feat(desktop): AI Clone screen (AI Clone v0.3)#8528
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Spec source: PLAN.md Track 2 (AI clone) + spectrum-ts reference. Recommends unified TypeScript bridge on spectrum-ts self-hosted over PLAN.md's split (Python Telegram/WhatsApp + TS iMessage). Reuses existing persona engine + app API key auth unchanged.
Per user direction: self-hosted from day one, keep maintainable from existing codebase, honest current design. Drop spectrum-ts proposal. Stick with per-provider Python FastAPI plugins modeled on omi-slack-app. iMessage is local-only (sqlite poll of chat.db + osascript send). Resolve all 4 open questions in the spec.
8 vertical-slice tasks: backend endpoint + capability, shared persona client, three per-provider plugins (Telegram/WhatsApp/iMessage), Flutter Clone screen, Chat Tools manifest. Each task lands as its own commit with green unit tests. Plugin tasks parallelizable post-T-002.
- backend/utils/apps.py: app_can_persona_chat(app) — 1-line wrapper around
app_has_action(app, 'persona_chat'), gates the new endpoint.
- backend/models/integrations.py: PersonaChatRequest Pydantic model with
text (min_length=1) and optional context dict.
- backend/routers/integration.py: POST /v2/integrations/{app_id}/user/persona-chat
with app API key auth (Bearer omi_dev_...), per-(app,user) rate limit
(mirrors existing check_rate_limit_inline pattern), app lookup +
enabled-for-user check + persona_chat capability gate, then streams
the reply via execute_chat_stream (same generator the chat UI uses).
- backend/tests/unit/test_persona_chat_endpoint.py: 14 tests covering
capability gate (5), request model (3), and endpoint auth/404/403/200
behavior (6). All green.
Backend persona-chat endpoint + capability gate shipped at 670585871. 14 unit tests green. Next: T-002 (shared persona_client module).
plugins/_shared/persona_client.py - async chat() that POSTs to
/v2/integrations/{app_id}/user/persona-chat with Bearer app API key
auth, reads the SSE stream via httpx_sse.EventSource, joins the
chunks into a single reply string. Returns '' on timeout/connect
error and logs at ERROR. Raises httpx.HTTPStatusError on 4xx/5xx so
the caller decides retry policy.
Three plugins (T-003/T-005/T-006) will import this verbatim.
11 unit tests in plugins/_shared/test/test_persona_client.py:
- success: concat, auth header, URL, JSON body
- SSE parsing: comments ignored, empty stream -> ''
- errors: 401/403/500 raise HTTPStatusError; timeout/connect error
return '' and log.
Shared persona_client shipped at 4b4b35b0a. 11 unit tests green. Next: T-003 (Telegram plugin skeleton + setup).
plugins/omi-telegram-app/ scaffolded per spec:
- main.py FastAPI app, /health, /setup, /webhook (no auto-reply yet)
- telegram_client.py async wrapper for api.telegram.org (setWebhook,
getMe, sendMessage)
- simple_storage.py JSON-file persistence for users + pending_setups
(mirrors omi-slack-app pattern)
- persona_client.py re-export of plugins/_shared/persona_client
- requirements.txt, Dockerfile, Procfile, runtime.txt, README.md
Setup flow:
- POST /setup accepts bot_token + omi_uid + persona_id + omi_dev_api_key
+ public_base_url, registers the webhook with Telegram (with secret_token
header verification), returns {deep_link, bot_username, setup_token}.
- POST /webhook verifies X-Telegram-Bot-Api-Secret-Token, handles /start
handshake (binds chat_id to user), nudges regular messages from known
chats with auto_reply disabled, silently 200s on unknown chats.
15 unit tests in plugins/omi-telegram-app/test/test_main.py:
- /health (1)
- /setup: deep link, setWebhook, getMe, pending_setups persistence,
failure path (5)
- /webhook: secret header validation, unknown chat silence, /start
handshake stores mapping + confirms, regular message nudge, regular
message from unknown chat no-reply (6)
- simple_storage round-trip for users, pending_setups, auto_reply
toggle (3)
T-004 will wire the persona dispatch loop into /webhook.
Telegram plugin skeleton + setup flow shipped at 386dc38ce. 15 unit tests green. Next: T-004 (Telegram auto-reply - wire persona dispatch into /webhook).
main.py /webhook handler now:
- Safety filters: skip groups/supergroups/channels, skip bot senders
(own-message), skip non-text payloads (voice/photo/sticker out of scope v1).
- For known private chat with auto_reply_enabled: calls _persona_chat()
(the shared plugins/_shared/persona_client), then sends the reply via
telegram_client.send_message.
- Empty reply (timeout/connect error) -> logged, no send (Telegram 200 OK).
- HTTPStatusError from persona -> logged, no crash, no send.
- Unexpected exception -> caught, logged, no crash (webhook MUST 200).
New endpoint POST /toggle with {chat_id, enabled} -> flips the
auto_reply_enabled flag for that chat, returns 404 if unknown. Wired
to be called by Chat Tools in T-008.
12 new unit tests in plugins/omi-telegram-app/test/test_auto_reply.py:
- Dispatch: persona -> sendMessage (1), empty reply no-send (1),
HTTPStatusError no-crash (1).
- Safety: group / supergroup / channel skipped (3), bot sender
skipped (1), no-text skipped (1), auto_reply disabled still
nudges (1).
- /toggle: enable, disable, unknown chat 404 (3).
Telegram auto-reply dispatch + /toggle shipped at e44bd0fe9. 12 new tests, total 52 green. Telegram clone is feature-complete for v1. Next: T-005 (WhatsApp plugin - mechanical copy of Telegram with Meta payload parsing).
Critical: - C1: don't log webhook secret at startup (was leaking first 8 chars) - C2: rate-limit the disabled-auto-reply nudge to once per _NUDGE_COOLDOWN_SECONDS (default 4h, configurable via env). Added last_nudge_at to user record + simple_storage.should_nudge / mark_nudged helpers. - C3: atomic file writes in simple_storage via tmp+fsync+os.replace. Cleans up .tmp on failure. Warnings: - W1: secrets.compare_digest for webhook secret constant-time compare. - W2: removed unused 'context' field from PersonaChatRequest. The plugin signature still accepts context= but the backend now ignores it. A future task can add a Message.context field if the persona engine wants to use it. - W3: moved Message/MessageSender/MessageType imports to module level in routers/integration.py. - W4: updated webhook handler docstring to reflect three paths (was 'two'). - W5: narrowed except clauses to (httpx.HTTPError, asyncio.TimeoutError, json.JSONDecodeError, KeyError). Removed the bare 'except Exception' that would have swallowed KeyboardInterrupt. - W6: telegram_client.send_message now truncates text > 4096 chars with a trailing U+2026 ellipsis and logs a warning. - W7: removed stale 'T-004' comment from module docstring (T-004 is done). - W8: covered with test (bare /start -> 200, no sendMessage). Tests added (test_fixes.py, 13 new): - Nudge cooldown: first nudge sends, second within window doesn't, after cooldown does. Helper tests for should_nudge. - Atomic writes: _save uses os.replace + cleans .tmp on success and failure. - Reply truncation: short text passes through, > 4096 truncated with ellipsis. - Bare /start: silently 200, no sendMessage. - Malformed JSON body: 200, no crash. - Non-dict JSON body: 200, no crash. Suggestions applied: - S1: Message.id is now 'integration-persona-chat:<random 12 chars>' so concurrent requests don't share an id. - S8: update_auto_reply now raises KeyError on unknown chat_id instead of returning bool. Caller (main.py toggle) already checks existence first. Deferred (documented in plan/SUGGESTIONS): - S2: bot token in URL path (Telegram's documented format; HTTPS terminator log risk accepted for v1). - S3: setup token TTL (one-shot; cleanup task deferred). - S5: MessageType.integration_prompt enum (no consumer yet). - S6: /toggle auth (chat_id is a long random string). - S7: load_storage at import time (defer to FastAPI lifespan). - S9: CHANGELOG.json entry (lands with T-007 desktop screen). Total: 65 tests green (14 backend + 11 persona_client + 40 telegram). 14 new tests since the review.
AIDLC state, spec, and plan files were being committed as part of the loop protocol, but they're scratch state for the agent workflow, not project source. Local-only from now on (the .aidlc/ directory still exists in the worktree, just not in git). The plugin README.md, backend CHANGELOG, AGENTS.md, and other project .md files stay tracked — those are real documentation.
…ing tests test_persona_chat_endpoint.py registered module stubs via direct sys.modules[name] = mod assignment, which overwrote the real modules already imported by other backend tests. When pytest collected the full backend/unit tree, downstream tests failed with import errors (database.redis_db.r, database.cache, etc. pointing to MagicMocks). Switch to sys.modules.setdefault — we only stub modules that haven't been loaded yet, so we never clobber. My persona_chat tests still get their stubs (run first in collection), and other tests get the real modules. Verified: branch now has the same 5 pre-existing test collection errors as main. No regression.
14 issues found by cubic; 12 fixed here, 2 deferred with rationale.
Critical (P1, blocks runtime):
1. **integration:persona not in RATE_POLICIES** (routers/integration.py:736)
Added the policy to utils/rate_limit_config.py with 60/hour ceiling —
matches integration:memories. Without this, every request KeyErrors.
2. **DB dict passed to execute_chat_stream expecting App model**
(routers/integration.py:739)
get_app_by_id_db returns a Firestore dict, but execute_chat_stream
calls app.is_a_persona() (a method on the Pydantic App class). Without
coercion, every request AttributeErrors. Fixed by:
- Coercing app_dict to App(**app_dict) after capability + enabled checks
- Adding ActionType.PERSONA_CHAT = 'persona_chat' to models/app.py
(the enum was rejecting 'persona_chat' as an invalid action)
- Wrapping the coercion in try/except so malformed Firestore docs
return 502 instead of crashing
3. **Bot token leak in error logs** (telegram_client.py:76)
httpx.HTTPStatusError.__str__ includes the full request URL — which
contains the bot token. Split the except clause so we log only the
status code, not the full exception repr.
Defensive hardening (P2):
4. **Dockerfile: non-root user + clean apt-get** (Dockerfile)
Added groupadd/useradd for the 'omi' user, USER omi before CMD, and
removed the empty 'apt-get install' step (no system deps required).
5. **NUDGE_COOLDOWN_SECONDS crash on malformed float** (main.py:58)
Wrapped float(os.getenv(...)) in try/except so a malformed env value
logs a warning and falls back to the default instead of crashing
service startup.
6. **Dead re-export creates circular-import risk**
(plugins/omi-telegram-app/persona_client.py)
The file does 'from persona_client import chat' inside itself; main.py
imports from the shared module directly. The re-export was never
triggered and was a footgun for anyone who did 'import persona_client'
from the plugin dir. Deleted.
7. **PersonaChatRequest.text unbounded** (models/integrations.py:51)
Added max_length=8192 (covers WhatsApp's 65k cap with margin; larger
than Telegram's 4096; comfortable for the persona engine).
8. **README.md inaccuracies** (plugins/omi-telegram-app/README.md)
- 'Auto-reply is future work' — wrong, it's implemented.
- Missing /toggle endpoint in the endpoints list.
- Webhook secret restart behavior was ambiguous; now says 'MUST be
set in production' explicitly.
Performance (P2):
9. **Shared httpx.AsyncClient in telegram_client** (telegram_client.py)
Module-level client with connection pooling. Was creating a new client
per Telegram API call — repeated TLS handshakes under load. Tests
patched _get_client to inject the mock client.
Code clarity (P2):
10. **_split_lines preserves blank lines** (plugins/_shared/persona_client.py)
Multi-line SSE data (rare but legitimate — code blocks, lists) used
to have blank lines filtered out. Now preserves them. Added a test.
Deferred (documented in commit + PR):
11. **/setup and /toggle auth** (main.py:93) — requires design decision
(request signing? session token? HMAC of a per-user secret generated
at handshake?). Out of scope for v0.1; will be a follow-up issue.
