 +29,13 @@ Scenario #2: A team adds a crypto abstraction layer but never tests rotation. Wh
 
 **Reference Links:**
 
-<!-- References verified 2026-07-13 against authoritative canonical sources. NCSC has no standalone crypto-agility page; the PQC migration timelines page is the appropriate anchor. -->
+<!-- References verified 2026-07-27 against authoritative primary sources. NCSC has no standalone crypto-agility page; the PQC migration timelines page is the appropriate anchor, and its 2028/2031/2035 milestones were confirmed against the live page. Reference #5 updated: draft-ietf-tls-hybrid-design was published as RFC 9954 in July 2026. -->
 
 1. [CISA, NSA, NIST - Quantum-Readiness fact sheet](https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/quantum-readiness-migration-post-quantum-cryptography): Cryptographic agility recommendation.
 2. [UK NCSC - Timelines for migration to post-quantum cryptography](https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/guidance/pqc-migration-timelines): Agility expectations within PQC migration guidance.
 3. [EU Coordinated Implementation Roadmap for PQC](https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/coordinated-implementation-roadmap-transition-post-quantum-cryptography): Explicit agility expectation.
 4. [IETF PQUIP Working Group](https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/pquip/about/): Agility documents and migration patterns.
-5. [IETF - Hybrid key exchange in TLS 1.3 (draft-ietf-tls-hybrid-design)](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-hybrid-design/): Hybrid KEM negotiation.
+5. [RFC 9954 - Hybrid Key Exchange in TLS 1.3](https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9954): Hybrid KEM negotiation (Informational, July 2026). Supersedes `draft-ietf-tls-hybrid-design`.
 
 **Standards and Regulatory Mapping:**
 

quantum-top-10/QS08_QPU-Tenant-Isolation-Failures.md

@@ -21,15 +21,15 @@ Cloud-based quantum platforms increasingly host workloads from multiple tenants
 
 **Example Attack Scenarios:**
 
-Scenario #1: A financial firm runs a proprietary optimisation circuit on a shared QPU. A malicious co-tenant schedules a circuit adjacent on the QPU topology and uses quantum crosstalk to degrade the victim's fidelity (Li et al., NDSS 2025; Ash-Saki et al., ISLPED 2020), corrupting results the firm relies on - without ever needing co-execution.
+Scenario #1: A financial firm runs a proprietary optimisation circuit on a shared QPU. A malicious co-tenant schedules a circuit adjacent on the QPU topology and uses quantum crosstalk to degrade the victim's fidelity (Choudhury et al., NDSS 2025; Ash-Saki et al., ISLPED 2020), corrupting results the firm relies on - without ever needing co-execution.
 
 Scenario #2: A tenant's circuit is scheduled on physical qubits immediately after a competitor's workload. Because standard reset gates do not fully clear state (Xu et al., CCS 2023), the tenant observes residual state leaking information about the previous, confidential computation.
 
 **Reference Links:**
 
-<!-- References verified 2026-07-13. Academic citations corrected to real papers; "Choudhury et al." was a mis-citation and is corrected to Li et al. (see #1). -->
+<!-- References verified 2026-07-27 against authoritative primary sources. Reference #1 is attributed to "Choudhury et al.": the paper's first author is Navnil Choudhury, confirmed against the arXiv metadata API for 2412.10507 and the NDSS proceedings PDF (13C-f2185-choudhury.pdf). Recorded here so the attribution is not changed again. -->
 
-1. [Li et al. - Crosstalk-induced Side Channel Threats in Multi-Tenant NISQ Computers (NDSS 2025)](https://www.ndss-symposium.org/ndss-paper/crosstalk-induced-side-channel-threats-in-multi-tenant-nisq-computers/): Demonstrated crosstalk-based side-channel/fidelity attack on shared QPUs. (Corrects the earlier "Choudhury et al." mis-citation; arXiv:2412.10507.)
+1. [Choudhury et al. - Crosstalk-induced Side Channel Threats in Multi-Tenant NISQ Computers (NDSS 2025)](https://www.ndss-symposium.org/ndss-paper/crosstalk-induced-side-channel-threats-in-multi-tenant-nisq-computers/): Demonstrated crosstalk-based side-channel/fidelity attack on shared QPUs ([arXiv:2412.10507](https://arxiv.org/abs/2412.10507)).
 2. [Ash-Saki et al. - Analysis of Crosstalk in NISQ Devices and Security Implications in Multi-Programming Regime (ISLPED 2020)](https://doi.org/10.1145/3370748.3406570): Crosstalk-based fault injection.
 3. [Xu et al. - Securing NISQ Quantum Computer Reset Operations Against Higher Energy State Attacks (CCS 2023)](https://doi.org/10.1145/3576915.3623104): Documents reset-operation state leakage across the tenant boundary.
 4. [EU DORA - Regulation (EU) 2022/2554, Article 28](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2554/oj/eng): Third-party ICT risk expectation that platform claims are evidenced.
@@ -38,5 +38,5 @@ Scenario #2: A tenant's circuit is scheduled on physical qubits immediately afte
 
 > **TODO:** This section is carried over from the source document and is not part of `_template.md`. Confirm whether to keep it in the final entry format, and verify each standard/citation.
 
-No formal standard yet covers QPU tenant isolation. NIST and NCSC have not published guidance on quantum platform security. The relevant published research includes Li et al. on crosstalk-induced side-channel threats (NDSS 2025), Ash-Saki et al. on crosstalk-based fault injection (ISLPED 2020), and Xu et al. on reset-operation state leakage (CCS 2023). Where DORA Article 28 third-party risk applies to financial entities using quantum platform services, the supervisory expectation is that platform security claims are evidenced rather than assumed.
+No formal standard yet covers QPU tenant isolation. NIST and NCSC have not published guidance on quantum platform security. The relevant published research includes Choudhury et al. on crosstalk-induced side-channel threats (NDSS 2025), Ash-Saki et al. on crosstalk-based fault injection (ISLPED 2020), and Xu et al. on reset-operation state leakage (CCS 2023). Where DORA Article 28 third-party risk applies to financial entities using quantum platform services, the supervisory expectation is that platform security claims are evidenced rather than assumed.