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153 changes: 132 additions & 21 deletions js/Icons.js
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -8,6 +8,106 @@ var REVERSE_DNS_PREFIX_REGEX = /^(?:com|org|io|net|dev|app|xyz|me|tv|de|fr|uk|nl
var TLD_REGEX = /\.(?:com|org|net|edu|gov|io|co|ai|app|dev|xyz|me|tv|fm|so|cc|us|uk|ca|in|de|fr|jp|info|biz|eu)(?:\.[a-z]{2})?$/i;
var SUBDOMAIN_REGEX = /^(?:web|app|m|mobile|www|mail|chat|music|play|desktop|client|portal|login|beta)\./i;

/**
* Checks if a path or URI represents a generic system fallback executable icon.
*/
function isFallbackIcon(path) {
if (!path || typeof path !== "string") return false;
return path.indexOf("application-x-executable") !== -1 || path.indexOf("system-run") !== -1;
}

/**
* Validates that an icon candidate is a safe FreeDesktop identifier.
* Rejects path traversal, directory separators, URI schemes, file extensions, and invalid characters.
*/
function isValidIconCandidate(name) {
if (!name || typeof name !== "string") return false;
var s = name.trim();
if (!s || s.length > 128) return false;

// Disallow path separators, URI schemes, control characters, or directory traversal
if (s.indexOf("/") !== -1 || s.indexOf("\\") !== -1 || s.indexOf(":") !== -1 || s.indexOf("..") !== -1 || s.indexOf("\0") !== -1) {
return false;
}

// Must not start or end with a dot or dash
if (s.charAt(0) === "." || s.charAt(0) === "-" || s.charAt(s.length - 1) === "." || s.charAt(s.length - 1) === "-") {
return false;
}

// Prohibit image file extensions (theme candidates are icon names, not disk filenames)
if (/\.(?:png|svg|svgz|xpm|ico|jpe?g|bmp|webp|gif)$/i.test(s)) {
return false;
}

// Strict FreeDesktop identifier: alphanumeric, underscores, hyphens, and dots
return /^[a-zA-Z0-9_\-\.]+$/.test(s);
}

/**
* Validates that an icon source path or URI is safe to load in the shell.
* Restricts file paths to trusted system/user icon repositories, preventing arbitrary file reads
* or memory exhaustion decompression attacks via client-supplied files.
*/
function isSafeIconSource(src, allowFallback) {
if (!src || typeof src !== "string") return false;
var s = src.trim();
if (!s) return false;

if (!allowFallback && isFallbackIcon(s)) return false;

// QML Image providers (e.g. image://icon/...) and Qt resources (qrc:/...) are safe
if (s.indexOf("image://") === 0 || s.indexOf("qrc:/") === 0) {
return true;
}

// Convert file:// to path for validation
var path = s;
if (path.indexOf("file://") === 0) {
path = path.slice(7);
}

// Must be an absolute path
if (path.charAt(0) !== "/") {
return false;
}

// Disallow directory traversal or null bytes
if (path.indexOf("..") !== -1 || path.indexOf("\0") !== -1) {
return false;
}

// Block dangerous temporary and system pseudo-directories
if (path.indexOf("/tmp/") === 0 || path === "/tmp" ||
path.indexOf("/var/tmp/") === 0 || path === "/var/tmp" ||
path.indexOf("/dev/") === 0 ||
path.indexOf("/proc/") === 0 ||
path.indexOf("/sys/") === 0) {
return false;
}

// Must be in trusted icon or application directories
var isTrusted = (
path.indexOf("/usr/share/icons/") === 0 ||
path.indexOf("/usr/share/pixmaps/") === 0 ||
path.indexOf("/usr/local/share/icons/") === 0 ||
path.indexOf("/usr/local/share/pixmaps/") === 0 ||
path.indexOf("/var/lib/flatpak/exports/share/icons/") === 0 ||
path.indexOf("/var/lib/snapd/desktop/icons/") === 0 ||
path.indexOf("/nix/store/") === 0 ||
path.indexOf("/run/current-system/sw/share/icons/") === 0 ||
path.indexOf("/opt/") === 0 ||
path.indexOf("/usr/share/app-info/icons/") === 0 ||
path.indexOf("/var/lib/app-info/icons/") === 0 ||
path.indexOf("/.local/share/icons/") !== -1 ||
path.indexOf("/.icons/") !== -1 ||
path.indexOf("/.local/share/pixmaps/") !== -1 ||
path.indexOf("/.local/share/flatpak/exports/share/icons/") !== -1
);