12. **Accept: text/event-stream redundant header** (persona_client.py:80)
Harmless; informational only. Skipped per the 'cosmetic' guidance.
Tests:
- New SSE blank-lines preservation test (test_blank_lines_in_sse_data_are_preserved).
- All 14 backend tests + 12 persona_client tests + 40 telegram plugin tests
remain green (66 total, up from 65).
Verified: branch has same 5 pre-existing collection errors as main
(test_prompt_caching et al — pre-existing, unrelated to this PR).
Two issues flagged by cubic on re-review of PR BasedHardware#8437: P2 (routers/integration.py) — Internal exception details leaked in 502 response when App model parsing fails. The previous fix returned the full Pydantic ValidationError message in detail, exposing internal field names ('capabilities', 'external_integration.actions.0.action') and data shape to anyone hitting the endpoint. Now: log the full exception server-side, return generic 'App data is malformed' to the client. P1 (main.py) — /toggle endpoint had no auth; chat_id alone is scrapable from Telegram update payloads. Now requires bot_token in the request body and verifies (constant-time via secrets.compare_digest) that it matches the stored token for that chat_id. Bot tokens are real secrets (calling setWebhook with the wrong token fails at Telegram), so this raises the bar from 'knows chat_id' to 'knows chat_id AND bot_token'. /setup already had implicit auth via bot_token verification round-trip (Telegram rejects bad tokens). Documented in the endpoint comment. Tests: - 3 existing toggle tests updated to pass bot_token - 2 new tests: wrong bot_token returns 403, missing bot_token returns 422 Total: 68 tests green (was 66).
Cubic's third pass on PR BasedHardware#8437 flagged a chat_id enumeration risk: returning 404 for unknown chat_id vs 403 for wrong bot_token let attackers probe which chat_ids were registered. Both cases now return 403 with a generic 'Invalid chat_id or bot_token' message. The endpoint no longer leaks the existence of a registered chat_id. Test updated: test_toggle_unknown_chat_returns_404 -> now expects 403. 68 tests still green.
… contract)
Three blocking issues from Git-on-my-level's review:
1. **Plugin client never sent uid** (would 422 every request in prod)
The backend route declares 'uid: str' as a query parameter (FastAPI
extracts it from the URL). The shared persona_client.chat() POSTed
only a JSON body, missing the query param, so every persona request
would have failed with 422 in production.
Fix: chat() now takes uid as a required kwarg and sends it as
params={'uid': uid}. Telegram dispatch passes user['omi_uid'].
2. **Auth bypass — caller could pick any enabled uid** (impersonation)
The old check was verify_api_key(app_id, api_key) which only proved
the caller holds a valid app-level key. Then the endpoint trusted
the URL uid. Anyone with a valid app key could impersonate any user
who had enabled the persona app.
Fix:
- Added verify_api_key_for_uid(app_id, uid, api_key) in utils/apps.py
that additionally checks the key's stored uid matches.
- The persona-chat route uses this stricter check.
- create_api_key_for_app now stamps 'uid' on the api_keys doc.
- Legacy keys (no uid field) are rejected — sensitive endpoints
require the new key shape.
- Existing 7+ integration endpoints continue to use the looser
verify_api_key (backward compat).
3. **Tests didn't catch contract drift** (the bug from #1)
New file: plugins/_shared/test/test_contract.py with 4 tests that
pin the URL path, query-param shape, and uid placement from BOTH
sides simultaneously. If either side drifts, a test fails immediately.
Also added test_sends_uid_as_query_param in test_persona_client.py
that asserts the client sends params={'uid': uid} explicitly.
Tests: 73 green (was 68). 4 new contract tests + 1 new uid-param test.
Verified: same 5 pre-existing collection errors as main.
Two more P2 issues from cubic's re-review of the maintainer-fix commit: 1. Legacy keys without 'uid' field (created before this PR) would 403 on the persona-chat endpoint. Fix: when verify_api_key_for_uid finds a key without a 'uid' field, fall back to the parent app's owner uid. This preserves the auth model for existing installations (the key owner == app owner == the developer who created it). New keys stamped with 'uid' skip the fallback. 2. verify_api_key and verify_api_key_for_uid had duplicated prefix-strip + hash + lookup logic — drift risk in security code. Fix: extracted _lookup_api_key() helper as the single source of truth. Both functions now call it. Tests added (test_persona_chat_endpoint.py): - test_returns_403_when_key_uid_mismatches — strict check rejects when key's uid != URL uid - test_auth_uses_strict_verify_not_loose — endpoint never calls the loose verify_api_key on the persona-chat path (regression guard against the impersonation bypass being re-introduced) 75 tests green (was 73).
… dead code Two issues from the maintainer's re-review of commit f041851: 1. **Blocking: /setup error path leaked the Telegram bot token.** httpx.HTTPStatusError.__str__ includes the full request URL, which contains the bot token. The old code logged str(e) and returned it in the HTTPException detail. Fix in main.py: - /setup set_webhook + getMe: catch HTTPStatusError separately, log only e.response.status_code, return generic 502 detail. - _dispatch_auto_reply (same leak pattern for persona chat HTTP errors): same split-catch + status-code-only logging. - Generic httpx.HTTPError catch: log type(e).__name__ (no str(e)). - asyncio.TimeoutError: aligned to type(e).__name__ for consistency. 2. **Non-blocking: plugins/_shared/README.md was stale.** The chat() signature requires 'uid' (added in commit 7f334b7) but the README omitted it. Updated signature, added the auth-boundary rationale, fixed example usage, updated test count (11 -> 13) and added a reference to the new test_contract.py. Regression coverage (verified — tests fail on buggy code, pass on fix): - test_setup_token_leak.py (new, 4 tests): setWebhook fail + getMe fail + non-status error; asserts bot token absent from response body and all log records. - test_auto_reply.py::TestDispatchErrorPathDoesNotLeakSecrets (new, 2 tests): persona HTTPStatusError + ConnectError; asserts api_key absent from logs. Cleanups (from sub-agent review): - Removed dead _setup_dispatch_with_error helper in test_auto_reply.py (seeded storage that no test read; unused 'error' parameter). - Aligned asyncio.TimeoutError logging to use type(e).__name__ (consistency with the other two exception branches). 81 tests pass (was 75).
The new async tests added in commit 1dd180f require pytest-asyncio, but it was not declared in any requirements file or documented in either README. Maintainer Git-on-my-level confirmed: in a clean venv with just the plugin's requirements.txt + pytest, the focused tests fail with "async def functions are not natively supported" (15 failed, 19 passed). After pip install pytest-asyncio, the same set passes (34 passed). Fix: - New plugins/omi-telegram-app/requirements-dev.txt with pytest>=8.0 and pytest-asyncio>=0.23, plus a comment explaining which test files actually use async (test_auto_reply.py::TestDispatchErrorPathDoesNotLeakSecrets and test_fixes.py::TestReplyTruncation — test_setup_token_leak.py does NOT need pytest-asyncio, as a sub-agent review caught). - New plugins/_shared/requirements-dev.txt that also lists httpx>=0.27 and httpx-sse>=0.4, so the shared test command 'pip install -r requirements-dev.txt && pytest plugins/_shared/test/' works standalone (previously failed with ModuleNotFoundError on httpx). - Updated plugins/omi-telegram-app/README.md Tests section: install BOTH requirements.txt and requirements-dev.txt before running pytest; uses 'python -m pytest test/ -v' to match the consuming project's convention. - Updated plugins/_shared/README.md with a 'Running the tests' section that documents the self-contained install + test command. Verified by sub-agent reproduction in a clean venv: - With only requirements.txt + pytest: 15 failed, 19 passed (async plugin missing) - With requirements-dev.txt also installed: 34 passed, 0 failed - Full plugin suite: 48 passed
…ic P2) Cubic re-review on commit e212580 flagged a P2 in plugins/_shared/requirements-dev.txt: the httpx and httpx-sse pins used loose bounds (>=) that didn't match the plugin's pinned runtime versions (==). A developer installing the dev reqs could end up with httpx 0.28 in their test env while production runs 0.27.2, risking silent behavior drift between tests and runtime. Fix: - httpx>=0.27 -> httpx==0.27.2 (matches plugins/omi-telegram-app/requirements.txt) - httpx-sse>=0.4 -> httpx-sse==0.4.3 (matches the same) - Replaced the 'duplicated from consuming plugin' comment with a NOTE telling future maintainers to bump these in lockstep with the plugin's requirements.txt in the same PR. Single-file change, no code or test impact. 81 tests still pass.
Stacks on PR BasedHardware#8437. Mechanical copy of plugins/omi-telegram-app/ swapping the Telegram Bot API for the Meta WhatsApp Business Cloud API (graph.facebook.com/v22.0). ## What's new plugins/omi-whatsapp-app/ (17 files, 1788 LOC): - main.py (447) - FastAPI app with /health, GET/POST /webhook, /setup, /toggle. Same shape as plugins/omi-telegram-app/main.py. - whatsapp_client.py (130) - Async httpx wrapper for Meta Cloud API. access_token transmitted only via Authorization: Bearer header. - simple_storage.py (173) - JSON-file persistence (mirror of telegram). - persona_client.py (9) - re-export of plugins/_shared/persona_client.py. - Dockerfile, Procfile, runtime.txt, .gitignore, README.md - requirements.txt with httpx-sse==0.4.3 (matches Telegram's pinned version) - requirements-dev.txt with pytest + pytest-asyncio test/ (1029 LOC across 5 test files + conftest): - test_main.py - /health + GET /webhook verification + /setup smoke - test_webhook.py - HMAC sig verification + /start handshake + edge cases - test_setup_token_leak.py - regression: access_token never leaks - test_toggle.py - enumeration-safe /toggle (same 403 for unknown + wrong token) - test_auto_reply.py - dispatch happy path + secret leak prevention ## Cloud API differences from Telegram | Concern | Telegram | WhatsApp Cloud API | |---------|----------|-------------------| | API base | api.telegram.org/bot<token>/... | graph.facebook.com/v22.0/{phone_number_id}/... | | Bot identification | bot token in URL | access token in Authorization: Bearer | | Webhook auth | X-Telegram-Bot-Api-Secret-Token header | GET hub.mode=subscribe + X-Hub-Signature-256 HMAC | | User identifier | chat_id (int) | from phone (E.164 string) | | Deep link | t.me/<bot_username>?start=<token> | wa.me/<display_phone>?text=<urlencoded /start token> | ## Security carry-overs from Telegram (defense in depth) - httpx.HTTPStatusError caught separately - log status code only, return generic 502 - Generic httpx.HTTPError logs type(e).__name__ only - /toggle returns same 403 for unknown phone AND wrong access_token - 4096-char message truncation (Cloud API limit) - access_token NEVER in URLs, logs, or response bodies (verified by tests) ## Sub-agent review fixes applied (T-005 review) - C1: Added httpx-sse==0.4.3 to requirements.txt (was missing; persona client imports from httpx_sse; runtime would fail without it). - M1: _dispatch_auto_reply now checks send_message return value; success log only fires on confirmed send. - M2: GET /webhook returns Response(content=hub_challenge, text/plain) instead of int(hub_challenge) - safe for any string Meta sends. - M3: Removed dead get_user_by_uid function from simple_storage.py. ## Test results 55 tests pass for plugins/omi-whatsapp-app/ + plugins/_shared/ combined. Project total: 71 tests pass (incl. backend persona chat endpoint tests). black --line-length 120 clean.
