Fix OS command injection in POST /create (package install feature finding) - #237
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Fix OS command injection in POST /create (package install feature finding)#237devin-ai-integration[bot] wants to merge 1 commit into
devin-ai-integration[bot] wants to merge 1 commit into
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… install feature finding)
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Fix OS command injection in POST /create ("package install feature" finding)
Summary
Remediates code-scan finding sfind-7a1a83a677484e13ae807bd6b4aef220 (CSV vulnerability inventory, repo
nodejs-goof, vuln_id 82: "Command injection in package install feature", CWE-78). nodejs-goof has no package-install feature; the actual CWE-78 sink is the todo-create handler, which shelled out with attacker-controlled input:Any todo like
![alt](http://x/;id ")executed arbitrary shell commands.Fix
routes/index.js: validate the extracted image URL (must parse as http/https with a well-formed host, reject shell metacharacters), then usechild_process.execFile('identify', [url])— no shell is ever invoked.tests/create-command-injection.spec.js: tap tests asserting shell-injection payloads never spawn a shell/child process (14 cases) and a well-formed URL is still inspected viaexecFilewith the URL as a single argv element (4 cases). All 18 pass locally.Same remediation as previously accepted PRs #129/#145/#164/#167/#176/#182/#194/#210/#216 for duplicate findings of this sink.
Written by Devin
Devin-Org: engineering