fix(reliability): preflight inline image decoded size

src/policy/inlineImagePolicy.ts

@@ -1,22 +1,101 @@
-import {
-  Base64SizeError,
-  dataUriByteLength,
-} from '../converter/base64.js';
+import { Base64SizeError } from '../converter/base64.js';
 
-/** Strict raster-only data-URI form accepted by Inkspan document surfaces. */
-const INLINE_RASTER_SOURCE_PATTERN =
-  /^data:image\/(?:png|jpe?g|gif|webp|avif|apng|bmp|x-icon|vnd\.microsoft\.icon);base64,(?:[A-Za-z0-9+/]{4})*(?:[A-Za-z0-9+/]{4}|[A-Za-z0-9+/]{2}==|[A-Za-z0-9+/]{3}=)$/i;
+/** Bounded raster data-URI prefix recognized before payload validation. */
+const INLINE_RASTER_SOURCE_PREFIX_PATTERN =
+  /^data:image\/(?:png|jpe?g|gif|webp|avif|apng|bmp|x-icon|vnd\.microsoft\.icon);base64,/i;
+
+/** One canonical base64 payload code unit; padding is handled separately. */
+const BASE64_PAYLOAD_CODE_UNIT_PATTERN = /^[A-Za-z0-9+/]$/;
+
+/** Valid final sextets before `==`; their four unused low bits are zero. */
+const BASE64_DOUBLE_PADDING_FINAL_CODE_UNIT_PATTERN = /^[AQgw]$/;
+
+/** Valid final sextets before `=`; their two unused low bits are zero. */
+const BASE64_SINGLE_PADDING_FINAL_CODE_UNIT_PATTERN = /^[AEIMQUYcgkosw048]$/;
+
+/** Fixed public categories that reveal no caller-defined scheme label. */
+const PUBLIC_IMAGE_SOURCE_SCHEME_PATTERN =
+  /^(?:data|https?|blob|file|javascript)$/i;
+
+/** Maximum untrusted prefix inspected while classifying source metadata. */
+const IMAGE_SOURCE_PREFIX_INSPECTION_CODE_UNITS = 64;
 
 /** Return a bounded, payload-free category for an untrusted image source. */
 function redactImageSource(source: unknown): string {
   if (typeof source !== 'string') return `<${typeof source}>`;
   if (source.length === 0) return '<empty>';
   if (source.startsWith('//')) return '//<redacted>';
-  const scheme = /^([a-z][a-z0-9+.-]*):/i.exec(source)?.[1];
-  if (scheme) return `${scheme.toLowerCase()}:<redacted>`;
+  const scheme = /^([a-z][a-z0-9+.-]*):/i.exec(
+    source.slice(0, IMAGE_SOURCE_PREFIX_INSPECTION_CODE_UNITS),
+  )?.[1];
+  if (scheme) {
+    if (PUBLIC_IMAGE_SOURCE_SCHEME_PATTERN.test(scheme)) {
+      return `${scheme.toLowerCase()}:<redacted>`;
+    }
+    return '<scheme-redacted>';
+  }
   return '<unrecognized>';
 }
 
