feat(network): write bounded BiDi WebSocket opening request

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -6,6 +6,9 @@ All notable changes to OriginWeave are documented in this file. The format follo
 
 ### Added
 
+- Bounded RFC 6455 frame transport on the established WebDriver BiDi stream: client text frames require a caller-supplied fresh mask key and are masked on the wire, server frames are required to be unmasked, reserved bits/opcodes and nonminimal lengths fail closed, and each frame is limited by payload and monotonic-I/O ceilings; this remains frame transport only and does not assemble BiDi messages or grant browser/Agent authority.
+- Bounded WebDriver BiDi `browsingContext.locateNodes` exchange over the established peer-verified WebSocket stream: the exact consumed command is written as one masked text frame, one end-to-end deadline and a 64-frame Ping/Pong budget bound the exchange, each Pong requires a fresh caller-supplied masking key, and only one final bounded text response may pass raw-document admission, exact command correlation, and node-result admission; fragmentation, binary/continuation/close shapes, exhausted entropy, and over-budget control traffic fail closed without granting browser, origin, policy, typed-input, or Agent authority.
+- Bounded RFC 6455 WebDriver BiDi opening-response validation on the exact peer-verified stream: it admits only HTTP/1.1 `101`, case-insensitive `Upgrade`/`Connection` tokens, and the client-key-correlated `Sec-WebSocket-Accept` value within monotonic time and header-size ceilings; it restores blocking mode and still does not implement WebSocket frames or grant browser/Agent authority.
 - Bounded WebDriver BiDi loopback TCP transport that consumes one exact no-DNS connect target, retries only explicitly recoverable local transport failures within repository timeout and attempt ceilings, exposes the stream only after operating-system peer inspection and exact peer verification, supports a consuming handoff of the original stream with typed credential-free peer/session/TLS and bounded-attempt evidence, preserves typed causal errors, and performs no DNS, proxy/PAC, process authentication, TLS, WebSocket, BiDi message, browser-action, or Agent-authority step.
 - Exact WebDriver BiDi socket-peer verification that consumes an approved no-DNS connect target, requires the observed IP address and port to match exactly, preserves the TLS requirement and exact correlated session id, and remains inert metadata that does not authenticate an OS process, does not negotiate TLS, perform a WebSocket handshake, or grant Agent authority.
 - Explicit no-DNS WebDriver BiDi loopback connection targets that derive exact IPv4/IPv6 loopback `SocketAddr` metadata from a session-correlated endpoint, reject `localhost` as requiring separately trusted name resolution, preserve the TLS requirement and exact session id, perform no socket I/O, and grant no Agent authority.
@@ -53,6 +56,19 @@ All notable changes to OriginWeave are documented in this file. The format follo
 
 ### Changed
 
+- Made WebDriver BiDi response-fragment admission reject an already oversized
+  buffer without subtraction underflow or a production panic.
+
+- Restored exact locateNodes-stack coverage without introducing an uncovered
+  test-only pattern-guard branch by exercising the deadline callback
+  without weakening its no-late-entropy assertion and removing an unreachable
+  private legacy handshake `Debug` implementation superseded by the redacting
+  wrapper.
+- Removed a redundant 20-microsecond loopback deadline assertion whose error
+  variant depended on host scheduling; deterministic unit-clock tests retain
+  the shrinking end-to-end budget contract.
+- Kept the no-late-entropy deadline gate as one result chain so exact coverage
+  does not require recreating an expired-clock race through a real socket.
 - Separated logical origin authority from resolved network destination authority; an origin grant no longer implies permission to connect to every resolver result.
 - Separated resolved-address authorization from direct transport evidence; an approved IP now becomes a usable stream only after the operating system reports the exact requested IP and port.
 - Separated exact TCP peer proof from authenticated TLS service identity; an observed peer becomes an authenticated HTTPS stream only after explicit-root, fixed-time, SAN-bound WebPKI verification over that same stream.
@@ -62,6 +78,7 @@ All notable changes to OriginWeave are documented in this file. The format follo
 - Separated hourly product PR publication authority from the organization review and merge system, and added live default-branch and release-blocker rechecks immediately before publication.
 - Made the agent-development contract work-conserving: completing one bounded slice, RCA, review request, check, merge, or documentation change is an intermediate state; maintenance must return to the live queue, treat waits as item-local, and perform a mandatory exit sweep before terminating while executable OriginWeave work remains.
 - Moved autonomous-agent Cargo targets and Python bytecode caches outside the proposed source tree and prefetched locked Cargo dependencies for offline verification.
+- Kept the real loopback WebDriver BiDi opening-write regression test fail-fast with test-only diagnostics, while explicitly covering successful and panicked server-thread handoffs so strict all-target Clippy and exact coverage remain clean.
 - Updated research doctoring to pin Chromium canonicalizer evidence to an immutable revision, add RFC 9293, RFC 5280, RFC 8446, RFC 9525, rustls 0.23.42, and Rust `TcpStream` evidence, distinguish the April 2026 Fugu beta from the June 2026 release, and treat vendor benchmark claims as first-party evidence rather than independent validation.
 
