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Security: FurlanLuka/crew

Security

SECURITY.md

Security

Supported versions

Only the latest release gets security fixes. crew update installs it, together with the matching Voice OS.

Reporting a vulnerability

Please report security issues privately: use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting on this repository (Security → Report a vulnerability), not a public issue. You'll get a reply as soon as possible, and a fix before anything is disclosed.

What's worth reporting

crew runs on your machine, but a few parts are reachable from other places or act on your behalf:

  • crew's web server (Voice OS and Set up, started by crew). It listens on 127.0.0.1 and is reachable from other devices, for example your phone, through crew's dev proxy. Sign-in is a cookie set from the token in ~/.crew/voiceos/token (owner-only, 64 hex characters); the WebSocket and POST /api/crew (Set up's typed crew commands) also require an exact Origin. Anything that gets around the sign-in, reads files through /media, runs a crew command the schema does not allow, or drives sessions without it matters.
  • Remote machines. A main drives another machine's sessions by running ssh <host> … crew voice _attach there, with BatchMode=yes: SSH is the only authentication, and the list of hosts is ~/.crew/voiceos/machines.json. On the remote, _attach bridges that login to the voiceos remote serve daemon over a unix socket in ~/.crew/voiceos/remote/ (socket 0600, directory 0700). Another local user reaching that socket, or anything that makes a main connect to a host it wasn't told about, matters.
  • Sessions act on their own. crew's server runs every Claude Code session, Set up's chat included, in Claude Code's auto permission mode: routine actions run without asking, and Claude Code's safety check blocks risky ones. "Allow it" approves only the one call that was blocked. A way to get a session to act beyond that, or to approve something by voice that you didn't say, matters.
  • The dev proxy and its HTTPS certificate authority (crew dev proxy trust).
  • Downloads: install.sh, crew update, and the Voice OS binary fetched on the first crew (or crew server start).
  • API keys, stored in ~/.config/crew-voiceos/*.key (owner-only), and anything that could leak them.
  • Commands run on your behalf: setup commands, env commands and dev server commands from a project's configuration.

There aren't any published security advisories