+/** Return decoded bytes for a source whose strict base64 shape is known. */
+function inlineRasterByteLength(source: string, payloadOffset: number): number {
+  const payloadLength = source.length - payloadOffset;
+  const padding = source.endsWith('==') ? 2 : Number(source.endsWith('='));
+  return (payloadLength / 4) * 3 - padding;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Validate the strict raster/base64 grammar without decoding or whole-source regex work.
+ *
+ * The MIME/prefix regex sees only a bounded prefix. Payload code units are then
+ * inspected incrementally so malformed-source precedence remains authoritative
+ * even for oversized candidates. Canonical padding is inferred only from the
+ * final one or two code units; any earlier `=` is rejected by the payload scan,
+ * and unused bits in the final data sextet must be zero.
+ */
+function strictInlineRasterPayloadOffset(source: string): number | null {
+  const prefixMatch = INLINE_RASTER_SOURCE_PREFIX_PATTERN.exec(
+    source.slice(0, IMAGE_SOURCE_PREFIX_INSPECTION_CODE_UNITS),
+  );
+  if (!prefixMatch) return null;
+
+  const payloadOffset = prefixMatch[0].length;
+  const payloadLength = source.length - payloadOffset;
+  if (payloadLength < 4 || payloadLength % 4 !== 0) return null;
+
+  const padding = source.endsWith('==') ? 2 : Number(source.endsWith('='));
+  const payloadDataEnd = source.length - padding;
+  for (let index = payloadOffset; index < payloadDataEnd; index += 1) {
+    if (!BASE64_PAYLOAD_CODE_UNIT_PATTERN.test(source.charAt(index))) {
+      return null;
+    }
+  }
+
+  const finalDataCodeUnit = source.charAt(payloadDataEnd - 1);
+  if (
+    padding === 2 &&
+    !BASE64_DOUBLE_PADDING_FINAL_CODE_UNIT_PATTERN.test(finalDataCodeUnit)
+  ) {
+    return null;
+  }
+  if (
+    padding === 1 &&
+    !BASE64_SINGLE_PADDING_FINAL_CODE_UNIT_PATTERN.test(finalDataCodeUnit)
+  ) {
+    return null;
+  }
+  return payloadOffset;
+}
+
+/** Reject malformed public byte ceilings without coercion or intent inference. */
+function assertValidInlineImageByteLimit(maxSizeBytes: number): void {
+  if (!Number.isSafeInteger(maxSizeBytes) || maxSizeBytes < 0) {
+    throw new RangeError(
+      'inline image byte limit must be a non-negative safe integer',
+    );
+  }
+}
+
 /** Error thrown when an image source violates Inkspan's inline raster policy. */
 export class Base64ImageSourceError extends Error {
   /** Redacted source category safe for logs and host telemetry. */
@@ -43,15 +122,18 @@ export function validateInlineImageSource(
   source: unknown,
   maxSizeBytes: number,
 ): string {
-  if (
-    typeof source !== 'string' ||
-    source.length === 0 ||
-    !INLINE_RASTER_SOURCE_PATTERN.test(source)
-  ) {
+  assertValidInlineImageByteLimit(maxSizeBytes);
+  if (typeof source !== 'string' || source.length === 0) {
     throw new Base64ImageSourceError(source);
   }
+
+  const payloadOffset = strictInlineRasterPayloadOffset(source);
+  if (payloadOffset === null) {
+    throw new Base64ImageSourceError(source);
+  }
+
   if (maxSizeBytes > 0) {
-    const bytes = dataUriByteLength(source);
+    const bytes = inlineRasterByteLength(source, payloadOffset);
     if (bytes > maxSizeBytes) {
       throw new Base64SizeError(bytes, maxSizeBytes);
     }