 ### Security

crates/originweave-network/Cargo.toml

@@ -11,8 +11,10 @@ homepage.workspace = true
 publish = false
 
 [dependencies]
+base64 = "0.22.1"
 originweave-core = { path = "../originweave-core" }
 originweave-destination = { path = "../originweave-destination" }
+sha1 = "0.10.6"
 
 [lints]
 workspace = true

crates/originweave-network/src/lib.rs

@@ -4,16 +4,35 @@
 //! without hostname resolution or proxy inheritance, verifies operating-system
 //! peers before exposing transport I/O, and emits credential-free evidence.
 //! It also bridges a session-correlated WebDriver BiDi loopback target from
-//! `originweave-core` into one bounded exact TCP connection and can bind an inert
-//! RFC 6455 opening request to an already-verified plain BiDi stream without
-//! granting browser, WebSocket, TLS, policy, or Agent authority.
+//! `originweave-core` into one bounded exact TCP connection, binds an RFC 6455
+//! opening request to that verified plain stream, and can write that exact request
+//! under one bounded deadline, validate its bounded RFC 6455 opening response,
+//! carry one bounded frame at a time, and bind one exact `locateNodes` command to
+//! its bounded correlated response without granting browser, WebSocket, TLS,
+//! policy, or Agent authority.
 
 #![forbid(unsafe_code)]
 #![deny(missing_docs)]
 
 mod connection;
 mod webdriver_bidi_connection;
+mod webdriver_bidi_locate_nodes_exchange;
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod webdriver_bidi_locate_nodes_exchange_transport_failure_tests;
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod webdriver_bidi_locate_nodes_exchange_unit_coverage_tests;
+mod webdriver_bidi_websocket_control;
+#[cfg(test)]
+#[allow(clippy::expect_used)]
+mod webdriver_bidi_websocket_coverage_tests;
+#[cfg(test)]
+#[allow(clippy::expect_used)]
+mod webdriver_bidi_websocket_debug_tests;
+#[path = "webdriver_bidi_websocket_validated.rs"]
 mod webdriver_bidi_websocket_handshake;
+#[path = "webdriver_bidi_websocket_raw_redacted.rs"]
+mod webdriver_bidi_websocket_handshake_raw;
+mod webdriver_bidi_websocket_mask_key;
 
 pub use connection::{
     ConnectionPlan, DirectTcpConnection, MAX_CONNECT_TIMEOUT, MAX_CONNECTION_ATTEMPTS,
@@ -23,7 +42,20 @@ pub use webdriver_bidi_connection::{
     WebDriverBiDiTcpConnection, WebDriverBiDiTcpConnectionError,
     WebDriverBiDiTcpConnectionEvidence, WebDriverBiDiTcpConnectionPlan,
 };
+pub use webdriver_bidi_locate_nodes_exchange::{
+    MAX_WEBDRIVER_BIDI_CONTROL_FRAMES_PER_EXCHANGE,
+    MAX_WEBDRIVER_BIDI_RESPONSE_FRAGMENTS_PER_EXCHANGE, WebDriverBiDiLocateNodesExchangeError,
+};
 pub use webdriver_bidi_websocket_handshake::{
-    WebDriverBiDiWebSocketClientKey, WebDriverBiDiWebSocketHandshakeError,
-    WebDriverBiDiWebSocketHandshakePlan,
+    WebDriverBiDiWebSocketEstablished, WebDriverBiDiWebSocketHandshakePlan,
+    WebDriverBiDiWebSocketOpeningRequestSent,
+};
+pub use webdriver_bidi_websocket_handshake_raw::{
+    MAX_WEBSOCKET_FRAME_PAYLOAD_SIZE, MAX_WEBSOCKET_FRAME_TIMEOUT,
+    MAX_WEBSOCKET_OPENING_RESPONSE_SIZE, MAX_WEBSOCKET_OPENING_RESPONSE_TIMEOUT,
+    MAX_WEBSOCKET_OPENING_WRITE_TIMEOUT, WebDriverBiDiWebSocketClientKey,
+    WebDriverBiDiWebSocketFrame, WebDriverBiDiWebSocketFrameError,
+    WebDriverBiDiWebSocketHandshakeError, WebDriverBiDiWebSocketHandshakeResponseError,
+    WebDriverBiDiWebSocketOpeningWriteError,
 };
+pub use webdriver_bidi_websocket_mask_key::WebDriverBiDiWebSocketMaskKey;