Remediation/00 baseline

[Adlgr87]

Summary by cubic

Establishes the remediation baseline for the trading bot: production now builds from main_prod.cpp (credentials read from env) instead of the main_hot_path.cpp demo, the hot path is now zero-allocation with network I/O moved to a background SPSC thread, and CI runs ctest plus a latency gate (P50 < 100µs, P99 < 200µs).

Behavior changes

• main_hot_path.cpp is excluded from the default build; the demo binary is opt-in via BUILD_DEMO=OFF.
• CI now triggers on the remediated branch and enforces the test suite and latency thresholds.
• Adds a latency benchmark and memory-allocation verification tool; committed results report P50 0.06µs, P99 0.07µs, and 0 allocations across 200k hot-path operations.
• Adds audit, verification, simulation, and integration-plan docs and rewrites the README to the remediated state.

Reviewer caveats

• core/build/ artifacts (CMake cache, object and dependency files) were committed; .gitignore was narrowed to bin/, which likely caused this.
• HOT_PATH_AUDIT_REPORT.md marks the code "CRITICAL FAIL — NOT APPROVED FOR PRODUCTION", while VERIFICATION_FINAL.md and the README claim approval with documented constraints.
• Adds a MutaLambda submodule gitlink with no other submodule content.

^{Written for commit d1f2ae9. Summary will update on new commits.}

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[cubic-dev-ai]

51 issues found and verified against the latest diff

Prompt for AI agents (unresolved issues)

Check if these issues are valid — if so, understand the root cause of each and fix them. If appropriate, use sub-agents to investigate and fix each issue separately.


<file name="core/include/order_book.hpp">

<violation number="1" location="core/include/order_book.hpp:112">
P1: `vwap` is immediately overwritten with `usd_available / (stake_usd > 0 ? stake_usd : 1)`, rendering the previous calculation dead code and returning a dimensionless coverage ratio instead of a fixed-point price. In addition, exiting the loop when `units_remaining == 0` prevents `usd_available` from accumulating total fillable liquidity across all asks up to `max_entry_price`. Compute VWAP as total fill cost divided by fill units, and continue accumulating `usd_available` for all eligible ask levels.</violation>
</file>

<file name="core/CMakeLists.txt">

<violation number="1" location="core/CMakeLists.txt:153">
P2: These discovered tests use `std::thread`, but neither test link branch links CMake’s thread target. On toolchains where pthread is not folded into libc, the new test executables fail at link time; call `find_package(Threads REQUIRED)` and link `Threads::Threads` to each test target.</violation>
</file>

<file name=".github/workflows/ci-cd-and-optimize.yml">

<violation number="1" location=".github/workflows/ci-cd-and-optimize.yml:61">
P2: `bc` is not installed in the `Setup Build Tools` step and may not be present in all runner environments. If `bc` is missing, the subshell outputs an error to stderr and returns empty stdout, causing `(( ))` to evaluate to 0 and silently bypass the latency threshold check. Use `awk` or install `bc` explicitly in `Setup Build Tools`.</violation>
</file>

<file name="team_remediation/agents/agente_obs/prompt.md">

<violation number="1" location="team_remediation/agents/agente_obs/prompt.md:18">
P1: A fixed 8192-slot queue with nonblocking enqueue cannot guarantee no event loss. The implementation drops events when full, so audit evidence can disappear; define durable overflow/backpressure or explicitly relax the no-loss requirement.</violation>

<violation number="2" location="team_remediation/agents/agente_obs/prompt.md:41">
P1: SPSC permits one producer, but this telemetry object receives events from `run_tick` and `process_submit_queue` (and can receive listener events). Concurrent pushes race on the ring; use an MPSC queue or serialize producers.</violation>

<violation number="3" location="team_remediation/agents/agente_obs/prompt.md:54">
P2: The required `ALERT_*` variables do not match `AlertConfig::load_from_env()`, which reads `TELEMETRY_*`. Setting the documented thresholds or webhook URL therefore has no effect; unify the names.</violation>

<violation number="4" location="team_remediation/agents/agente_obs/prompt.md:57">
P2: The alert defaults conflict with the Fase 2 kill-switch thresholds: the position-divergence alert (0.05) can never fire because trading is already halted at 0.01, and the daily-loss alert (500) equals the kill-switch threshold exactly, so it only trips after the halt. Alerts intended as early warning must be strictly below the kill thresholds; also reuse one env namespace (RISK_* / FEED_DEAD_TIMEOUT_MS) instead of duplicating the same conditions under ALERT_* names.</violation>
</file>

<file name="REMEDIATION_MASTER_PLAN.md">

<violation number="1" location="REMEDIATION_MASTER_PLAN.md:19">
P2: This plan cites `VERIFICATION_REPORT_FINAL.md` as authoritative, but that file does not exist; the repository contains `VERIFICATION_FINAL.md` instead. Rename the references or add the missing artifact so the remediation decision is verifiable.</violation>