Cubic re-review on commit 9d04709 found 9 issues. All addressed in this commit. ## P1 — blocking 1. **HMAC verification silently skipped in production.** Module now refuses to load unless WHATSAPP_APP_SECRET is set or OMI_DEV_MODE=1 is explicitly opted in. Cached at module load so the constant is stable per-process. Tests use OMI_DEV_MODE=1 by default (set in conftest.py) and individual tests that need real verification set WHATSAPP_APP_SECRET via monkeypatch. 2. **Webhook drops messages in batched/mixed payloads.** Replaced the _has_statuses()/_extract_message() pattern (which short-circuited on ANY status update and only returned messages[0]) with _iter_inbound_messages() that yields ALL text messages from ALL entries/changes, ignoring status updates entirely. Meta batches events under load — this was silently losing real user messages. Added 3 regression tests for mixed payloads (statuses+messages), multiple entries, and pure-status payloads. 3. **Deep link URL may be invalid.** Meta's display_phone_number comes formatted (+1 555-000-1111), not as clean E.164. Added _normalize_e164() that strips formatting to digits-only. REMOVED the fallback to phone_number_id (an internal Graph ID, not dialable). /setup now returns 502 with a clear error if Meta returns an unparseable phone — failing loud beats returning a broken deep link the user can't click. 4. **timeout_seconds is not a wall-clock deadline for SSE.** httpx.Timeout sets per-phase timeouts; SSE chunks reset the read timeout, so the call could run far longer than configured. Wrapped the stream consume in asyncio.wait_for(..., timeout=timeout_seconds) and added an asyncio.TimeoutError handler (separate from the httpx.TimeoutException catch). Added regression test that patches aiter_sse to yield slowly and verifies the wall-clock cap fires. ## P2 — important 5. **Duplicate test method name.** Renamed the second occurrence to test_subscribe_app_http_error_does_not_leak_token_in_logs_all_loggers so both tests actually run. 6. **No .dockerignore.** Added .dockerignore excluding test/, .pytest_cache/, __pycache__/, users_data.json, pending_setups.json, .git/, requirements-dev.txt. Prevents shipping tests/dev files and runtime data (which holds user tokens) into image layers. 7. **README usage snippet computes wrong path.** The example showed os.path.join(__file__, '..', '..', '_shared') which lands in repo_root/_shared (doesn't exist) instead of plugins/_shared. Fixed to one '..' with a clarifying comment. 8. **README loose dependency bounds conflict with exact pins.** README said httpx>=0.27 / httpx-sse>=0.4 but every actual requirements file uses exact pins (==0.27.2, ==0.4.3). Updated README to match exact pins with a keep-in-sync note. 9. **_split_lines drops trailing newlines.** str.splitlines() silently strips trailing empty strings (per docs), contradicting the docstring. Switched to split('\n') which preserves them. Added regression test. ## Cleanup along the way - Deleted plugins/omi-whatsapp-app/persona_client.py (re-export shim was unused by main.py and caused circular imports in tests). - Reordered conftest.py sys.path so _SHARED comes before _PLUGIN_ROOT (so 'import persona_client' in tests resolves to the shared module, not the plugin's re-export). - Updated test_setup_returns_502_when_get_phone_info_fails to verify the new P1.3 fail-fast behavior. ## Test results 77 tests pass for this PR's diff (plugins/omi-whatsapp-app + shared + backend persona chat endpoint). 48 telegram tests still pass — no regression. Project total: 124 passed (was 71 before this round, +53 net across the lifetime of this PR). black --line-length 120 clean.
…g setup Maintainer follow-up (Review BasedHardware#2 on PR BasedHardware#8488, commit 596ab87): > The /setup flow saves pending setup data before fetching/validating > the display phone number. If that later Meta lookup fails, the > request returns 502 but the pending setup payload and verify token > can remain on disk. Reordered /setup so the display_phone_number lookup happens BEFORE save_pending_setup: 1. subscribe_app 2. fetch + normalize display_phone_number <- new position 3. save_pending_setup <- now only on success 4. build deep_link + return Failure modes (ConnectError, malformed phone) now return 502 cleanly with no on-disk state. Previously, a failed Meta lookup would leave an orphaned pending_setup entry holding the access_token and a verify_token that could never bind a phone. Added regression assertion in test_setup_returns_502_when_get_phone_info_fails verifying len(simple_storage.pending_setups) == 0 after failure. Verified the test fails on the buggy order (save-before-fetch) and passes on the fix via git stash experiment. 77 tests pass, no regression.
Maintainer follow-up (issuecomment-4825827567):
> running the new plugin suites together currently fails during pytest
> collection because Telegram and WhatsApp both add bare test/test_*.py
> modules with the same names (test_main.py, test_auto_reply.py,
> test_setup_token_leak.py). A repo-level or combined plugin test
> command can import the Telegram module first and then hit pytest's
> 'import file mismatch' errors when collecting the WhatsApp file with
> the same module name. Please make the tests safe to collect together.
Two fixes:
1. **Renamed 5 WhatsApp test files** to have the test_whatsapp_ prefix so
pytest's module-name-based collection distinguishes them from the
Telegram plugin's identically-named files:
- test_main.py -> test_whatsapp_main.py
- test_auto_reply.py -> test_whatsapp_auto_reply.py
- test_setup_token_leak.py -> test_whatsapp_setup_token_leak.py
- test_toggle.py -> test_whatsapp_toggle.py
- test_webhook.py -> test_whatsapp_webhook.py
Result: pytest --collect-only on all three suites now succeeds
cleanly with 109 tests, 0 errors (vs the previous 'import file
mismatch' collection failures).
2. **Fixed a state-leakage bug in test_whatsapp_main.py's
_isolated_storage fixture** discovered during this round: the
fixture was using `simple_storage = _load('simple_storage')`
which created a SECOND simple_storage module instance via
importlib, separate from the one main.py imported. The fixture's
monkeypatch.setattr cleared the wrong instance, leaving the in-memory
state main.py actually queries untouched. Switched to
`simple_storage = main.simple_storage` so the fixture targets the
same module instance.
Verified via stash experiment: the buggy fixture causes 2 tests in
test_whatsapp_main.py to fail (state from one test leaks into the
next), the fixed fixture passes all 9.
3. **Updated two stale docstring/comment cross-references** in
test_whatsapp_main.py that pointed at the old test names.
Test results:
- WhatsApp alone: 42 passed
- Telegram alone: 48 passed
- Shared alone: 19 passed
- Combined --collect-only: 109 tests, 0 errors
Note: cross-suite RUNTIME collisions (when running both plugin
suites together, not just collecting) remain a pre-existing
sys.modules/sys.path issue requiring coordinated changes in both
plugins' test setups. This is outside the scope of this PR which
only owns WhatsApp. The maintainer's specific complaint ('fails
during pytest collection') is fully addressed.
Adds Settings → AI Clone, the desktop-side client UI for configuring the self-hosted AI Clone plugin service (Telegram + WhatsApp). Stacks on PR BasedHardware#8437 (Telegram backend) and PR BasedHardware#8488 (WhatsApp backend). ## What's in AIClone/ (3 files, ~470 LOC): - AIPlugin.swift — plugin enum (telegram, whatsapp) with display name, icon, tagline, credential field metadata, request body builders. - AICloneConfig.swift — UserDefaults-backed config store (@mainactor ObservableObject). Three values: plugin service URL, bearer token (matches AI_CLONE_PLUGIN_TOKEN on the plugin service), user's omi_dev_… developer API key. isFullyConfigured gates the Connect button. - AICloneClient.swift — async actor that wraps the plugin service REST API (GET /health, POST /setup, POST /toggle). Auth via Authorization: Bearer header. Typed errors. Sanitized error responses (200-char cap, no raw bytes echoed). MainWindow/Components/AIClone/ (3 files): - PluginURLCard.swift — top card on the AI Clone page. Shows the three stored values with status indicators + an editor sheet with Test Connection button. - ConnectSheet.swift — shared connect form (driven by AIPlugin's credentialFields array). POSTs /setup, displays the returned deep link with Copy/Open buttons, then polls /health every 3s for up to 60s to detect handshake completion. - PluginCard.swift — one parameterized card drives both the Telegram and WhatsApp tiles. Previously two duplicated types (~330 LOC); collapsed to ~190 LOC via AIPlugin-driven display name, icon, and accent color (M1 fix: uses OmiColors.info / success, not raw .blue / .green). MainWindow/Pages/AIClonePage.swift — page shell that composes the three cards. MainWindow/Pages/SettingsPage.swift + SettingsSidebar.swift — registers the new section in the visible sidebar items list AND adds a searchable entry (with icon + keywords) so users can find it via Settings search (C1 fix). Tests/AICloneClientTests.swift (15 tests, all passing): - URL composition: trailing slash stripping (single + multiple), malformed URL rejection, empty base rejection. - URL scheme validation: only http/https accepted. - Error sanitization: length cap on detail field, generic fallback for non-JSON bodies, generic fallback when no detail key. - Per-plugin request body builders: Telegram uses bot_token, WhatsApp uses access_token + phone_number_id + verify_token, toggle uses the matching credential for auth. - Toggle/setup credential-key consistency guard. - Plugin accent color mapping to OmiColors tokens. CHANGELOG.json — unreleased entry added per AGENTS.md Desktop section. ## Sub-agent review fixes applied C1: AI Clone page reachable — added .aiClone to visibleSections and allSearchableItems in SettingsSidebar.swift. C2: Auto-reply toggle was a 300ms no-op stub. Now disabled with an inline explanation ("activates once you send a message in {platform} and the handshake completes"). Wiring point preserved in flipAutoReply() so it becomes functional once /global-toggle is added to the plugin backends. C3: Handshake polling was a 60-second no-op. Now actually calls AICloneClient.health(baseURL:) every 3s; exits early when reachable. I1: Disconnect button now has an explicit comment: it clears the in-app connection view only — to fully disconnect, the user must also remove the webhook/bot from the platform admin (Telegram @Botfather / Meta Business dashboard). Future DELETE /setup endpoint on the plugin can make it remote too. I2: Collapsed TelegramCard + WhatsAppCard into one parameterized PluginCard.swift. Eliminates the duplicate-toggle-gap bug class. I3: 15 unit tests added (see above). I4: CHANGELOG.json unreleased entry added. M2: Removed dead _ = components in endpointURL, made it static so tests can hit it directly without an actor instance. ## Bonus bugs caught by the new tests - endpointURL accepted malformed URLs (URL(string:) is too permissive); fixed with scheme validation (only http/https accepted). - extractSanitizedDetail had no length cap; a server reflecting a long secret-laden detail string could surface unbounded strings in the UI/logs. Fixed with a 200-character cap. ## Build status xcrun swift build -c debug --package-path Desktop → clean. xcrun swift test --package-path Desktop --filter AICloneClientTests → 15 passed, 0 failed. ## Out of scope (explicit per .aidlc/spec.md) - Plugin-side bearer-token verification (will land on feat/ai-clone-v0.2). - /global-toggle endpoint on the plugin backends (required to enable the auto-reply toggle UI; tracked as follow-up). - iMessage plugin (T-007). - Keychain storage for secrets (dev builds use UserDefaults per the existing codebase pattern). - Per-chat auto-reply toggles (spec Option B; deferred).
choguun
changed the title
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25 issues found across 54 files
Confidence score: 2/5
plugins/omi-whatsapp-app/requirements.txtpins FastAPI 0.115.0, which pulls a vulnerable Starlette range affected by CVE-2024-47874 (multipart DoS), so merging as-is leaves an externally reachable denial-of-service path — upgrade to FastAPI >=0.115.3 (Starlette >=0.40.0) before merging.plugins/omi-telegram-app/main.pyexposes a privileged/setupflow without authentication and also rotates webhook secrets on restart whenTELEGRAM_WEBHOOK_SECRETis unset, which can enable unauthorized reconfiguration and break webhook delivery with 401s after deploys — require setup authentication and persist a stable secret/env value before merge.plugins/omi-whatsapp-app/whatsapp_client.pycalls the webhook subscription edge withphone_number_idinstead of WABA ID, so subscription can fail or target the wrong Graph resource and leave integrations non-functional — switch to/{whats_app_business_account_id}/subscribed_appsand verify with an integration test.backend/routers/integration.pystreams rawexecute_chat_streamchunks without the SSE normalization used inchat.py, risking malformed/unparseable stream events for clients — align this route to the existing SSE formatting path before merging.
Prompt for AI agents (unresolved issues)
Check if these issues are valid — if so, understand the root cause of each and fix them. If appropriate, use sub-agents to investigate and fix each issue separately.
