CooperateISO

axelrod/strategies/_strategies.py

@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@
 from .better_and_better import BetterAndBetter
 from .bush_mosteller import BushMosteller
 from .calculator import Calculator
+from .cooperate_iso import LongtermTfT, ISO, CooperateISO
 from .cooperator import Cooperator, TrickyCooperator
 from .cycler import (
     AntiCycler,
@@ -316,6 +317,7 @@
     CautiousQLearner,
     CollectiveStrategy,
     ContriteTitForTat,
+    CooperateISO,
     Cooperator,
     CooperatorHunter,
     CycleHunter,
@@ -397,11 +399,13 @@
     Hopeless,
     Inverse,
     InversePunisher,
+    ISO,
     KnowledgeableWorseAndWorse,
     LevelPunisher,
     LimitedRetaliate,
     LimitedRetaliate2,
     LimitedRetaliate3,
+    LongtermTfT,
     MEM2,
     MathConstantHunter,
     Michaelos,

axelrod/strategies/cooperate_iso.py

@@ -0,0 +1,349 @@
+import numpy as np
+from scipy.optimize import minimize
+
+from axelrod.action import Action
+from axelrod.player import Player
+
+C, D = Action.C, Action.D
+
+
+class LongtermTfT(Player):
+    """Noise-tolerant Tit-for-Tat.
+
+    Cooperates by default and mirrors the opponent, but distinguishes
+    noise-corrupted cooperation from genuine defection using a statistical
+    test: it compares the opponent's observed defection count against the
+    binomial null expected from the noise rate (via a z-statistic) and
+    forgives defections that are consistent with noise. The number of
+    forgiven defections grows like O(sqrt(N_C)), so the forgiven *rate*
+    tends to zero — tolerating noise while staying unexploitable in the
+    long run. Retaliates only when the defection rate is significantly
+    above what noise alone would explain.
+
+    Names:
+    - Longterm TFT: [Hutter2023]_
+    """
+
+    name = "LongtermTfT"
+    classifier = {
+        "memory_depth": float("inf"),
+        "stochastic": False,
+        "makes_use_of": {"noise"},
+        "long_run_time": False,
+        "inspects_source": False,
+        "manipulates_source": False,
+        "manipulates_state": False,
+    }
+
+    def __init__(self):
+        super().__init__()
+        self.n_tft_would_c = 0
+        self.n_d_when_tft_would_c = 0
+        self.z = 0.0
+
+    def receive_match_attributes(self):
+        self.noise = self.match_attributes.get("noise", 0.0)
+
+    def strategy(self, opponent: Player) -> Action:
+        if not self.history:
+            return C
+        if len(self.history) == 1:
+            return opponent.history[-1]
+        if self.history[-2] == C:
+            self.n_tft_would_c += 1
+            if opponent.history[-1] == D:
+                self.n_d_when_tft_would_c += 1
+            n_expected_ds = self.n_tft_would_c * self.noise
+            std_expected_ds = np.sqrt(
+                self.noise * (1 - self.noise) * self.n_tft_would_c
+            )
+            self.z = (self.n_d_when_tft_would_c - n_expected_ds) / max(
+                1.0, std_expected_ds
+            )
+        if self.n_tft_would_c >= 5 and self.z < 2:
+            return C
+        else:
+            return opponent.history[-1]
+
+
+def get_reward(
+    my_strategy: np.ndarray,
+    opp_strategy: np.ndarray,
+    init_state: np.ndarray,
+    p_end: float,
+    p_noise: float,
+    RPST: tuple[float, float, float, float],
+) -> float:
+    """Calculates the expected average reward per step for a given policy
+    against a specific opponent strategy (including the effect of noise),
+    utilizing Markov transition matrices.
+
+    Memory-1 strategies are described as length-4 arrays, quantifying the probability
+    of cooperation in the states [CC, CD, DC, DD].
+
+    Applies p_noise only to own strategy (the opponent strategy already includes
+    noise effects) and flips CD/DC indices for the opponent.
+    """
+    own = my_strategy + p_noise * (1.0 - 2.0 * my_strategy)
+    opp = opp_strategy[[0, 2, 1, 3]]
+
+    trans_mat = np.array(
+        [
+            own * opp,
+            own * (1.0 - opp),
+            (1.0 - own) * opp,
+            (1.0 - own) * (1.0 - opp),
+        ]
+    ).T
+
+    R, P, S, T = RPST
+    rewards = np.array([R, S, T, P], dtype=float)
+    inv = np.linalg.inv(np.eye(4) - (1.0 - p_end) * trans_mat)
+    reward = init_state @ (inv @ rewards - rewards)
+    return p_end * float(reward) / (1.0 - p_end)
+
+
+def optimize_against(
+    opponent: np.ndarray,
+    init_state_idx: int,
+    p_end: float,
+    p_noise: float,
+    RPST: tuple[float, float, float, float],
+) -> tuple[float, np.ndarray]:
+    """
