Persephone is a Matrix desktop client for Windows, Linux and macOS, written in Rust. It is tested against Merovingian first and works with other standard homeservers. The first release will have one account, rooms, message history, text and image messages, and end-to-end encrypted chats. It is made for everyone, but engineered to withstand a targeted attack, not only everyday threats.
Project page: https://omg-software.github.io/Persephone/ (source in
site/).
Warning
Persephone is in early development. No milestone has passed its acceptance gates, and its production security gates are open. Do not use it for real or high-risk conversations yet.
A Windows development build signed in to a disposable local Merovingian server. The accounts, rooms and messages are synthetic.
An encrypted room with text and an image message. The room list shows each room's encryption and unread count, and the members are on the right.
Hostile room names and messages show as text. The markup and the
javascript: link below do not run. A web link (http or https) becomes a
link, and Persephone asks in its own window before it opens one. The
right-to-left override still reverses its own line, but bidirectional
isolation keeps it out of the text around it.
Settings, Security & encryption, after setting up encryption: cross-signing is ready, this device is verified and recovery is set up.
The sign-in page. Persephone asks for the username and password in a separate Windows window, so the page never sees the password.
The milestone status lists each deliverable. The feasibility workbench lists recorded results and open gates.
| OS | State |
|---|---|
| Windows | Runs. Live-tested against disposable Merovingian and Synapse servers, and with Element Web. |
| macOS | Builds and passes CI. It has its Keychain vault, prompts and UI host, but it has never run with a display. Its file panels, link opening and idle lock are new and have not yet been through macOS CI. |
| Linux | Builds and passes CI. It has its Secret Service vault, GTK prompts and file choosers, and a UI host with a systemd memory cap, but the app has never been launched with a display. |
On Windows, the app can do these things today:
- Keep an encrypted local profile that opens only with your passphrase (ADR-0006).
- Sign in with a password through the core's own native prompt, and sign out.
Sign-out revokes the session and deletes the local profile. Source also
includes
.well-knowndiscovery and browser-based OIDC sign-in. No live OAuth-provider run is recorded; see proposed ADR-0027 and ADR-0030. - Show the room list and message history. Sliding Sync is preferred, with classic sync as the fallback.
- Send and receive encrypted text. Room keys go only to cross-signed devices, and you verify your own devices and your contacts by comparing emoji. Sending pauses when a contact's identity changes. Sending to an unencrypted room needs your consent.
- Start an encrypted direct conversation by Matrix ID, and accept or decline direct-message invitations (ADR-0014). This is new and has automated tests only; no live run is recorded yet.
- Send and receive images. Received images load only when you ask. Sent images have their metadata removed.
The current source also adds per-room drafts, local room organisation, bounded cache search with filters, ignore and report controls, date navigation, shared pins, attachment browsing, and a connection health panel. These tools keep Matrix authority in the core. Search terms stay local; date navigation and attachment browsing request room history. Shared pins expose event references as room state. See Room tools. Automated checks are recorded in the verification record. Native UI and live-server acceptance remain open. This does not establish security readiness.
Not done yet: Linux and macOS runs, keyboard and screen-reader checks, signed releases, and an independent security review.
The latest pre-release
is the newest build of main. It is unsigned, and it is replaced after each
merge. A build publishes only if its commit is still the tip of main when
the build ends. After quick merges, latest can therefore be behind main
until the newest build ends. To see which build you have, read the revision
in the app's version line. No signed release is available yet. See
Releases.
Persephone runs as separate processes, so that the code that draws hostile content holds no secrets (ADR-0004).
flowchart LR
S["Homeserver"] <-->|"TLS"| C["Core: persephone<br/>sessions, Matrix SDK, keys, stores"]
C -->|"Bounded text and pixels"| U["UI: persephone-ui<br/>Tauri web view, no keys"]
U -->|"Narrow, validated requests"| C
C -->|"Encoded image"| W["Media worker<br/>WebAssembly decoder"]
W -->|"Bounded pixels"| C
- Core (
crates/core). The entry process. It owns the sessions, the Matrix SDK and its cryptography, the encrypted stores, the keys and the media broker. - UI (
src-tauri/,frontend/). A keyless Tauri host with a bundled Svelte interface. It relays each allowed command to the core as one bounded frame. - Media worker. A contained process that decodes images in a WebAssembly guest. The guest has no network or file access. On Windows, the worker process itself is not network-denied yet (ADR-0003).
A common belief is that a native UI toolkit is safer than a web view. For Persephone, the web view is the more secure design. The page that draws hostile content runs in the engine's renderer sandbox, under a UI process that holds no keys. Only bundled code runs. Received text stays inert, and received images never reach the web engine's decoders. The UI can ask only for narrow operations that the core validates.
This is a design argument, not a tested ranking. Persephone's own controls are verified on Windows only, and it has not tested the renderer sandbox. The security design note gives the full reasons, the evidence for each control and the limits.
Run these commands from the repository root. They use the committed
Cargo.lock and frontend/package-lock.json.
| Command | Purpose |
|---|---|
python tools/dev.py bootstrap |
Install the locked frontend dependencies (run once) |
python tools/dev.py check |
Rust, frontend, contract drift and Python harness checks |
python tools/dev.py audit |
OSV dependency audit (needs network access) |
python tools/dev.py sandbox --offline |
Windows native containment gate |
The sandbox gate currently exits 1 on Windows, because the AppContainer worker
is not network-denied. Image decoding is therefore done in the WebAssembly
guest (ADR-0003). On other OSes the command exits 2 as unsupported. After a
build, run the app with .local/build/rust/debug/persephone.exe. Add --demo
to see synthetic rooms without a profile. See Development
for prerequisites, output paths and the component layout.
- Documentation index: plans, decisions, evidence and research
- Architecture decision records
- Security policy and privacy notice
The GNU General Public License v3.0 applies. See LICENSE.