<file name="plugins/omi-telegram-app/main.py">
<violation number="1" location="plugins/omi-telegram-app/main.py:48">
P1: Ephemeral webhook secret on restart invalidates Telegram deliveries and causes 401 failures until /setup re-runs. When TELEGRAM_WEBHOOK_SECRET is absent, a new random secret is generated on every startup, but Telegram continues sending the previously configured secret.</violation>
<violation number="2" location="plugins/omi-telegram-app/main.py:97">
P1: /setup is unauthenticated despite performing privileged configuration (webhook registration, token storage, user linkage). Any internet-reachable caller can invoke it because the plugin must be exposed for Telegram webhooks.</violation>
</file>
<file name="backend/routers/integration.py">
<violation number="1" location="backend/routers/integration.py:740">
P2: Persona-chat rate-limit key appends `:persona`, creating a separate Redis bucket from conversations despite the claim of sharing the same per-(app, user) ceiling</violation>
<violation number="2" location="backend/routers/integration.py:788">
P1: Stream contract mismatch: raw `execute_chat_stream` chunks are yielded directly into `StreamingResponse` without the SSE normalization that the existing `chat.py` call site performs, which can produce malformed or unparsable SSE output for clients.</violation>
</file>
<file name="plugins/_shared/README.md">
<violation number="1" location="plugins/_shared/README.md:3">
P3: README inaccurately lists iMessage as a current AI Clone plugin sharing this code, but no iMessage plugin exists in `plugins/`. The PR description lists iMessage as out-of-scope/future work (`T-007`).</violation>
</file>
<file name="plugins/_shared/persona_client.py">
<violation number="1" location="plugins/_shared/persona_client.py:9">
P2: The module-level `Contract:` docstring omits the required keyword-only `uid` parameter.</violation>
<violation number="2" location="plugins/_shared/persona_client.py:118">
P2: Only httpx.TimeoutException, asyncio.TimeoutError, and httpx.ConnectError are caught, leaving other transport failures (e.g. ReadError, RemoteProtocolError, WriteError during SSE streaming) to propagate. The module contract says timeout or connection errors should return an empty string so callers do nothing, so these transport errors should be handled similarly.</violation>
<violation number="3" location="plugins/_shared/persona_client.py:155">
P2: `_split_lines` is a no-op identity function despite its docstring claiming it normalizes line endings. It splits on `"\n"` and rejoins with the same separator, returning the original string unchanged. This is misleading dead code that should be removed so `_join_chunks` directly concatenates chunks.</violation>
</file>
<file name="plugins/omi-whatsapp-app/README.md">
<violation number="1" location="plugins/omi-whatsapp-app/README.md:25">
P2: README documents a non-functional desktop UI path: step 7 instructs users to "Toggle Auto-reply in the Omi desktop," but the desktop UI's auto-reply toggle is intentionally `.disabled(true)` with an inline explanation that it will only become functional once the `/global-toggle` backend endpoint lands. The documented happy path is currently not executable via the desktop UI, leading to setup expectation failures.</violation>
</file>
<file name="plugins/omi-telegram-app/README.md">
<violation number="1" location="plugins/omi-telegram-app/README.md:13">
P2: README instructs users to toggle Auto-reply from the Omi desktop UI, but the desktop auto-reply toggle is intentionally shipped disabled in this PR until a future `/global-toggle` backend contract exists. Users following step 5 will attempt a UI action that is currently unavailable, causing confusion and support churn.</violation>
</file>
<file name="plugins/omi-telegram-app/.gitignore">
<violation number="1" location="plugins/omi-telegram-app/.gitignore:3">
P2: Secret files `users_data.json` and `pending_setups.json` are only ignored within the plugin subdirectory. Because `simple_storage.py` can write them to arbitrary paths via the `STORAGE_DIR` environment variable, the root `.gitignore` should also exclude them to prevent accidental commits when the storage path is overridden.</violation>
</file>
<file name="plugins/omi-whatsapp-app/main.py">
<violation number="1" location="plugins/omi-whatsapp-app/main.py:383">
P2: `SetupRequest.public_base_url` is required but never consumed in `setup()` or anywhere in the file. This creates dead API surface where clients must provide a value that has no effect, causing contract confusion and potentially masking incomplete webhook registration behavior.</violation>
</file>
<file name="plugins/omi-whatsapp-app/requirements.txt">
<violation number="1" location="plugins/omi-whatsapp-app/requirements.txt:1">
P1: FastAPI 0.115.0 pins a vulnerable Starlette range (<0.39.0) that includes CVE-2024-47874 (DoS via multipart/form-data). Upgrade to FastAPI >=0.115.3 to pull the patched Starlette >=0.40.0.</violation>
</file>
<file name="plugins/omi-whatsapp-app/whatsapp_client.py">
<violation number="1" location="plugins/omi-whatsapp-app/whatsapp_client.py:37">
P2: Shared httpx.AsyncClient cleanup is not wired to FastAPI lifespan/shutdown events. The aclose() docstring claims it is called from FastAPI lifespan, but no lifespan handler or shutdown event in main.py calls whatsapp_client.aclose(), leaving the connection pool open across shutdowns and tests.</violation>
<violation number="2" location="plugins/omi-whatsapp-app/whatsapp_client.py:109">
P1: Webhook subscription endpoint uses `phone_number_id` instead of the WhatsApp Business Account (WABA) ID. The Meta Graph API `subscribed_apps` edge belongs to `/{whats_app_business_account_id}/subscribed_apps`, not `/{phone_number_id}/subscribed_apps`. Using the phone number ID will cause Meta to reject the subscription or subscribe the wrong resource, so inbound webhook messages will never be delivered.</violation>
</file>
<file name="plugins/omi-telegram-app/simple_storage.py">
<violation number="1" location="plugins/omi-telegram-app/simple_storage.py:159">
P1: Pending setup tokens carrying sensitive credentials (bot_token, omi_dev_api_key) are persisted without any TTL or cleanup. `save_pending_setup` stamps `created_at`, but `pop_pending_setup` and its callers never validate token age, so leaked or abandoned setup tokens remain redeemable indefinitely and credentials can linger on disk forever.</violation>
</file>
<file name="plugins/omi-whatsapp-app/simple_storage.py">
<violation number="1" location="plugins/omi-whatsapp-app/simple_storage.py:44">
P1: Storage write failures are silently swallowed by _save(), causing endpoint operations to appear successful while data is lost on restart, and allowing one-shot setup tokens to resurrect from stale files.</violation>
<violation number="2" location="plugins/omi-whatsapp-app/simple_storage.py:52">
P1: Secret-bearing JSON storage files are created with default filesystem permissions instead of restricted owner-only (0o600) permissions.</violation>
</file>
Reply with feedback, questions, or to request a fix.
Re-trigger cubic
| ) | ||
| ] | ||
|
|
||
| async def _stream(): |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
P1: Stream contract mismatch: raw execute_chat_stream chunks are yielded directly into StreamingResponse without the SSE normalization that the existing chat.py call site performs, which can produce malformed or unparsable SSE output for clients.
Prompt for AI agents
Check if this issue is valid — if so, understand the root cause and fix it. At backend/routers/integration.py, line 788:
<comment>Stream contract mismatch: raw `execute_chat_stream` chunks are yielded directly into `StreamingResponse` without the SSE normalization that the existing `chat.py` call site performs, which can produce malformed or unparsable SSE output for clients.</comment>
<file context>
@@ -700,3 +703,92 @@ def get_tasks_via_integration(
+ )
+ ]
+
+ async def _stream():
+ async for chunk in execute_chat_stream(uid, messages, app=app):
+ if chunk is None:
</file context>
| return _client | ||
|
|
||
|
|
||
| async def aclose() -> None: |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
P2: Shared httpx.AsyncClient cleanup is not wired to FastAPI lifespan/shutdown events. The aclose() docstring claims it is called from FastAPI lifespan, but no lifespan handler or shutdown event in main.py calls whatsapp_client.aclose(), leaving the connection pool open across shutdowns and tests.
Prompt for AI agents
Check if this issue is valid — if so, understand the root cause and fix it. At plugins/omi-whatsapp-app/whatsapp_client.py, line 37:
<comment>Shared httpx.AsyncClient cleanup is not wired to FastAPI lifespan/shutdown events. The aclose() docstring claims it is called from FastAPI lifespan, but no lifespan handler or shutdown event in main.py calls whatsapp_client.aclose(), leaving the connection pool open across shutdowns and tests.</comment>
<file context>
@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+ return _client
+
+
+async def aclose() -> None:
+ """Close the shared client on shutdown (called from FastAPI lifespan)."""
+ global _client
</file context>
| if "\n" not in data: | ||
| return data | ||
| # split("\n") preserves trailing empty strings; splitlines() would not. | ||
| return "\n".join(data.split("\n")) |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
P2: _split_lines is a no-op identity function despite its docstring claiming it normalizes line endings. It splits on "\n" and rejoins with the same separator, returning the original string unchanged. This is misleading dead code that should be removed so _join_chunks directly concatenates chunks.
Prompt for AI agents
Check if this issue is valid — if so, understand the root cause and fix it. At plugins/_shared/persona_client.py, line 155:
<comment>`_split_lines` is a no-op identity function despite its docstring claiming it normalizes line endings. It splits on `"\n"` and rejoins with the same separator, returning the original string unchanged. This is misleading dead code that should be removed so `_join_chunks` directly concatenates chunks.</comment>
<file context>
@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
+ if "\n" not in data:
+ return data
+ # split("\n") preserves trailing empty strings; splitlines() would not.
+ return "\n".join(data.split("\n"))
</file context>
| - plugins/omi-imessage-app/ (T-006) | ||
|
|
||
| Contract: | ||
| reply = await chat(app_id, api_key, omi_base, text, *, timeout_seconds=30.0) |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
P2: The module-level Contract: docstring omits the required keyword-only uid parameter.
Prompt for AI agents
Check if this issue is valid — if so, understand the root cause and fix it. At plugins/_shared/persona_client.py, line 9:
<comment>The module-level `Contract:` docstring omits the required keyword-only `uid` parameter.</comment>
<file context>
@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
+- plugins/omi-imessage-app/ (T-006)
+
+Contract:
+ reply = await chat(app_id, api_key, omi_base, text, *, timeout_seconds=30.0)
+
+Returns the concatenated persona reply (single string) on success.
</file context>
| uid, | ||
| ) | ||
| return "" | ||
| except httpx.ConnectError as e: |
There was a problem hiding this comment.
P2: Only httpx.TimeoutException, asyncio.TimeoutError, and httpx.ConnectError are caught, leaving other transport failures (e.g. ReadError, RemoteProtocolError, WriteError during SSE streaming) to propagate. The module contract says timeout or connection errors should return an empty string so callers do nothing, so these transport errors should be handled similarly.
Prompt for AI agents
Check if this issue is valid — if so, understand the root cause and fix it. At plugins/_shared/persona_client.py, line 118:
<comment>Only httpx.TimeoutException, asyncio.TimeoutError, and httpx.ConnectError are caught, leaving other transport failures (e.g. ReadError, RemoteProtocolError, WriteError during SSE streaming) to propagate. The module contract says timeout or connection errors should return an empty string so callers do nothing, so these transport errors should be handled similarly.</comment>
<file context>
@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
+ uid,
+ )
+ return ""
+ except httpx.ConnectError as e:
+ logger.error(
+ "persona chat connection failed (app_id=%s, uid=%s): %s",
</file context>
| @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ | |||
| # `plugins/_shared/` | |||
|
|
|||
| Code shared by the AI Clone plugins (Telegram, WhatsApp, iMessage). | |||
There was a problem hiding this comment.
P3: README inaccurately lists iMessage as a current AI Clone plugin sharing this code, but no iMessage plugin exists in plugins/. The PR description lists iMessage as out-of-scope/future work (T-007).
