Add serial-in-SSID PSK, Telnet PSK leak & cloud IDOR vectors (GivEnergy battery gateways) - #2732
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🔗 Additional ContextOriginal Blog Post: https://pentestpartners.com/security-blog/givenergy-enters-administration-legacy-home-batteries-still-expose-customer-networks Content Categories: Based on the analysis, this content was categorized under "Pentesting WiFi / IoT gateway attacks, with cross-references to Pentesting Telnet, Pentesting Modbus, and Web IDOR". Repository Maintenance:
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Bot Version: HackTricks News Bot v1.0 |
Rework the auto-generated section so it states the actual vectors instead of abstract methodology prose: - serial-in-SSID -> WPA PSK (WK<serial>, or legacy 12345678) - HF-A21-SMT module: Telnet/HTTP admin:admin -> home WLAN PSK in cleartext - Modbus 502 / API 8099 battery control (force no-charge) - cloud IDOR: GET /internal-api/inverter/data/<serial>/<date> - port scan -> module crash -> factory reset (destructive DoS) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GSQojfKSHdfKd8NVYxa3N3
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What this adds
A new section in Pentesting Wi-Fi documenting the IoT battery-gateway attack chain from the GivEnergy "All In One" research, written as concrete, reusable attack vectors (not device trivia).
Section:
src/generic-methodologies-and-resources/pentesting-wifi/README.md→ Serial-in-SSID PSKs & dual-homed battery gateways (GivEnergy AIO case)Attack vectors covered
WK<SERIAL>and derives the WPA PSK from that same serial (or ships the fixed12345678), so the wireless password is recoverable from the beacon with no handshake capture or cracking. SSID pattern is also searchable in wardriving datasets (wigle.net) to pre-locate targets.admin/adminon the Hi-Flying HF-A21-SMT module → home Wi-Fi PSK in cleartext. The dual-homed gateway (own AP + STA on the home WLAN, plus optional RJ45 bridge) exposes a module console whose config dump leaks the customer's home WLAN PSK, pivoting the attacker onto the home LAN (same class as the 2015 iKettle bug).502/ vendor API8099— force the battery to stop charging/discharging.GET /internal-api/inverter/data/<serial>/<date>takes the serial straight from the path with no ownership check; swapping the serial (read from the SSID) returns any customer's grid/generation/consumption/battery data.Cross-references to Pentesting Telnet, Pentesting Modbus, and IDOR/BOLA. Reference
[30].Note
Rewritten from the original auto-generated draft, which described these as abstract "management-plane pivot" methodology and dropped the concrete values (SSID→PSK derivation,
admin/admin, the module name, the IDOR URL, the Modbus/API control plane).Source: https://pentestpartners.com/security-blog/givenergy-enters-administration-legacy-home-batteries-still-expose-customer-networks