return isTrusted;
}

/**
* Dynamically decomposes Wayland app_id / X11 WM_CLASS, window title, and initial title
* into standard FreeDesktop icon candidates and web app domain identifiers.
Expand All @@ -18,7 +118,7 @@ function getNativeIconCandidates(clientClass, initialClass, title, initialTitle)
var seen = {};

function add(name) {
if (!name || typeof name !== "string") return;
if (!isValidIconCandidate(name)) return;
var s = name.trim();
if (!s || seen[s]) return;
seen[s] = true;
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -210,39 +310,46 @@ function resolveIcon(quickshell, desktopEntries, clientClass, initialClass, shel
return _iconCache[key];
}

function isFallbackIcon(path) {
if (!path || typeof path !== "string") return false;
return path.indexOf("application-x-executable") !== -1 || path.indexOf("system-run") !== -1;
}

function queryPath(iconName) {
if (!iconName) return "";
if (!iconName || typeof iconName !== "string") return "";
var name = iconName.trim();
if (!name) return "";

// If iconName contains path characters (from desktop entry Icon= field), validate safe path
var isPath = name.indexOf("/") !== -1 || name.indexOf("\\") !== -1 || name.indexOf("://") !== -1;
if (isPath) {
if (!isSafeIconSource(name, false)) return "";
} else {
// Icon name must be a valid FreeDesktop theme icon candidate
if (!isValidIconCandidate(name)) return "";
}

// 1. AppLibrary iconIndex directly (instant lookup for disk paths in ~/.local/share/icons etc.)
if (shellAppLib && shellAppLib.iconIndex && shellAppLib.iconIndex[iconName]) {
var direct = shellAppLib.iconIndex[iconName];
if (direct) {
return (direct.indexOf("://") !== -1) ? direct : ("file://" + direct);
if (shellAppLib && shellAppLib.iconIndex && shellAppLib.iconIndex[name]) {
var direct = shellAppLib.iconIndex[name];
if (direct && typeof direct === "string") {
var directUri = (direct.indexOf("://") !== -1) ? direct : ("file://" + direct);
if (isSafeIconSource(directUri, false)) return directUri;
}
}

// 2. Quickshell native theme lookup
if (typeof quickshell.iconPath === "function") {
var r = quickshell.iconPath(iconName, true);
if (r && r.length > 0 && !isFallbackIcon(r)) return r;
var r = quickshell.iconPath(name, true);
if (r && r.length > 0 && isSafeIconSource(r, false)) return r;
}

// 3. AppLibrary iconSource (with guard against returning fallback application-x-executable on miss)
if (shellAppLib && typeof shellAppLib.iconSource === "function") {
var r = shellAppLib.iconSource(iconName);
if (r && r.length > 0 && !isFallbackIcon(r)) return r;
var r = shellAppLib.iconSource(name);
if (r && r.length > 0 && isSafeIconSource(r, false)) return r;
}

return "";
}

function save(p) {
if (p) {
if (p && isSafeIconSource(p, true)) {
_iconCache[key] = p;
return p;
}
Expand All @@ -256,15 +363,17 @@ function resolveIcon(quickshell, desktopEntries, clientClass, initialClass, shel
var bPrefixMatch = (cClass || "").match(BROWSER_PREFIX_REGEX);
if (bPrefixMatch) {
var stripped = (cClass || "").slice(bPrefixMatch[0].length).replace(PROFILE_SUFFIX_REGEX, "");
if (stripped.indexOf(".") !== -1) {
if (stripped.indexOf(".") !== -1 && isValidIconCandidate(stripped)) {
webAppDomains.push(stripped.toLowerCase());
var noSub = stripped.replace(SUBDOMAIN_REGEX, "");
if (noSub !== stripped) webAppDomains.push(noSub.toLowerCase());
if (noSub !== stripped && isValidIconCandidate(noSub)) webAppDomains.push(noSub.toLowerCase());
}
}
if (wTitle && wTitle.indexOf(".") !== -1 && !/\s/.test(wTitle.trim())) {
var cleanTitleUrl = wTitle.trim().replace(/\/.*$/, "").replace(/_.*$/, "");
if (cleanTitleUrl.indexOf(".") !== -1) webAppDomains.push(cleanTitleUrl.toLowerCase());
if (cleanTitleUrl.indexOf(".") !== -1 && isValidIconCandidate(cleanTitleUrl)) {
webAppDomains.push(cleanTitleUrl.toLowerCase());
}
}