<violation number="2" location="REMEDIATION_MASTER_PLAN.md:55">
P2: This entry identifies a nonexistent `POLY_ADDRESS`/`maker_hex` defect as unresolved. Update the consolidated issue list to reference the actual current identity/signing implementation, or remove the item after verifying the audit evidence.</violation>

<violation number="3" location="REMEDIATION_MASTER_PLAN.md:58">
P2: This entry reports a `built_count_` race that does not exist in the current `presigned_pool.hpp`. Revalidate the source location before assigning this as a P0 blocker; otherwise the remediation plan will pursue a nonexistent defect.</violation>
</file>

<file name="README.md">

<violation number="1" location="README.md:237">
P2: This line documents the signature scheme as `secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign32`, but that is wrong on two counts. The actual signing path in `core/crypto/eip712_signer.hpp` (lines ~280–296) uses `secp256k1_ecdsa_sign_recoverable` + `secp256k1_ecdsa_recoverable_signature_serialize_compact` — it is ECDSA, not Schnorr. Additionally, `secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign32` produces a 64-byte `r || s` signature with no recovery id, so the documented `v = 27 + recid` output does not even apply to it. Fix the name to `secp256k1_ecdsa_sign_recoverable` so the README accurately describes the crypto scheme.</violation>

<violation number="2" location="README.md:317">
P2: The CI-gates table and the note above it ("The CI workflow checks out `Adlgr87/MutaLambda` before running the evolution cycle") claim the workflow runs a MutaLambda evolution job daily. The only workflow, `.github/workflows/ci-cd-and-optimize.yml` (70 lines), contains a single build-and-test job with no MutaLambda step or checkout anywhere. Either add the job or reword the docs to say the evolution cycle is run manually.</violation>
</file>

<file name="core/src/balance_checker.hpp">

<violation number="1" location="core/src/balance_checker.hpp:51">
P1: The refresh thread shares the client’s persistent CURL handle with order submission, so concurrent `curl_easy_setopt`/`curl_easy_perform` calls can corrupt requests. Serialize client calls or give each worker its own client handle.</violation>

<violation number="2" location="core/src/balance_checker.hpp:53">
P1: On any failed balance fetch this wipes the known-good cache with zero. `client_.get_balances()` (core/src/lightweight_client.hpp:209) returns `std::nullopt` when the rate limiter rejects the call or the HTTP status isn't 200, and `fetch_balances()` then writes `{0.0, 0.0, now}` into `cached_balance_`. The next `check_min_balance()` therefore reports insufficient funds and blocks trading until a later successful refresh (up to 30s later). A single transient rate-limit or network blip halts the bot. Keep the previous cache on failure instead of overwriting it with zeros.</violation>

<violation number="3" location="core/src/balance_checker.hpp:60">
P2: This hot-path accessor takes a blocking mutex, contradicting the documented atomic/lock-free balance cache and allowing refresh contention to add nondeterministic latency. Publish a lock-free snapshot, such as atomics or a seqlock.</violation>

<violation number="4" location="core/src/balance_checker.hpp:120">
P1: A malformed 200 response can escape `fetch_balances()` and terminate the entire process from the refresh thread. Catch refresh errors and retain the last known-good snapshot.</violation>

<violation number="5" location="core/src/balance_checker.hpp:121">
P2: Stopping the checker can block for almost 30 seconds while the refresh thread sleeps, delaying shutdown. Replace `sleep_for` with a condition-variable wait and notify it from `stop_background_refresh()`.</violation>
</file>

<file name="team_remediation/agents/agente_econ/prompt.md">

<violation number="1" location="team_remediation/agents/agente_econ/prompt.md:66">
P2: This formula subtracts gas separately, but `FeeModel::compute_fee()` already includes gas and `compute_net_ev()` subtracts it again. That double-charges gas and rejects trades covering one gas charge; subtract it in only one place.</violation>
</file>

<file name="team_remediation/agents/agente_api/prompt.md">

<violation number="1" location="team_remediation/agents/agente_api/prompt.md:16">
P1: This is labeled per-endpoint, but neither `RateLimiter` nor `try_acquire()` identifies an endpoint. The production client uses one bucket for orders, status, and balances; add separate endpoint buckets or change the requirement to a global limit.</violation>

<violation number="2" location="team_remediation/agents/agente_api/prompt.md:33">
P1: These environment settings are never applied in production: `main_prod.cpp` constructs the client with defaults, and the client never reads them. Operators cannot tune the rate or retry safety limits as required.</violation>

<violation number="3" location="team_remediation/agents/agente_api/prompt.md:39">
P2: The requirement includes 504, but `HttpStatus` has no 504 value and `should_retry()` handles only 429/502/503. A gateway timeout will be returned as non-retryable; add 504 handling and test it.</violation>
</file>