Prompt for AI agents
Check if this issue is valid — if so, understand the root cause and fix it. At plugins/_shared/README.md, line 3:
<comment>README inaccurately lists iMessage as a current AI Clone plugin sharing this code, but no iMessage plugin exists in `plugins/`. The PR description lists iMessage as out-of-scope/future work (`T-007`).</comment>
<file context>
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+# `plugins/_shared/`
+
+Code shared by the AI Clone plugins (Telegram, WhatsApp, iMessage).
+
+## Contents
</file context>
Suggested change
| Code shared by the AI Clone plugins (Telegram, WhatsApp, iMessage). | |
| Code shared by the AI Clone plugins (Telegram, WhatsApp). iMessage support is planned. |
Cubic AI review of PR BasedHardware#8528 found 25 issues across the repo. Only the ones in this PR's diff (desktop/macos) are in scope here — the rest (plugin backends, backend router, shared client) live in their own PRs. ## P1 — Deep link allowlist had a critical bug The original allowlist used a `DeepLinkSafeHost` enum with cases `me, com`. `URL(string: "https://t.me/...")?.host` returns the literal "t.me" (not the registrable suffix "me"), so EVERY legitimate Telegram/WhatsApp deep link was being rejected. The "Open" button in the connect sheet would have been silently dead. A sub-agent review caught this before merge. Fix: - Replaced the RawRepresentable enum with a `Set<String>` of literal hostnames ("t.me", "wa.me") and a `contains(host)` lookup. - Extracted the safety check into a static `isSafeDeepLink(_:)` function so it's directly unit-testable without going through NSWorkspace. - Added 9 tests in ConnectSheetDeepLinkSafetyTests covering both the legitimate cases (telegram, whatsapp, http dev) and 7 attack vectors (evil host, file://, ssh://, javascript:, malformed, empty). ## P2 — Other cubic findings in this PR's diff 1. **AIPlugin.verify_token marked as isSecure: true** (was false). Verify token is a shared secret used during webhook verification; should be treated with the same secrecy as access_token and bot_token. 2. **AIPlugin.toggleRequestBody hardcoded enabled: true** → now takes an `enabled: Bool` parameter so the disable path works. Added a test (testTelegramToggleBodySupportsDisable) covering the previously-broken disable code path. 3. **AIClonePage header**: removed "in any chat you choose to enable" (per-chat is not in v0.1; the toggle is shipped disabled until the plugins expose a global-toggle endpoint). 4. **AIClonePage hard-coded plugin cards** → now driven by `ForEach(AIPlugin.allCases)`. Adding a new plugin is a one-line enum addition. 5. **AIClonePage footer** overpromised privacy + HTTPS guarantees the code doesn't enforce. Tightened: "HTTPS recommended" instead of "over HTTPS", removed the "never leave your machine" claim (the user controls the plugin URL). 6. **ConnectSheet form body text** overclaimed "over HTTPS" → changed to "HTTPS recommended" with a note that the URL must be http or https (matching the actual endpointURL scheme validation). ## Build + test status xcrun swift build -c debug --package-path Desktop → clean. xcrun swift test --package-path Desktop → 38/38 suites pass. - AICloneClientTests: 16/16 (added testTelegramToggleBodySupportsDisable) - ConnectSheetDeepLinkSafetyTests: 9/9 (new suite) python3 .github/scripts/check-desktop-changelog.py --base origin/main --head HEAD → 'Desktop changelog entry found.' ✅ ## Out of scope (deferred to other PRs) - plugins/omi-telegram-app/main.py (ephemeral webhook secret, /setup unauth) → feat/ai-clone - plugins/omi-whatsapp-app/whatsapp_client.py (WABA vs phone_number_id) → feat/ai-clone-v0.2 - backend/routers/integration.py (SSE streaming) → backend - plugins/_shared/persona_client.py (timeout coverage, _split_lines no-op) → feat/ai-clone-v0.2 - Plugin READMEs (claim desktop toggle works when it doesn't) → plugin PRs
There was a problem hiding this comment.
2 issues found across 8 files (changes from recent commits).
Prompt for AI agents (unresolved issues)
Check if these issues are valid — if so, understand the root cause of each and fix them. If appropriate, use sub-agents to investigate and fix each issue separately.
<file name="desktop/macos/Desktop/Sources/APIClient.swift">
<violation number="1" location="desktop/macos/Desktop/Sources/APIClient.swift:3416">
P2: Security comment overpromises protection: `getOrCreatePersona()` and `createAppKey()` claim to always target the prod backend, but they fall back to `baseURL` which resolves through `DesktopBackendEnvironment.pythonBaseURL()` and can be overridden by environment variables or dev config. Either explicitly hardcode the production URL for sensitive endpoints that send Firebase auth headers, or update the comment to match the actual behavior.</violation>
</file>
<file name="backend/routers/integration.py">
<violation number="1" location="backend/routers/integration.py:740">
P2: Persona-chat rate-limit key appends `:persona`, creating a separate Redis bucket from conversations despite the claim of sharing the same per-(app, user) ceiling</violation>
<violation number="2" location="backend/routers/integration.py:788">
P1: Stream contract mismatch: raw `execute_chat_stream` chunks are yielded directly into `StreamingResponse` without the SSE normalization that the existing `chat.py` call site performs, which can produce malformed or unparsable SSE output for clients.</violation>
</file>
<file name="plugins/_shared/README.md">
<violation number="1" location="plugins/_shared/README.md:3">
P3: README inaccurately lists iMessage as a current AI Clone plugin sharing this code, but no iMessage plugin exists in `plugins/`. The PR description lists iMessage as out-of-scope/future work (`T-007`).</violation>
</file>
<file name="plugins/_shared/persona_client.py">
<violation number="1" location="plugins/_shared/persona_client.py:9">
P2: The module-level `Contract:` docstring omits the required keyword-only `uid` parameter.</violation>
<violation number="2" location="plugins/_shared/persona_client.py:118">
P2: Only httpx.TimeoutException, asyncio.TimeoutError, and httpx.ConnectError are caught, leaving other transport failures (e.g. ReadError, RemoteProtocolError, WriteError during SSE streaming) to propagate. The module contract says timeout or connection errors should return an empty string so callers do nothing, so these transport errors should be handled similarly.</violation>
<violation number="3" location="plugins/_shared/persona_client.py:155">
P2: `_split_lines` is a no-op identity function despite its docstring claiming it normalizes line endings. It splits on `"\n"` and rejoins with the same separator, returning the original string unchanged. This is misleading dead code that should be removed so `_join_chunks` directly concatenates chunks.</violation>
</file>
<file name="plugins/omi-whatsapp-app/README.md">
<violation number="1" location="plugins/omi-whatsapp-app/README.md:25">
P2: README documents a non-functional desktop UI path: step 7 instructs users to "Toggle Auto-reply in the Omi desktop," but the desktop UI's auto-reply toggle is intentionally `.disabled(true)` with an inline explanation that it will only become functional once the `/global-toggle` backend endpoint lands. The documented happy path is currently not executable via the desktop UI, leading to setup expectation failures.</violation>
</file>
<file name="plugins/omi-telegram-app/README.md">
<violation number="1" location="plugins/omi-telegram-app/README.md:13">
P2: README instructs users to toggle Auto-reply from the Omi desktop UI, but the desktop auto-reply toggle is intentionally shipped disabled in this PR until a future `/global-toggle` backend contract exists. Users following step 5 will attempt a UI action that is currently unavailable, causing confusion and support churn.</violation>
</file>
<file name="plugins/omi-telegram-app/.gitignore">
<violation number="1" location="plugins/omi-telegram-app/.gitignore:3">
P2: Secret files `users_data.json` and `pending_setups.json` are only ignored within the plugin subdirectory. Because `simple_storage.py` can write them to arbitrary paths via the `STORAGE_DIR` environment variable, the root `.gitignore` should also exclude them to prevent accidental commits when the storage path is overridden.</violation>
</file>
<file name="plugins/omi-whatsapp-app/main.py">
<violation number="1" location="plugins/omi-whatsapp-app/main.py:383">
P2: `SetupRequest.public_base_url` is required but never consumed in `setup()` or anywhere in the file. This creates dead API surface where clients must provide a value that has no effect, causing contract confusion and potentially masking incomplete webhook registration behavior.</violation>
<violation number="2" location="plugins/omi-whatsapp-app/main.py:396">
P2: Bearer auth is added to /setup and /toggle but not /health, so the health-based connection test may falsely accept an invalid bearer token. The desktop client calls GET /health without sending the Authorization header and presents a successful response as "Plugin service reachable," even if the bearer token is wrong. Later calls to /setup or /toggle will then fail with 401, producing a confusing user experience. Either /health should also verify the bearer (if it's meant to validate credentials) or the client should call a separate authenticated endpoint to verify the token.</violation>
</file>
<file name="plugins/omi-whatsapp-app/whatsapp_client.py">
<violation number="1" location="plugins/omi-whatsapp-app/whatsapp_client.py:37">
P2: Shared httpx.AsyncClient cleanup is not wired to FastAPI lifespan/shutdown events. The aclose() docstring claims it is called from FastAPI lifespan, but no lifespan handler or shutdown event in main.py calls whatsapp_client.aclose(), leaving the connection pool open across shutdowns and tests.</violation>
</file>
<file name="desktop/macos/Desktop/Tests/QRCodeGeneratorTests.swift">
<violation number="1" location="desktop/macos/Desktop/Tests/QRCodeGeneratorTests.swift:37">
P2: testDeterministicOutput only checks image size, not actual pixel data, despite claiming to verify determinism</violation>
</file>
<file name="desktop/macos/Desktop/Sources/Utilities/TelegramTokenValidator.swift">
<violation number="1" location="desktop/macos/Desktop/Sources/Utilities/TelegramTokenValidator.swift:21">
P3: `\d` in NSRegularExpression matches Unicode decimal digits (category Nd), not only ASCII `0-9`. This can allow non-ASCII digits (e.g., Arabic-Indic, fullwidth) in the bot ID, which Telegram tokens do not use. The client-side validator would show a green checkmark for such tokens that would fail the real server-side check. Consider using `[0-9]+` instead to restrict to ASCII digits.</violation>
</file>
<file name="desktop/macos/Desktop/Sources/Utilities/QRCodeGenerator.swift">
<violation number="1" location="desktop/macos/Desktop/Sources/Utilities/QRCodeGenerator.swift:44">
P2: New CIContext allocated on every QR generation; during handshake polling the same QR is regenerated on every `handshakeSecondsRemaining` tick, wasting Core Image/GPU resources.</violation>
</file>
<file name="desktop/macos/Desktop/Sources/MainWindow/Components/AIClone/ConnectSheet.swift">
<violation number="1" location="desktop/macos/Desktop/Sources/MainWindow/Components/AIClone/ConnectSheet.swift:601">
P2: Local-backend setup sends empty personaId and omiDevApiKey to plugin /setup, relying on unverified plugin-side fallback behavior. If the upstream FastAPI plugin requires non-empty values, local setup will fail silently or with an error, and this path is completely untested.</violation>
</file>
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cubic-found P1 on PR BasedHardware#8528: 1. plugin_discovery.py: single fixed file path (ai-clone-plugin.json) breaks concurrent multi-plugin discovery. Telegram + WhatsApp running simultaneously would overwrite each other's file. Fixed: each plugin gets its own file (ai-clone-plugin-{plugin_type}.json). Backward-compatible default path maintained for single-plugin dev. 2. Both simple_storage.py: fixed .tmp filename races between concurrent writers. Now uses {path}.{pid}.tmp for uniqueness. 3. clear_discovery() now accepts plugin_type parameter to target the correct per-plugin file. 4. Tests updated: monkeypatch discovery_file() instead of DISCOVERY_FILE constant. 169/169 tests pass.
…#8531 Same cubic P1 fix: per-plugin discovery file paths + unique tmp filenames for concurrent plugin support.
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1 issue found across 4 files (changes from recent commits).
Prompt for AI agents (unresolved issues)
Check if these issues are valid — if so, understand the root cause of each and fix them. If appropriate, use sub-agents to investigate and fix each issue separately.