+    Discovers the optimal response strategy (policy) against a fixed opponent
+    model by maximizing the expected reward from a given starting state.
+    """
+    assert p_noise < 0.5
+
+    opp = np.clip(opponent, p_noise, 1.0 - p_noise)
+
+    init_state = np.zeros(4, dtype=np.float32)
+    init_state[init_state_idx] = 1.0
+
+    def objective(params: np.ndarray) -> float:
+        return -get_reward(params, opp, init_state, p_end, p_noise, RPST)
+
+    x0 = np.array([0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5])
+    bounds = [(0.0, 1.0), (0.0, 1.0), (0.0, 1.0), (0.0, 1.0)]
+    result = minimize(
+        objective, x0, method="L-BFGS-B", bounds=bounds, options={"maxiter": 50}
+    )
+
+    return -result.fun, result.x
+
+
+class ISO(Player):
+    """Optimal response against a memory-1 opponent model.
+
+    Estimates the opponent's memory-1 (order-1) conditional cooperation
+    probabilities, which together with its own memory-1 strategy induce a
+    Markov chain over outcome pairs. Computes the exact expected discounted
+    long-term payoff in closed form via the chain's stationary/resolvent
+    solution, then optimizes its own memory-1 policy to maximize it. A
+    simplification and refinement of DBS: it replaces bounded-depth tree
+    search with the exact infinite-horizon value, yielding stronger play
+    against exploitable opponents at lower complexity. Adaptive only w.r.t.
+    memory-1 opponents (the model is misspecified for higher-memory play).
+
+    Names:
+    - ISO: [Hutter2023]_
+    """
+
+    name = "ISO"
+    classifier = {
+        "memory_depth": float("inf"),
+        "stochastic": True,
+        "makes_use_of": {"noise", "game"},
+        "long_run_time": True,
+        "inspects_source": False,
+        "manipulates_source": False,
+        "manipulates_state": False,
+    }
+
+    def __init__(self):
+        """Initializes discount factors, opponent models, and policy state.
+
+        Tracks the opponent's rate of cooperation (numerator, denominator) for each
+        state. Assumes having seen the opponent play following TfT once in each state
+        to make the opponent-model well-defined from the start.
+
+        Sets initial cooperation probabilities (num / den) for opp_model and my_policy.
+        """
+        super().__init__()
+        self.discount_factor = 0.99
+
+        self.ewma_CC = [1.0, 1.0]
+        self.ewma_CD = [1.0, 1.0]
+        self.ewma_DC = [0.0, 1.0]
+        self.ewma_DD = [0.0, 1.0]
+
+        self.opp_model = [1.0, 0.0, 1.0, 0.0]
+        self.my_policy = [1.0, 0.0, 1.0, 0.0]
+
+    def receive_match_attributes(self):
+        self.noise = self.match_attributes.get("noise", 0.0)
+        self.RPST = self.match_attributes["game"].RPST()
+
+    def _update_single_ewma(
+        self, state_ewma: list[float], action_val: float
+    ) -> float:
+        """Updates the (numerator, denominator) pair in-place and returns the new average."""
+        state_ewma[0] = self.discount_factor * state_ewma[0] + action_val
+        state_ewma[1] = self.discount_factor * state_ewma[1] + 1.0
+        return state_ewma[0] / state_ewma[1]
+
+    def _update_opponent_model(self, opponent: Player):
+        if len(self.history) < 2:
+            return
+
+        prev_state = (self.history[-2], opponent.history[-2])
+        opp_act = 1.0 if opponent.history[-1] == C else 0.0
+
+        if prev_state == (C, C):
+            pr_c = self._update_single_ewma(self.ewma_CC, opp_act)
+            self.opp_model[0] = pr_c
+        elif prev_state == (C, D):
+            pr_c = self._update_single_ewma(self.ewma_CD, opp_act)
+            self.opp_model[2] = pr_c
+        elif prev_state == (D, C):
+            pr_c = self._update_single_ewma(self.ewma_DC, opp_act)
+            self.opp_model[1] = pr_c
+        elif prev_state == (D, D):
+            pr_c = self._update_single_ewma(self.ewma_DD, opp_act)
+            self.opp_model[3] = pr_c
+
+    def _get_state_idx(self, opponent) -> int:
+        if not self.history:
+            return 0
+        state = (self.history[-1], opponent.history[-1])
+        if state == (C, C):
+            return 0
+        elif state == (C, D):
+            return 1
+        elif state == (D, C):
+            return 2
+        elif state == (D, D):
+            return 3
+        return -1
+
+    def update(self, opponent: Player) -> float:
+        """Updates the opponent model and our policy.
+
+        Returns our expected reward per step.
+        """
+        self._update_opponent_model(opponent)
+        state_idx = self._get_state_idx(opponent)