// 1. DesktopEntries direct lookup by candidate ID (e.g. "Whatsapp", "brave-browser", "code")
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -343,7 +452,9 @@ function resolveIcon(quickshell, desktopEntries, clientClass, initialClass, shel

// 5. Probing native icon theme directly with candidates
for (var i = 0; i < candidates.length; i++) {
var p = queryPath(candidates[i]);
var cand = candidates[i];
if (!isValidIconCandidate(cand)) continue;
var p = queryPath(cand);
if (p) return save(p);
}

Expand All @@ -355,7 +466,7 @@ function resolveIcon(quickshell, desktopEntries, clientClass, initialClass, shel
if (!fallback && shellAppLib && typeof shellAppLib.iconSource === "function") {
fallback = shellAppLib.iconSource("application-x-executable");
}
if (fallback) return save(fallback);
if (fallback && isSafeIconSource(fallback, true)) return save(fallback);

return "";
}
Expand Down
98 changes: 98 additions & 0 deletions tests/test_logic.js
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -1187,6 +1187,104 @@ const nav = loadModule("js/Navigation.js");
console.log(" ✓ Dismissal recursion guard and commit dispatch order verified");
}

// Test 20: Security check: Icons.js guards against client-supplied arbitrary file paths, URI schemes, and PNG decompression bombs
{
const icons = loadModule("js/Icons.js");

// 1. Validate isValidIconCandidate rejects path traversal, schemes, extensions, and malformed candidates
assert.strictEqual(icons.isValidIconCandidate("/tmp/evil.png"), false, "Must reject absolute filesystem paths");
assert.strictEqual(icons.isValidIconCandidate("file:///tmp/evil.png"), false, "Must reject file:// URIs");
assert.strictEqual(icons.isValidIconCandidate("../evil.png"), false, "Must reject relative directory traversal");
assert.strictEqual(icons.isValidIconCandidate("evil.png"), false, "Must reject image file extensions");
assert.strictEqual(icons.isValidIconCandidate("evil.svg"), false, "Must reject svg extensions");
assert.strictEqual(icons.isValidIconCandidate("evil.xpm"), false, "Must reject xpm extensions");
assert.strictEqual(icons.isValidIconCandidate("foo:bar"), false, "Must reject colons");
assert.strictEqual(icons.isValidIconCandidate("foo\\bar"), false, "Must reject backslashes");
assert.strictEqual(icons.isValidIconCandidate("foo\0bar"), false, "Must reject null bytes");
assert.strictEqual(icons.isValidIconCandidate("-bad"), false, "Must reject leading dash");
assert.strictEqual(icons.isValidIconCandidate("bad-"), false, "Must reject trailing dash");
assert.strictEqual(icons.isValidIconCandidate(".bad"), false, "Must reject leading dot");
assert.strictEqual(icons.isValidIconCandidate("bad."), false, "Must reject trailing dot");
assert.strictEqual(icons.isValidIconCandidate(""), false, "Must reject empty string");
assert.strictEqual(icons.isValidIconCandidate("a".repeat(150)), false, "Must reject oversized strings");

// Permitted candidates
assert.strictEqual(icons.isValidIconCandidate("ghostty"), true);
assert.strictEqual(icons.isValidIconCandidate("com.mitchellh.ghostty"), true);
assert.strictEqual(icons.isValidIconCandidate("brave-browser"), true);
assert.strictEqual(icons.isValidIconCandidate("web.whatsapp.com"), true);
assert.strictEqual(icons.isValidIconCandidate("org.telegram.desktop"), true);