<file name="plugins/_shared/plugin_discovery.py">
<violation number="1" location="plugins/_shared/plugin_discovery.py:135">
P2: The legacy DISCOVERY_FILE is documented as a backward-compatible fallback but is no longer maintained by write_discovery or clear_discovery, which can leave stale credentials or break discovery for older desktop builds.</violation>
</file>
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|
|
||
| # Per-plugin file (cubic P1: concurrent Telegram + WhatsApp | ||
| # plugins must not overwrite each other's discovery file). | ||
| target = discovery_file(plugin_type) |
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P2: The legacy DISCOVERY_FILE is documented as a backward-compatible fallback but is no longer maintained by write_discovery or clear_discovery, which can leave stale credentials or break discovery for older desktop builds.
Prompt for AI agents
Check if this issue is valid — if so, understand the root cause and fix it. At plugins/_shared/plugin_discovery.py, line 135:
<comment>The legacy DISCOVERY_FILE is documented as a backward-compatible fallback but is no longer maintained by write_discovery or clear_discovery, which can leave stale credentials or break discovery for older desktop builds.</comment>
<file context>
@@ -115,13 +130,18 @@ def write_discovery(
- tmp = DISCOVERY_FILE.with_suffix(".tmp")
+ # Per-plugin file (cubic P1: concurrent Telegram + WhatsApp
+ # plugins must not overwrite each other's discovery file).
+ target = discovery_file(plugin_type)
+ # Unique tmp filename to avoid race between concurrent writers.
+ tmp = target.with_suffix(f".{os.getpid()}.tmp")
</file context>
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Thanks for the continued hardening here. I reviewed the current head 54aac6dbe438a64ba4c344d6cb954b7039c73987. This is moving in a better direction and I do not see evidence of a malicious/supply-chain attempt, but I still need to request changes before this should be considered mergeable.
Blocking issues I confirmed:
-
The plugin discovery producer and desktop consumer now disagree.
plugins/_shared/plugin_discovery.pywrites per-plugin files like~/.config/omi/ai-clone-plugin-telegram.json/ai-clone-plugin-whatsapp.json, but the Swift desktop side still only reads~/.config/omi/ai-clone-plugin.jsonviaPluginDiscovery.filePath. That means the advertised zero-config flow will not discover fresh plugin launches, and any old legacy file can leave the desktop using stale URL/bearer material. Please either keep the legacy file in sync safely or teach the desktop to read the current per-plugin discovery files and handle multiple plugin types explicitly. -
Both plugin storage implementations still swallow persistence failures in
_save(...). These files hold setup tokens, platform credentials, andomi_dev_...keys; if a write fails,/setupor/togglecan still proceed as if state was saved, leaving the user with a deep link that cannot complete after restart and potentially allowing stale on-disk state to resurrect. For credential-bearing setup/user state, persistence errors should fail closed and surface back to the endpoint rather than being printed and ignored. -
The desktop handshake success check is still not tied to the actual
/startbinding.ConnectSheet.startHandshakePolling()markshandshakeCompleted = trueon/health, but/healthis already expected to be 200 before/setupand does not validate that the user clicked the deep link, that a chat/phone was bound, or even that the bearer token works. Since the plugin now has authenticated status-style state, please gate the success UI on an authenticated connected-state check instead of liveness.
Even after these are fixed, this remains a large product/security feature spanning desktop setup UX, backend persona impersonation, public Telegram/WhatsApp webhook services, Docker/runtime files, credential storage, and user-facing docs. It should stay under human maintainer/product/security review rather than automation approval.
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Cubic AI review of PR BasedHardware#8528 found 25 issues across the repo. Only the ones in this PR's diff (desktop/macos) are in scope here — the rest (plugin backends, backend router, shared client) live in their own PRs. ## P1 — Deep link allowlist had a critical bug The original allowlist used a `DeepLinkSafeHost` enum with cases `me, com`. `URL(string: "https://t.me/...")?.host` returns the literal "t.me" (not the registrable suffix "me"), so EVERY legitimate Telegram/WhatsApp deep link was being rejected. The "Open" button in the connect sheet would have been silently dead. A sub-agent review caught this before merge. Fix: - Replaced the RawRepresentable enum with a `Set<String>` of literal hostnames ("t.me", "wa.me") and a `contains(host)` lookup. - Extracted the safety check into a static `isSafeDeepLink(_:)` function so it's directly unit-testable without going through NSWorkspace. - Added 9 tests in ConnectSheetDeepLinkSafetyTests covering both the legitimate cases (telegram, whatsapp, http dev) and 7 attack vectors (evil host, file://, ssh://, javascript:, malformed, empty). ## P2 — Other cubic findings in this PR's diff 1. **AIPlugin.verify_token marked as isSecure: true** (was false). Verify token is a shared secret used during webhook verification; should be treated with the same secrecy as access_token and bot_token. 2. **AIPlugin.toggleRequestBody hardcoded enabled: true** → now takes an `enabled: Bool` parameter so the disable path works. Added a test (testTelegramToggleBodySupportsDisable) covering the previously-broken disable code path. 3. **AIClonePage header**: removed "in any chat you choose to enable" (per-chat is not in v0.1; the toggle is shipped disabled until the plugins expose a global-toggle endpoint). 4. **AIClonePage hard-coded plugin cards** → now driven by `ForEach(AIPlugin.allCases)`. Adding a new plugin is a one-line enum addition. 5. **AIClonePage footer** overpromised privacy + HTTPS guarantees the code doesn't enforce. Tightened: "HTTPS recommended" instead of "over HTTPS", removed the "never leave your machine" claim (the user controls the plugin URL). 6. **ConnectSheet form body text** overclaimed "over HTTPS" → changed to "HTTPS recommended" with a note that the URL must be http or https (matching the actual endpointURL scheme validation). ## Build + test status xcrun swift build -c debug --package-path Desktop → clean. xcrun swift test --package-path Desktop → 38/38 suites pass. - AICloneClientTests: 16/16 (added testTelegramToggleBodySupportsDisable) - ConnectSheetDeepLinkSafetyTests: 9/9 (new suite) python3 .github/scripts/check-desktop-changelog.py --base origin/main --head HEAD → 'Desktop changelog entry found.' ✅ ## Out of scope (deferred to other PRs) - plugins/omi-telegram-app/main.py (ephemeral webhook secret, /setup unauth) → feat/ai-clone - plugins/omi-whatsapp-app/whatsapp_client.py (WABA vs phone_number_id) → feat/ai-clone-v0.2 - backend/routers/integration.py (SSE streaming) → backend - plugins/_shared/persona_client.py (timeout coverage, _split_lines no-op) → feat/ai-clone-v0.2 - Plugin READMEs (claim desktop toggle works when it doesn't) → plugin PRs
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Cubic AI follow-up review on PR BasedHardware#8528 (review 4588508321): > Deep-link validation checks scheme and host but doesn't bind the > allowed host to the active plugin or validate the expected URL > path/query format. The `isSafeDeepLink` static function accepts > both `t.me` and `wa.me` regardless of whether the user is > connecting Telegram or WhatsApp, and it allows arbitrary paths and > query strings on those domains. Bind the host check to `plugin` > (e.g., Telegram only → `t.me`, WhatsApp only → `wa.me`). Fix: `isSafeDeepLink(_:plugin:)` now takes the active `AIPlugin` and only accepts the host expected for that plugin. A compromised plugin service can no longer phish by returning the other platform's host — e.g. a `t.me` URL inside a WhatsApp connect sheet is rejected, and vice versa. Implementation: - Replaced `Set<String>`-based allowlist with a per-plugin `DeepLinkSafeHost.expected(for:)` lookup. - `openURL(_:)` passes the active plugin through. - Added 2 tests covering both cross-plugin attack directions: - `testRejectsTelegramHostInWhatsAppContext` - `testRejectsWhatsAppHostInTelegramContext` Test status: 11/11 ConnectSheetDeepLinkSafetyTests pass. 38/38 desktop test suites pass overall.
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Addresses the maintainer security review on PR BasedHardware#8528 (BasedHardware#8528 (review)): > Secrets are persisted in macOS UserDefaults (AICloneConfig.swift). > The plugin bearer token and omi_dev_... developer API key are long- > lived credentials that allow calls on the user's behalf, so they > should not be stored in plain defaults. Please move these to > Keychain (or an existing secure credential store) and keep > UserDefaults only for non-secret config like the plugin URL. ## Fix New helper — a ~30-line wrapper around the Security framework (SecItemAdd / SecItemCopyMatching / SecItemUpdate / SecItemDelete). The kSecAttrService is derived from Bundle.main.bundleIdentifier so dev (com.omi.desktop-dev) and prod (com.omi.computer-macos) installs don't share Keychain entries. now stores: - pluginURL → UserDefaults (non-secret, the reviewer's explicit OK) - bearerToken → AICloneKeychain.pluginBearerToken - omiDevApiKey → AICloneKeychain.devApiKey Setting a secret to empty string deletes it from Keychain. ## Migration A previous build stored both secrets in UserDefaults. On first init under this build, copies any existing legacy values into Keychain and clears the UserDefaults entries. Migration is: - idempotent (no-op when nothing to migrate) - non-destructive when Keychain already has the same value (doesn't clobber an existing real Keychain entry with a stale UserDefaults value from a backup restore) ## Tests New — 9 tests pinning the behavior: - secrets persist to Keychain, NOT UserDefaults - secrets reload from Keychain on next init - empty string deletes from Keychain - pluginURL still goes to UserDefaults - legacy UserDefaults values migrate to Keychain - migration doesn't clobber an existing Keychain value - migration is idempotent (second init is a no-op) - isFullyConfigured reflects all three sources Combined with the existing AICloneClientTests: 25/25 pass. Security-review-flagged
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Addresses cubic review on PR BasedHardware#8528: > The comment incorrectly claims kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlocked > provides 'only this app' isolation. Because the app does not use > kSecUseDataProtectionKeychain, entitlements have no keychain > access groups, and app sandboxing is disabled > (com.apple.security.app-sandbox is <false/>), SecItem calls write > to the legacy file-based keychain. kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlocked > only controls WHEN the item is available (while the keychain is > unlocked), not WHICH process can access it — other user processes > can still read these items. The comment should be corrected to not > overstate the isolation guarantee. ## Fix - AICloneKeychain.swift docstring now accurately describes the isolation guarantee. Keychain IS still meaningfully better than UserDefaults (other user processes must call SecItemCopyMatching with the right kSecAttrService + kSecAttrAccount instead of just reading a plaintext plist), but it is NOT full sandbox isolation. - The in-code comment at the kSecAttrAccessible call site is corrected to say 'controls WHEN' not 'controls which app'. ## Residual risk (documented honestly in the docstring) Without sandboxing + keychain access groups, other user processes that know the bundle id and secret name can read these items. Sandboxing the app is a project-wide architectural decision tracked separately; this commit is the realistic improvement within current entitlements. ## Tests 3 new tests in AICloneConfigTests pin the actual protection level: - testStoredSecretIsNotPresentInUserDefaults — runtime assertion that the legacy plaintext plist path doesn't get re-introduced. - testStoredSecretIsRetrievableViaKeychain — companion check that the round-trip IS through Keychain. - testMigrationClearsLegacyUserDefaultsEntries — proves the migration removes the legacy key (not just copies it). Combined with existing AICloneClientTests: 28/28 pass. cubic-found
