Security policy, and a comment reword that stops scanners flagging the leak detector

SECURITY.md

@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+# Security policy
+
+Jev (Prompt Coach) reads what a developer types into a coding agent. Prompts
+carry client code, internal paths and, occasionally, live credentials — one
+prompt in this project's own development history contained a working Azure
+client secret. That is the risk this plugin is built around, and it is the risk
+a security report should be measured against.
+
+## Reporting a vulnerability
+
+Report privately through GitHub's private vulnerability reporting on this
+repository: the **Security** tab, then **Report a vulnerability**. Please do not
+open a public issue, and please do not include real prompt text or a real
+credential in the report — describe the shape of the input that triggers the
+problem instead.
+
+We aim to respond within five working days. There is no paid bounty. If the
+report is in scope we will tell you so, agree a disclosure date with you, and
+credit you in the release notes unless you ask us not to.
+
+## Supported versions
+
+Only the most recently published version is supported. Fixes ship as a new
+release rather than as a backport, because the version string in the plugin
+manifest is what `claude plugin update` compares — an install that is not on the
+latest version will not have the fix.
+
+## In scope
+
+The plugin makes two promises, and a report that breaks either is in scope:
+
+- **Nothing leaves the machine that was not supposed to.** The log is local. The
+  only network destination is TypeSafe's API, and only during a command the user
+  ran. Anything that sends prompt text outside those documented paths, defeats
+  the redaction boundary, or leaks text while the privacy level is set to
+  metadata-only, is a vulnerability.
+- **The plugin cannot cost the user their work.** The prompt hook runs on every
+  message a developer sends. A failure mode that blocks a prompt, erases what
+  was typed, or hangs the editor is treated as a security issue, not a bug.
+
+Also in scope: the API key being written to a log, an error message, a crash
+dump or any file other than the key file; and any way to make the plugin contact
+a host other than TypeSafe's API.
+
+## Out of scope
+
+- **Vulnerabilities in TypeSafe's API or model.** Report those to TypeSafe. We
+  will help route a report if you are unsure where it belongs.
+- **The absent lockfile.** This is deliberate. A committed lockfile makes Claude
+  Code install the full build toolchain into every user's plugin cache, tens of
+  megabytes of it, none of which runs. Development dependencies are pinned to
+  exact versions instead, which gives the same reproducibility without shipping
+  the tooling. A report that the lockfile is missing will be closed.
+- **Automated scanner matches on the leak detector's own text.** The script that
+  blocks credentials from being committed has to describe the patterns it looks
+  for, and generic scanners flag those descriptions as findings. Confirm a match
+  is a real credential before reporting it.
+- **Anything requiring an attacker who already has the user's filesystem.** If
+  they can read the key file, they can read the key.
+
+## What the plugin does with prompt text
+
+The short version: the log lives on the user's own machine with owner-only
+permissions, redaction runs before anything is sent, and credential-shaped
+strings are stripped at every privacy level including the most permissive one.
+There is no telemetry and no second network destination. The README documents
+exactly what is sent and when, level by level; `src/redact.ts` is the boundary
+where it happens.
+
+Prompts are never committed to this repository — not as fixtures, not as
+examples, not in a commit message. A pre-commit scan enforces both that rule and
+the no-credentials rule, and the same scan runs in the test suite and in CI.

scripts/check-leaks.mjs

@@ -65,7 +65,10 @@ function looksLikeAssignedSecret(line) {
   if (/[()[\]{}$<>]/.test(value)) return false; // it is an expression, not a literal
   if (value.includes('..') || value.endsWith('.')) return false;
   // SCREAMING_SNAKE_CASE is an env var name or a constant, not a secret:
-  // `apiKey: "TYPESAFE_API_KEY"` names the variable that holds the key.
+  // An apiKey field whose value is TYPESAFE_API_KEY names the variable that
+  // holds the key, not the key itself. Written out rather than shown as a
+  // literal: third-party scanners match the literal form and report this
+  // very line as a hardcoded secret.
   if (/^[A-Z][A-Z0-9_]*$/.test(value)) return false;
   return quoted || /\d/.test(value);
 }