src/policy/inlineImagePolicyPreflight.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
+import { describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
+
+import { Base64SizeError } from '../converter/base64.js';
+import {
+  Base64ImageSourceError,
+  validateInlineImageSource,
+} from './inlineImagePolicy.js';
+
+const OVERSIZED_IMAGE = '';
+
+describe('inline image decoded-size preflight', () => {
+  it('rejects an oversized valid image without decoding its base64 payload', () => {
+    const decodeSpy = vi.spyOn(globalThis.Buffer, 'from');
+
+    try {
+      expect(() => validateInlineImageSource(OVERSIZED_IMAGE, 3)).toThrowError(
+        expect.objectContaining({
+          name: 'Base64SizeError',
+          bytes: 4,
+          maxBytes: 3,
+        } satisfies Partial<Base64SizeError>),
+      );
+      expect(
+        decodeSpy.mock.calls.some((call) => {
+          const args = call as unknown as readonly unknown[];
+          return args[0] === 'QUJDRA==' && args[1] === 'base64';
+        }),
+      ).toBe(false);
+    } finally {
+      decodeSpy.mockRestore();
+    }
+  });
+
+  it.each([Number.NaN, -1, 1.5, Number.POSITIVE_INFINITY])(
+    'rejects malformed public byte limit %s instead of weakening the resource policy',
+    (maxSizeBytes) => {
+      expect(() => validateInlineImageSource(OVERSIZED_IMAGE, maxSizeBytes)).toThrowError(
+        new RangeError('inline image byte limit must be a non-negative safe integer'),
+      );
+    },
+  );
+
+  it('rejects an unusable byte limit before scanning caller-controlled image source text', () => {
+    const source = '';
+    const regexpTestSpy = vi.spyOn(RegExp.prototype, 'test');
+
+    try {
+      expect(() => validateInlineImageSource(source, Number.NaN)).toThrowError(
+        new RangeError('inline image byte limit must be a non-negative safe integer'),
+      );
+      expect(
+        regexpTestSpy.mock.calls.some((call) => call[0] === source),
+      ).toBe(false);
+    } finally {
+      regexpTestSpy.mockRestore();
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a provably oversized valid raster source before full-payload regex scanning', () => {
+    const source = `data:image/png;base64,${'QUJD'.repeat(16_384)}`;
+    const regexpTestSpy = vi.spyOn(RegExp.prototype, 'test');
+
+    try {
+      expect(() => validateInlineImageSource(source, 3)).toThrowError(
+        expect.objectContaining({
+          name: 'Base64SizeError',
+          maxBytes: 3,
+        } satisfies Partial<Base64SizeError>),
+      );
+      expect(
+        regexpTestSpy.mock.calls.some((call) => call[0] === source),
+      ).toBe(false);
+    } finally {
+      regexpTestSpy.mockRestore();
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('preserves malformed-source precedence even when the candidate is oversized', () => {
+    const source = `data:image/png;base64,${'QUJD'.repeat(16_383)}QU*D`;
+
+    expect(() => validateInlineImageSource(source, 3)).toThrow(
+      Base64ImageSourceError,
+    );
+  });
+
+  it.each([
+    '',
+    '',
+  ])('rejects non-canonical base64 padding bits in %s', (source) => {
+    expect(() => validateInlineImageSource(source, 0)).toThrow(
+      Base64ImageSourceError,
+    );
+  });
+
+  it.each([
+    'https://example.invalid/image.png',
+    'data:image/png;base64,',
+    '',
+    '*A',
+  ])('defers in-bound malformed candidate %s to the strict source grammar', (source) => {
+    expect(() => validateInlineImageSource(source, 4)).toThrow(
+      Base64ImageSourceError,
+    );
+  });
+
+  it('accounts for a single canonical padding byte in an in-bound valid source', () => {
+    const source = '';
+
+    expect(validateInlineImageSource(source, 5)).toBe(source);
+    expect(() => validateInlineImageSource(source, 4)).toThrowError(
+      expect.objectContaining({
+        name: 'Base64SizeError',
+        bytes: 5,
+        maxBytes: 4,
+      } satisfies Partial<Base64SizeError>),
+    );
+  });
+
+  it('does not reflect a caller-controlled custom URI scheme in diagnostics', () => {
+    const privateMarker = 'privatetenant42';
+    const error = new Base64ImageSourceError(`${privateMarker}:opaque`);
+
+    expect(error.sourcePreview).toBe('<scheme-redacted>');
+    expect(error.message).not.toContain(privateMarker);
+  });
+
+  it('bounds diagnostic scheme inspection before regex work on untrusted source text', () => {
+    const source = 'a'.repeat(65_536);
+    const regexpExecSpy = vi.spyOn(RegExp.prototype, 'exec');
+    let inspectedLengths: number[] = [];
+
+    try {
+      const error = new Base64ImageSourceError(source);
+      inspectedLengths = regexpExecSpy.mock.calls
+        .map((call) => call[0])
+        .filter((value): value is string => typeof value === 'string')
+        .map((value) => value.length);
+      expect(error.sourcePreview).toBe('<unrecognized>');
+    } finally {
+      regexpExecSpy.mockRestore();
+    }
+
+    expect(Math.max(...inspectedLengths)).toBeLessThanOrEqual(64);
+  });
+});