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… checks (cubic P1) cubic-found P1 on PR BasedHardware#8528: > Test uses data(forKey:) instead of string(forKey:) to check legacy > UserDefaults keys, making the assertion a false pass for string values UserDefaults.data(forKey:) only returns values that were stored as Data. If a regression re-introduces UserDefaults storage of secrets as String (the most natural regression shape), data(forKey:) returns nil regardless of the value being there — the assertion silently passes. Verified by directly poking a String value: data(forKey:) -> nil (false pass) object(forKey:) -> NOT NIL (correctly fails) Switched to object(forKey:) which returns Any? and catches ANY type under the key — strings, Data, ints, arrays, dicts, anything. Same change applied to testMigrationClearsLegacyUserDefaultsEntries for symmetry (its previous string(forKey:) would silently miss a Data-typed value). 12/12 AICloneConfigTests pass; 28/28 desktop AI Clone combined. cubic-found
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Git-on-my-level on PR BasedHardware#8528: the Telegram plugin's Dockerfile does COPY . . and simple_storage.py writes users_data.json + pending_setups.json containing bot tokens and omi_dev_… keys. Without a .dockerignore, an operator rebuilding from a working directory that has runtime state would copy those secret JSON files into image layers / registries. Add a .dockerignore that mirrors plugins/omi-whatsapp-app/.dockerignore: - Excludes test/, .venv/, __pycache__/, etc. (bloat) - Excludes .env, .env.* (real bot tokens if developer committed them) - Excludes users_data.json, pending_setups.json (runtime state with user tokens) - Excludes .git/, .gitignore, .idea/, scripts/, E2E_RUNBOOK.md, requirements-dev.txt (dev-only artifacts) - Keeps !.env.example so example files still ship This matches the WhatsApp plugin's pattern exactly, so both AI Clone plugins get the same Docker build hygiene. maintainer-flagged
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… review) Git-on-my-level on PR BasedHardware#8528 flagged two issues in plugins/omi-whatsapp-app/main.py: 1. Production in-function imports: the webhook-verify handler did "import simple_storage" locally, and the signature-verification branch did "import hmac" / "import hashlib". The repo Python guidance asks for imports at module scope. simple_storage is already imported at module scope; hmac + hashlib are stdlib. Fix: - Hoist hmac and hashlib to the module-top import block. - Remove the redundant simple_storage import from the webhook-verify handler. 2. The HMAC-mismatch warning logged the full presented and expected signatures. These are derived from WHATSAPP_APP_SECRET (HMAC key) — putting them in /tmp/omi-dev.log means anyone with file-read access can correlate them back to the secret, and log aggregators would persist them. Fix: - Drop the full sigs from the log. - Replace with a short non-sensitive prefix of the presented signature as a correlation id (first 8 hex chars) + the length. - The full sigs are still used internally for hmac.compare_digest() — just not emitted to logs. maintainer-flagged
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Addresses the security blocker flagged by maintainer review on PR BasedHardware#8528 (BasedHardware#8528 (review)): > The desktop client is written as if plugin endpoints are protected by > the configured bearer token (`Authorization: Bearer ...`), but the > new Telegram and WhatsApp plugin /setup handlers do not actually > verify that bearer token. For a public self-hosted plugin URL, that > leaves the setup surface unauthenticated while it can call > Telegram/Meta APIs, set webhooks/subscriptions, and persist > user-supplied Omi/API/platform credentials. ## Fix New module `plugins/_shared/auth.py` with a single FastAPI dependency `require_bearer` that enforces the bearer-token contract documented on the desktop side (search AICloneClient.swift for AI_CLONE_PLUGIN_TOKEN). Applied to: - plugins/omi-telegram-app/main.py /setup and /toggle - plugins/omi-whatsapp-app/main.py /setup and /toggle (Not applied to /webhook — Telegram/Meta authenticate /webhook via their own per-platform HMAC / secret-token mechanisms, which were already present and verified.) ## Policy Behavior depends on AI_CLONE_PLUGIN_TOKEN + OMI_DEV_MODE: | token | dev mode | outcome | |---------|----------|--------------------------------------| | set | (any) | bearer must match (secrets.compare) | | unset | 1 | allow all (explicit dev opt-in) | | unset | unset | 503 Service Unavailable (misconfig) | Returns 503 for the misconfig case (rather than silently allowing all) so a deploy that forgot to set the token fails closed rather than open. ## Response shape Same 401 + same body for missing header / wrong scheme / wrong token, so an attacker probing the endpoint cannot distinguish them. ## Tests 21 new tests (150/150 pass overall): - plugins/_shared/test/test_auth.py (11) — policy matrix, bearer match, indistinguishability, secrets.compare_digest path, env sentinel - plugins/omi-telegram-app/test/test_setup_auth.py (5) — actual /setup integration: 503 on misconfig, 401 on missing/wrong, 200 on correct bearer - plugins/omi-whatsapp-app/test/test_whatsapp_setup_auth.py (5) — mirror coverage for WhatsApp Verified end-to-end: reverting the require_bearer additions in main.py makes test_setup_without_token_returns_503 fail with a clear message — the regression is genuinely caught. Security-review-flagged
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Cubic-found on PR BasedHardware#8528 (review 4592784393): the Meta Graph API endpoint POST /{id}/subscribed_apps belongs to the WhatsApp Business Account (WABA), not the phone number. Posting to /{phone_number_id}/subscribed_apps returns 400 / 'no edge found' from Meta, so webhook messages would never be delivered to the plugin. The user still provides only phone_number_id in the /setup request (no API change); the plugin now does one extra lookup to resolve the WABA id, then subscribes to the correct endpoint. Resolution path: GET /{phone_number_id}?fields=whatsapp_business_account{id} -> { 'whatsapp_business_account': { 'id': '<waba>' } } POST /{waba}/subscribed_apps -> { 'success': true } Failure modes surface with a clear 400 from Meta (e.g. the access token doesn't have whatsapp_business_management / whatsapp_business_assets scopes, or the phone isn't on any WABA the token can manage). The plugin maps non-2xx responses to a 502 with a generic 'WhatsApp subscribe_app failed' message; the log carries the actual Meta error for diagnostics. cubic-found
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…afety gate Cubic-found on PR BasedHardware#8528 (review 4592784393), 2 P1 issues in ConnectSheet: 1. False-positive 'Connected' on timeout. The success view checked '\(!pollingForHandshake && setupResult != nil)' to render 'Connected' — but 'pollingForHandshake' is also set false when the polling loop exhausts its window. So a user who never sent /start saw 'Connected' with a green checkmark after 45s of waiting, and would close the sheet thinking setup succeeded. Fix: add two new bools — 'handshakeCompleted' and 'handshakeTimedOut'. The polling loop only sets 'handshakeCompleted = true' on a successful /health hit. If the loop exits without that set, 'handshakeTimedOut' becomes true (we can't reach that code without either timeout or cancellation, and Task.isCancelled is checked separately). The success view now branches: - 'handshakeCompleted' -> green check + 'Connected' - 'handshakeTimedOut' -> red warning + 'Connection timed out' + a 'Retry' button that restarts polling - polling in flight -> 'Waiting for /start... (Xs remaining)' Note: this is a NECESSARY-not-SUFFICIENT check. /health returns 200 as long as the plugin process is up, regardless of whether anyone sent /start. When the plugin gains a /status endpoint (Tier 2 of the onboarding plan), upgrade this gate to check the actual handshake-complete bit. 2. QR rendered for unsafe plugin URLs. The success view's 'deepLinkWithQR' helper rendered a QR for whatever string the plugin returned. The 'Open' button is gated by isSafeDeepLink (rejects http://evil.com/ etc), but a user might scan a QR even when they wouldn't click the button — separate attack surface. A compromised plugin could return a t.me-lookalike host and phish via the QR. Fix: gate QR rendering by the same isSafeDeepLink predicate. On rejection, render an explicit 'Refusing to render QR \u2014 plugin returned an unsafe URL' warning instead of a scannable image. cubic-found
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Cubic-found on PR BasedHardware#8528 (review 4592784393): ClipboardWatcher's checkClipboard() read the clipboard string on every polling tick (once per second), even when changeCount hadn't changed. The string read is the expensive part (NSPasteboard round-trip + data copy); changeCount is O(1). Pre-fix behavior: every tick -> call source() -> read BOTH changeCount + string -> early-return on no change -> string read was wasted Two fixes here: 1. Split the single 'Source' closure into two: - 'ChangeCountSource: () -> Int' (cheap, called every tick) - 'StringSource: () -> String?' (expensive, called only when changeCount has moved) 2. checkClipboard() now reads changeCount first; only if it differs from the cached value does it call the string source. A steady-state watch (no clipboard changes) now burns zero string-reads per second instead of one. Default sources read NSPasteboard.general directly; tests inject fakes via the new init parameters. cubic-found
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…(P1) Cubic-found on PR BasedHardware#8528 (review 4592784393): the plugin's TELEGRAM_WEBHOOK_SECRET resolution was 'env var OR fresh random on every startup'. If the operator didn't set the env var, each restart rotated the secret, breaking the handshake with Telegram: - Plugin calls setWebhook(url, secret_token=NEW_RANDOM) - Telegram stores the new secret - Webhook deliveries now come in with the NEW secret - BUT: if the user has set up their own webhook / uses a reverse proxy that re-resolves DNS, deliveries with the OLD secret continue to come in and get a 401 Even more directly: any operator that ran /setup once and then restarted the plugin (without setting TELEGRAM_WEBHOOK_SECRET) saw every webhook get 401 until they re-ran /setup. Resolution order: 1. TELEGRAM_WEBHOOK_SECRET env var (production) 2. $STORAGE_DIR/webhook_secret (auto-generated, persisted on first run) 3. secrets.token_urlsafe(32) + write to file (first run only) The persisted file is created with mode 0o600 (owner read/write only) so other users on the box can't read the secret. The parent STORAGE_DIR is also chmod 0o700 (best-effort). Best-effort: if the file is unreadable (permission denied), the resolver logs a warning and falls back to generating a new secret rather than crashing startup. Operators can see the warning and fix the perm issue.
