Please report vulnerabilities privately through GitHub's private vulnerability reporting, not in a public issue. You can expect a first reply within a week.

In scope: the watcher, install.sh, uninstall.sh, and the LaunchAgent they create. Things worth reporting include the installer or uninstaller touching files outside the install prefix, injection through device names, paths or environment variables, and anything that runs with more privilege than a per-user LaunchAgent.

SidecarKeeper never uses sudo, makes no network requests at runtime, and collects no data.

What you are trusting depends on how you install:

• Release install (the one-liner or the downloaded bundle). Two prebuilt binaries are installed. They are built by GitHub Actions from the tagged source, ad-hoc signed and not notarized, and the installer removes the macOS quarantine flag from them so they can run, which also means macOS does not prompt before they do. The install.sh attached to a release carries the SHA-256 of that release's archive and refuses anything else. Each release file also has a build provenance attestation, which the installer does not check for you: gh attestation verify SidecarKeeper.tar.gz --repo EMOEMOJAI/SidecarKeeper.
• Source install (from a git clone). Both binaries are compiled on your Mac. The installer fetches one pinned commit of SidecarLauncher and builds it locally.

Either way you are trusting this repository and its GitHub account. Issues in SidecarLauncher or in Apple's private SidecarCore framework belong upstream.

Only the latest release is supported.