// 2. Validate isSafeIconSource
assert.strictEqual(icons.isSafeIconSource("image://icon/app", false), true, "image:// provider is safe");
assert.strictEqual(icons.isSafeIconSource("qrc:/icons/app.png", false), true, "qrc:/ resource is safe");
assert.strictEqual(icons.isSafeIconSource("/usr/share/icons/hicolor/scalable/apps/ghostty.svg", false), true, "System icon directory is safe");
assert.strictEqual(icons.isSafeIconSource("/usr/share/pixmaps/app.png", false), true, "System pixmaps directory is safe");
assert.strictEqual(icons.isSafeIconSource("file:///home/user/.local/share/icons/app.png", false), true, "User local icons directory is safe");

// Dangerous paths rejected
assert.strictEqual(icons.isSafeIconSource("/tmp/bomb.png", false), false, "/tmp paths must be rejected");
assert.strictEqual(icons.isSafeIconSource("file:///tmp/bomb.png", false), false, "file:///tmp URIs must be rejected");
assert.strictEqual(icons.isSafeIconSource("/var/tmp/bomb.png", false), false, "/var/tmp paths must be rejected");
assert.strictEqual(icons.isSafeIconSource("/dev/shm/bomb.png", false), false, "/dev paths must be rejected");
assert.strictEqual(icons.isSafeIconSource("/proc/self/bomb.png", false), false, "/proc paths must be rejected");
assert.strictEqual(icons.isSafeIconSource("/home/user/Downloads/bomb.png", false), false, "Unverified user directories must be rejected");
assert.strictEqual(icons.isSafeIconSource("file:///etc/passwd", false), false, "Arbitrary system files must be rejected");
assert.strictEqual(icons.isSafeIconSource("/usr/share/icons/../../tmp/bomb.png", false), false, "Traversal must be rejected");

// 3. Simulated malicious host shellAppLib and resolver test
const mockQuickshell = {
iconPath: function(name, theme) {
if (name === "application-x-executable") return "image://icon/application-x-executable";
return "";
}
};

const hostileAppLib = {
iconIndex: {},
iconSource: function(name) {
// Hostile host shellAppLib returning client-supplied paths directly
if (name && (name.startsWith("/") || name.startsWith("file://"))) {
return name.startsWith("/") ? ("file://" + name) : name;
}
return "image://icon/application-x-executable";
}
};

const emptyDesktopEntries = {
byId: () => null,
heuristicLookup: () => null,
applications: { values: [] }
};

// Malicious Wayland client trying /tmp/exploit.png
icons.clearIconCache();
const res1 = icons.resolveIcon(mockQuickshell, emptyDesktopEntries, "/tmp/exploit.png", "", hostileAppLib);
assert.strictEqual(res1, "image://icon/application-x-executable", "Malicious /tmp path must fall back to application-x-executable");

// Malicious Wayland client trying file:///tmp/exploit.png
icons.clearIconCache();
const res2 = icons.resolveIcon(mockQuickshell, emptyDesktopEntries, "file:///tmp/exploit.png", "", hostileAppLib);
assert.strictEqual(res2, "image://icon/application-x-executable", "Malicious file:// URI must fall back to application-x-executable");

// Malicious Wayland client trying directory traversal
icons.clearIconCache();
const res3 = icons.resolveIcon(mockQuickshell, emptyDesktopEntries, "../../../tmp/exploit.png", "", hostileAppLib);
assert.strictEqual(res3, "image://icon/application-x-executable", "Traversal candidate must fall back to application-x-executable");

// Malicious Wayland client attempting decompression bomb via title
icons.clearIconCache();
const res4 = icons.resolveIcon(mockQuickshell, emptyDesktopEntries, "innocent-app", "", hostileAppLib, "/tmp/evil-bomb.png");
assert.strictEqual(res4, "image://icon/application-x-executable", "Malicious title path must fall back to application-x-executable");

// Malicious winData object passed as first argument
icons.clearIconCache();
const res5 = icons.resolveIcon(mockQuickshell, emptyDesktopEntries, { clientClass: "/tmp/exploit.png", title: "/tmp/exploit.png" }, "", hostileAppLib);
assert.strictEqual(res5, "image://icon/application-x-executable", "Malicious winData object must fall back to application-x-executable");

console.log(" ✓ Security check: Icons.js blocks arbitrary file paths, URI schemes, and PNG decompression bombs from untrusted window metadata");
}

console.log("All unit tests passed successfully!");


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