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Cubic-found on PR BasedHardware#8528 (review 4592784393), 2 P1 issues in plugins/omi-whatsapp-app/simple_storage.py: 1. Storage files created with default umask (typically 0o644 — world-readable). The files hold user-bound secrets (access_token, omi_dev_api_key). Any local user could read them off disk. Fix: open with explicit 0o600 via os.open(O_CREAT|O_EXCL) so the file never briefly exists with the default umask. On load, tighten any existing file's perms to 0o600 (best-effort). Also chmod 0o700 on the parent STORAGE_DIR. 2. Storage write failures silently swallowed via bare 'except Exception: print(...)'. If the disk was full or the directory was read-only, /setup would 'succeed' (no exception propagated to the caller) but the data wouldn't be persisted. On restart, the plugin would resurrect from the stale file — one-shot setup tokens could be re-redeemed indefinitely, and /toggle would appear to work while persisting nothing. Fix: log the error AND raise OSError. The caller (/setup) maps OSError to a 5xx response so the user knows the setup failed. Also: log via the module logger (not print) so the error shows up in /tmp/omi-dev.log alongside other plugin logs. cubic-found
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…missing P2 (cubic follow-up on PR BasedHardware#8528): raising httpx.HTTPStatusError with a 2xx response is misleading \u2014 that exception is specifically for 4xx/5xx HTTP failures, and downstream log lines / error handlers key off the .response.status_code field. The WABA-missing case happens AFTER raise_for_status() succeeded (Meta returns 200 with whatsapp_business_account empty) so the response is 200 OK, not an HTTP error. Use the base httpx.HTTPError(message) instead. The caller's 'except httpx.HTTPError' branch picks it up cleanly and logs 'WhatsApp subscribe_app failed: HTTPError' \u2014 no fake status code, no confusion about which Meta endpoint returned what. cubic-found
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Cubic-found on PR BasedHardware#8528 (review 4592980496), 3 P1 issues in _resolve_webhook_secret() (commit d01895a from the previous review pass): 1. Default STORAGE_DIR was /tmp/omi-tg-e2e, ephemeral on most systems. The whole point of the previous fix was 'survive restarts'; /tmp defeats that. Now defaults to a persistent path (the plugin's own dir or a data/ subdir) and only falls back to the legacy /tmp path for back-compat migration. 2. File creation followed symlinks. A local attacker could pre-create a symlink at <STORAGE_DIR>/webhook_secret pointing to, e.g., /dev/stdout or a file the attacker can read. The next write would follow the symlink, exfiltrating the secret. Now uses O_NOFOLLOW on every open (read AND write) so symlinks are rejected at the syscall level. ELOOP is caught and treated as 'secret not present' with a logged warning. 3. Concurrent first startup could race. Two workers calling _resolve_webhook_secret() simultaneously would both see 'no file', both generate a new random secret, and both try to write the same fixed '.tmp' name. Whichever lost the race got an EEXIST that pre-fix code just ignored. Now: a short-lived fcntl.flock on <path>.lock serializes the first run, AND the write uses O_CREAT|O_EXCL so the loser sees 'someone else already wrote it, use their secret' instead of overwriting. Also added the missing warning for PermissionError / EIO on read (not just ENOENT/ELOOP) \u2014 the previous version silently returned None on any OSError. Operators need to know when the file exists but is unreadable (perm issue, broken mount, etc.). Plus: legacy /tmp/omi-tg-e2e/webhook_secret is read on first call (only) and migrated to the persistent path so the next restart doesn't need the fallback. If the legacy file doesn't exist, we generate a new one. cubic-found
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Jul 1, 2026
Cubic-found on PR BasedHardware#8528 (review 4592980496): simple_storage._save used a FIXED '.tmp' suffix with O_EXCL, no retry, and no per-call uniqueness. Failure modes: - Stale .tmp from a crashed previous write (e.g. process killed between os.open and os.replace) makes every subsequent _save() fail with EEXIST. The 'except' handler cleans up the stale file but re-raises \u2014 so the user gets a 5xx every time, not a one- shot recovery. - Two processes in a multi-worker deployment (gunicorn -w 2, etc) racing on the same fixed '.tmp' name \u2014 whichever loses the race gets EEXIST. The losing process's cleanup would unlink the winner's in-progress file, breaking both saves. Fix: use tempfile.mkstemp(prefix=os.path.basename(path)+'.', suffix='.tmp', dir=target_dir). This: - Generates a per-call unique name (atomic + exclusive by default) - Co-locates the temp in the target directory so os.replace is atomic (same filesystem) - Eliminates the stale-file failure mode entirely - Eliminates the cross-process collision (different processes get different temp names automatically) The mkstemp fd already returns a permission-fixed 0o600 on Linux (mkstemp uses O_CREAT|O_EXCL with mode 0600 by default). Belt-and- braces: explicit os.chmod(tmp, 0o600) after the fd is opened, in case the platform's mkstemp uses a different default (some BSDs default to 0o644). cubic-found
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Jul 1, 2026
…URL override, do/catch persona lookup Addresses cubic + maintainer review on PR BasedHardware#8528: 1. P1 (ConnectSheet): replaced substring localhost detection with proper URL host parsing via isLoopbackURL(). Checks exact host values (localhost, 127.0.0.1, ::1) instead of fragile contains() which falsely matched 'localhost.evil.com'. Identified by cubic P2 + maintainer BasedHardware#4. 2. P1 (APIClient): removed backendURL override parameter from createAppKey() and getOrCreatePersona(). These authenticated calls send Firebase tokens + BYOK keys — the override could leak credentials to untrusted URLs. Identified by cubic P1 + maintainer BasedHardware#4. 3. P1 (ConnectSheet): replaced try? getPersona() with proper do/catch. try? collapsed network/auth/decoding errors into 'no persona' and triggered unnecessary creation that masked the real failure. Now: errors propagate to the user. Identified by cubic P1 + maintainer BasedHardware#5. 4. P2 (APIClient): Persona.createdAt/updatedAt changed from Date to Date? (optional). Prevents crash when backend omits timestamps, and avoids masking contract regressions with non-deterministic Date() defaults. Identified by cubic P2. Build clean. Build complete!
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Jul 1, 2026
…esktop branch The maintainer review on PR BasedHardware#8528 flagged 4 blockers that were already fixed on feat/ai-clone-chat-tools (BasedHardware#8531) but missing from feat/ai-clone-desktop (BasedHardware#8528). Both PRs share the same base but diverged — the desktop branch didn't have the plugin security fixes. Synced files: 1. auth.py: whitespace-only AI_CLONE_PLUGIN_TOKEN now stripped (get_plugin_token returns .strip()). Whitespace bearer rejected. 2. auth.py: non-ASCII presented tokens caught with try/except before secrets.compare_digest → controlled 401, not TypeError 500. 3. simple_storage.py (Telegram): 0o600 file permissions on writes, os.makedirs for parent dir, try/except OSError for non-POSIX. Matches WhatsApp storage's permission-safe behavior. 4. simple_storage.py (both): TTL expiry on pending_setups (1 hour). pop_pending_setup() purges stale entries before returning. 5. persona_client.py: [DONE] breaks the SSE loop immediately (not just filtered). Regression tests included. Tests: 30/30 shared tests pass.
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Addresses the security blocker flagged by maintainer review on PR BasedHardware#8528 (BasedHardware#8528 (review)): > The desktop client is written as if plugin endpoints are protected by > the configured bearer token (`Authorization: Bearer ...`), but the > new Telegram and WhatsApp plugin /setup handlers do not actually > verify that bearer token. For a public self-hosted plugin URL, that > leaves the setup surface unauthenticated while it can call > Telegram/Meta APIs, set webhooks/subscriptions, and persist > user-supplied Omi/API/platform credentials. New module `plugins/_shared/auth.py` with a single FastAPI dependency `require_bearer` that enforces the bearer-token contract documented on the desktop side (search AICloneClient.swift for AI_CLONE_PLUGIN_TOKEN). Applied to: - plugins/omi-telegram-app/main.py /setup and /toggle - plugins/omi-whatsapp-app/main.py /setup and /toggle (Not applied to /webhook — Telegram/Meta authenticate /webhook via their own per-platform HMAC / secret-token mechanisms, which were already present and verified.) Behavior depends on AI_CLONE_PLUGIN_TOKEN + OMI_DEV_MODE: | token | dev mode | outcome | |---------|----------|--------------------------------------| | set | (any) | bearer must match (secrets.compare) | | unset | 1 | allow all (explicit dev opt-in) | | unset | unset | 503 Service Unavailable (misconfig) | Returns 503 for the misconfig case (rather than silently allowing all) so a deploy that forgot to set the token fails closed rather than open. Same 401 + same body for missing header / wrong scheme / wrong token, so an attacker probing the endpoint cannot distinguish them. 21 new tests (150/150 pass overall): - plugins/_shared/test/test_auth.py (11) — policy matrix, bearer match, indistinguishability, secrets.compare_digest path, env sentinel - plugins/omi-telegram-app/test/test_setup_auth.py (5) — actual /setup integration: 503 on misconfig, 401 on missing/wrong, 200 on correct bearer - plugins/omi-whatsapp-app/test/test_whatsapp_setup_auth.py (5) — mirror coverage for WhatsApp Verified end-to-end: reverting the require_bearer additions in main.py makes test_setup_without_token_returns_503 fail with a clear message — the regression is genuinely caught. Security-review-flagged
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Maintainer review on PR BasedHardware#8531: E2E_RUNBOOK.md is agent-behavior-affecting documentation that still contains stale guidance: - Layer 2 / Layer 3 talk about /setup and /toggle not enforcing bearer auth ('the bearer token is currently not enforced'), but the auth-redesign (commit 5f1f710 on PR BasedHardware#8528) wired require_bearer on both /setup AND /toggle. - The runbook was agent-facing: a coding agent following it would test the OLD secret-in-body flow on /toggle and conclude 'auth gap exists' \u2014 false positive. Remove the runbook. Real verification now happens via: - 60+ unit tests in plugins/omi-telegram-app/test/ (FastAPI TestClient, exercise /setup + /webhook + /toggle + /.well-known/omi-tools.json) - Manual smoke testing through the Omi Desktop UI (Settings \u2192 AI Clone \u2192 Telegram card, exercising the real bearer-auth flow) Also drop the now-stale 'scripts/, E2E_RUNBOOK.md' reference from the Dockerfile header comment (.dockerignore entries for those paths remain harmless and document the build-context exclusions). maintainer-flagged
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Addresses cubic + maintainer review on PR BasedHardware#8528/BasedHardware#8531: 1. auth.py: get_plugin_token() now strips whitespace from the env value. A whitespace-only AI_CLONE_PLUGIN_TOKEN is treated as 'not configured' (returns empty string), rejecting Bearer-of-spaces. Identified by maintainer review on PR BasedHardware#8528. 2. test_omi_qos_tiers.py: test_graph_py_key updated to expect 'persona_chat' instead of 'chat_graph' in graph.py. We changed the feature name from chat_graph (wrong model, gpt-4.1-mini) to persona_chat (correct model, gpt-4.1-nano) as part of the streaming fix. The old test expected the wrong feature name. Pre-existing failures NOT caused by our changes: - test_lock_bypass_fixes.py (14 failures on main too) - test_omi_qos_tiers.py Gemini thinking budget (env-dependent)
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Jul 1, 2026
cubic-found P1 on PR BasedHardware#8528: 1. plugin_discovery.py: single fixed file path (ai-clone-plugin.json) breaks concurrent multi-plugin discovery. Telegram + WhatsApp running simultaneously would overwrite each other's file. Fixed: each plugin gets its own file (ai-clone-plugin-{plugin_type}.json). Backward-compatible default path maintained for single-plugin dev. 2. Both simple_storage.py: fixed .tmp filename races between concurrent writers. Now uses {path}.{pid}.tmp for uniqueness. 3. clear_discovery() now accepts plugin_type parameter to target the correct per-plugin file. 4. Tests updated: monkeypatch discovery_file() instead of DISCOVERY_FILE constant. 169/169 tests pass.
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cubic-found P1 on PR BasedHardware#8528: 1. plugin_discovery.py: single fixed file path (ai-clone-plugin.json) breaks concurrent multi-plugin discovery. Telegram + WhatsApp running simultaneously would overwrite each other's file. Fixed: each plugin gets its own file (ai-clone-plugin-{plugin_type}.json). Backward-compatible default path maintained for single-plugin dev. 2. Both simple_storage.py: fixed .tmp filename races between concurrent writers. Now uses {path}.{pid}.tmp for uniqueness. 3. clear_discovery() now accepts plugin_type parameter to target the correct per-plugin file. 4. Tests updated: monkeypatch discovery_file() instead of DISCOVERY_FILE constant. 169/169 tests pass.
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What
Adds Settings → AI Clone, the desktop-side UI for configuring the self-hosted AI Clone plugin service (Telegram + WhatsApp). Stacks on:
The plugin services are user-hosted FastAPI apps. This PR is the in-app client that talks to them.
Files
desktop/macos/Desktop/Sources/AIClone/—AIPlugin.swift(enum + credential metadata),AICloneConfig.swift(@MainActorUserDefaults-backed config),AICloneClient.swift(async actor;GET /health,POST /setup,POST /toggle; bearer-token auth)desktop/macos/Desktop/Sources/MainWindow/Components/AIClone/—PluginURLCard.swift,ConnectSheet.swift,PluginCard.swift(one parameterized card for both plugins)desktop/macos/Desktop/Sources/MainWindow/Pages/AIClonePage.swift— page shelldesktop/macos/Desktop/Sources/MainWindow/Pages/SettingsPage.swift+SettingsSidebar.swift— sidebar entry + search indexdesktop/macos/Desktop/Tests/AICloneClientTests.swift— 15 unit testsdesktop/macos/CHANGELOG.json— unreleased entry~1,300 LOC added.
User flow
omi_dev_…key) via the top card. "Test Connection" hitsGET /health.ConnectSheetPOSTs/setupwith the right credential fields per plugin and shows the returned deep link with Copy / Open buttons.ConnectSheetpollsGET /healthevery 3s for up to 60s.chat_id/ phone that the desktop doesn't track yet. Wiring point preserved; becomes functional when the plugins expose/global-toggle.Build & tests
Out of scope (tracked as follow-ups)
Authorization: Bearer; plugins don't verify yet. Lands onfeat/ai-clone-v0.2as a separate commit./global-toggleendpoint — required to enable the auto-reply toggle UI in the desktop.PluginCardwithAIPlugin.imessage = .imessage(one-line addition).