Only the most recent release line receives security fixes.
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
0.1.x (moving v1 once released) |
✅ |
| anything older | ❌ |
Email security@avarok.com. Please include a description of the issue, a proof of concept if you have one, and the action version (tag or commit SHA) you tested against. We aim to acknowledge reports within 3 business days.
Please do not open a public issue for security reports.
- The key crosses into the action only via an environment variable
(
INPUT_EMBEDDING_API_KEY); it is never interpolated into arun:body, command line, or URL. - The very first thing the entrypoint does is register the key with
::add-mask::, so it is redacted from all subsequent step logs. - The key is used solely as an
Authorization: Bearerheader on requests to theembedding-endpointyou configured. It is never persisted: it is not written to the corpus, the metadata file, the step summary, action outputs, caches, or artifacts. - Mock mode (
mock-embeddings: true) needs no key at all — use it for CI on forks and pull requests so secrets never reach untrusted contexts.
- Zero npm dependencies — the action runs vendored, plain Node ESM sources.
- The
lattice-serverbinary is downloaded from a pinned release tag (lattice-version, defaultv0.3.3) and verified against its published SHA-256 checksum before it is executed; it listens on loopback only. - Our own CI pins every third-party action by full commit SHA.