π‘οΈ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) - #1344
π‘οΈ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)#1344seonghobae wants to merge 2 commits into
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This commit implements a hostname validation in the `wait_for_url` function to prevent Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerabilities. Validating URL schemes is insufficient to prevent SSRF if the URL can target arbitrary external or internal hosts. A malicious URL could target internal network services. By using `urllib.parse.urlparse`, we validate that the parsed URL hostname is restricted to safe loopback addresses (`localhost` or `127.0.0.1`) before opening the URL when making network requests in CI scripts. The `.jules/sentinel.md` journal is also updated with this learning. Tests and test coverage have been maintained at 100%.
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| if parsed.hostname not in {"localhost", "127.0.0.1"}: | ||
| raise ValueError(f"URL must target localhost or 127.0.0.1 to prevent SSRF, got: {parsed.hostname}") |
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π Allowlist rejects other loopback forms
The hostname allowlist permits only localhost and 127.0.0.1. Readiness URLs using [::1], 0.0.0.0, or other 127.x.x.x addresses now raise ValueError, breaking any CI config that relies on them.
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Superseded by PR #1342, which carries the loopback SSRF fix plus required bubblewrap OS isolation for backend/frontend/E2E processes. Closing this duplicate so only the hardened implementation proceeds. |
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Closed as superseded by #1342. |
Pull request was closed
Understood. Acknowledging that this work is superseded by PR #1342 and stopping work on this task. |
Acknowledged. |
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π¨ Severity: CRITICAL
π‘ Vulnerability: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in
wait_for_urlhelper function withinscripts/ci/sandboxed_web_e2e.py.π― Impact: Attackers controlling the readiness URL could potentially access arbitrary internal resources or loopback services, leading to internal network reconnaissance or interaction with sensitive local endpoints.
π§ Fix: Added strict hostname validation using
urllib.parse.urlparseto ensure onlylocalhostand127.0.0.1are permitted. Additionally, updatedtests/test_sandboxed_web_e2e.pyto maintain 100% test coverage and appended the related learning to the Sentinel journal.β Verification: Ran test suite with 100% code coverage. Bandit reports no new security vulnerabilities.
PR created automatically by Jules for task 469850485368275234 started by @seonghobae