+        expected, my_policy = optimize_against(
+            self.opp_model,
+            init_state_idx=state_idx,
+            p_noise=self.noise,
+            RPST=self.RPST,
+            p_end=1e-2,
+        )
+        self.my_policy = my_policy
+        return expected
+
+    def act(self, opponent: Player) -> Action:
+        state_idx = self._get_state_idx(opponent)
+        pr_c = self.my_policy[state_idx]
+        return self._random.random_choice(pr_c)
+
+    def strategy(self, opponent: Player) -> Action:
+        _ = self.update(opponent)
+        return self.act(opponent)
+
+
+class CooperateISO(Player):
+    """Forgiving cooperation combined with optimal exploitation.
+
+    Seeks to establish and sustain mutual cooperation using LongtermTFT's
+    noise-robust forgiveness, while switching to ISO to respond optimally
+    to opponents that can be exploited. In effect: cooperate with
+    retaliators, exploit the exploitable. This combination is the paper's
+    tournament-strong strategy, outperforming prior champions against the
+    Axelrod library across noise levels of 0–10%.
+
+    Names:
+    - CooperateISO: [Hutter2023]_
+    """
+
+    name = "CooperateISO"
+    classifier = {
+        "memory_depth": float("inf"),
+        "stochastic": True,
+        "makes_use_of": {"noise", "game"},
+        "long_run_time": True,
+        "inspects_source": False,
+        "manipulates_source": False,
+        "manipulates_state": False,
+    }
+
+    def __init__(self):
+        self.iso_instance = ISO()
+        super().__init__()
+        self.n_tft_would_c = 0
+        self.n_d_when_tft_would_c = 0
+        self.z = 0.0
+        self.playing_iso = False
+        self.reward_history = []
+
+    def set_seed(self, seed: int = None):
+        super().set_seed(seed)
+        self.iso_instance.set_seed(seed)
+
+    def receive_match_attributes(self):
+        super().receive_match_attributes()
+        self.RPST = self.match_attributes["game"].RPST()
+        self.noise = self.match_attributes["noise"]
+        self.iso_instance.noise = self.noise
+
+    def _update_reward_history(self, opponent):
+        R, P, S, T = self.RPST
+        state = (self.history[-1], opponent.history[-1])
+        if state == (C, C):
+            self.reward_history.append(R)
+        elif state == (C, D):
+            self.reward_history.append(S)
+        elif state == (D, C):
+            self.reward_history.append(T)
+        elif state == (D, D):
+            self.reward_history.append(P)
+
+    def strategy(self, opponent: Player) -> Action:
+        if not self.history:
+            return C
+        self.iso_instance.history.append(self.history[-1], opponent.history[-1])
+        if self.playing_iso:
+            return self.iso_instance.strategy(opponent)
+        self._update_reward_history(opponent)
+        expected = self.iso_instance.update(opponent)
+        if len(self.history) == 1:
+            return opponent.history[-1]
+        if self.history[-2] == C:
+            self.n_tft_would_c += 1
+            if opponent.history[-1] == D:
+                self.n_d_when_tft_would_c += 1
+            n_expected_ds = self.n_tft_would_c * self.noise
+            std_expected_ds = np.sqrt(
+                self.noise * (1 - self.noise) * self.n_tft_would_c
+            )
+            self.z = (self.n_d_when_tft_would_c - n_expected_ds) / max(
+                1.0, std_expected_ds
+            )
+        R, P, _, _ = self.RPST
+        expected_gain = expected - np.mean(self.reward_history)
+        if (
+            len(self.reward_history) >= 10
+            and expected_gain
+            > 2.0
+            * np.std(self.reward_history)
+            / np.sqrt(len(self.reward_history))
+            and expected_gain > 0.05 * (R - P)
+        ):
+            self.playing_iso = True
+            return self.iso_instance.act(opponent)
+        if self.n_tft_would_c >= 5 and self.z < 2:
+            return C
+        else:
+            return opponent.history[-1]

axelrod/tests/integration/test_tournament.py

@@ -145,7 +145,9 @@ def test_noisy_tournament(self):
 
         # If the noise is large enough, cooperator should win
         players = [axl.Cooperator(), axl.Defector()]
-        tournament = axl.Tournament(players, turns=5, repetitions=3, noise=0.75)
+        tournament = axl.Tournament(
+            players, turns=5, repetitions=3, noise=0.75, seed=42
+        )
         results = tournament.play(progress_bar=False)
         self.assertEqual(results.ranked_names[0], "Cooperator")