Skip to content

Security: Erreur32/TopviewR

SECURITY.md

Security policy

TopviewR puts a view of the host (processes, disks, network, GPU) in a browser tab, with keys that can signal processes: a flaw in it can matter. Thanks for reporting one privately.

Reporting a vulnerability

Use Report a vulnerability in the Security tab of this repository. The report stays private until a fix is out. Please do not open a public issue or discussion for it.

Include what you can: the image tag, the compose file you use (without the password), the steps to reproduce and what an attacker gains.

Supported versions

Only the latest release and the latest image get security fixes. The image is rebuilt every week for Alpine fixes.

Scope notes

  • TopviewR is meant for a LAN. ttyd has no brute-force protection: never expose the port to the Internet, use a VPN or a reverse proxy with SSO (BTOP_AUTH_HEADER).
  • The monitor runs as UID 10001 and cannot signal host processes; ttyd itself runs as root to read the certificates.
  • ttyd only accepts the password as a command-line argument; a small LD_PRELOAD shim (ttyd-cred.c) keeps it out of ttyd's command line, so it no longer shows in ps on the host nor in the process lists of btop and htop. Root on the host (or the docker group) can still read it, like any container secret. The password showing in any process command line is a vulnerability: please report it.
  • The switch layer (tmux) has every default binding removed so it cannot open a shell. A way to reach a shell from the page is a vulnerability: please report it.

There aren't any published security advisories