<file name="team_remediation/agents/agente_compliance/prompt.md">

<violation number="1" location="team_remediation/agents/agente_compliance/prompt.md:34">
P1: Metadata is fetched once at startup only, so `status` (active/closed/resolved) in the cache goes stale as soon as a market closes or resolves after boot. The cache never refreshes, yet T5-1's acceptance criterion is "mercado cerrado → pre_trade_check bloquea": a market that was active at boot stays tradable indefinitely. Add a periodic refresh (off hot path, on a TTL timer) that re-fetches status/resolution, or the T5-3 resolution-warning gate only works for markets already closed at startup.</violation>

<violation number="2" location="team_remediation/agents/agente_compliance/prompt.md:37">
P2: The spec never defines behavior when metadata is missing or the RPC fetch fails. `get()` returns nullptr with no stated contract, and `apply_tick_size(uint64_t raw_price, int tick_size)` divides by `tick_size`, so an unparsed fetch leaving `tick_size` at 0 (the struct declares no default) is integer division by zero — UB. Unknown/unfetched tokens must fail closed (treated as not tradable, not as tradable) and `apply_tick_size` must guard `tick_size > 0`.</violation>

<violation number="3" location="team_remediation/agents/agente_compliance/prompt.md:51">
P1: The documented jurisdiction variable is singular, but `ComplianceGuard` reads the plural name and ignores `RiskConfig`'s singular value. Setting the documented variable leaves the guard at its default allowlist; unify the configuration contract.</violation>
</file>

<file name="MutaLambda">

<violation number="1" location="MutaLambda:1">
P2: This adds an unresolved gitlink without a `.gitmodules` mapping, so fresh clones cannot initialize or fetch `MutaLambda` and `git submodule update --init` fails. Add the submodule URL (or remove the gitlink and document the external dependency).</violation>
</file>

<file name="SIMULATION_RESULTS.md">

<violation number="1" location="SIMULATION_RESULTS.md:21">
P2: The result buckets double-count below-EV signals: T110 sums to 626 events for 500 ticks because `Slippage` includes the `NO_SIGNAL` count already shown as `Below EV`. Split the counters or remove the duplicated column, then regenerate the matrix.</violation>

<violation number="2" location="SIMULATION_RESULTS.md:90">
P2: The no-noise conclusion is contradicted by the simulator: `--no-noise` stops price walking but leaves in-band, above-threshold buy signals and the 75% fill path active. Re-run these fixtures or correct the simulator before using the claimed zero fills as validation.</violation>

<violation number="3" location="SIMULATION_RESULTS.md:113">
P2: The staleness summary does not match the matrix: 19 rows have stale events, with values 15–197; 1224 is a risk-blocked count from T129, not a stale count. Correct the denominator and range before treating this as validation evidence.</violation>
</file>

<file name="INTEGRATION_POLYWHALES_PLAN.md">

<violation number="1" location="INTEGRATION_POLYWHALES_PLAN.md:21">
P1: The plan maps the 35–70¢ price band to order-notional limits. Map it to `min_price_micros`/`max_price_micros`; `max_order_usd` is used for order size and cannot enforce this rule.</violation>

<violation number="2" location="INTEGRATION_POLYWHALES_PLAN.md:88">
P2: These Phase A rows describe work already implemented: `pre_trade_check()` in core/include/risk_engine.hpp already enforces the entry band via `is_price_in_entry_band()` (defaults 350000/700000 micros, lines 66–69) and per-market exposure via `max_exposure_per_market` (lines 77–80). Mark both rows `(DONE)` like the kill-switch row, or drop them, so the plan doesn't drive duplicate re-implementation of the baseline.</violation>
</file>

<file name="core/src/main_prod.cpp">

<violation number="1" location="core/src/main_prod.cpp:26">
P2: This comment claims the production entrypoint does NOT include execution_engine.cpp, but the very next lines `#include "execution_engine.cpp"`. That contradicts the file's stated purpose (and the PR's remediation intent) of proper header/source separation, and it means execution_engine.cpp is compiled twice into the same target (once as its own TU via the CMake glob, once embedded here). Either make the comment accurate or actually separate the engine into a header + .cpp so the #include isn't needed.</violation>

<violation number="2" location="core/src/main_prod.cpp:49">
P2: load_private_key_from_env only checks the string length, but strtol silently accepts non-hex characters (e.g. "zz" decodes to 0, "1g" to 1), so a malformed BOT_PRIVATE_KEY_HEX yields a silently wrong key instead of failing fast. Validate that all 64 chars are hex before decoding, or reject on parse error, since this is the production entrypoint for a trading bot.</violation>
</file>

<file name="core/include/spsc_ring_buffer.hpp">

<violation number="1" location="core/include/spsc_ring_buffer.hpp:32">
P1: This raw allocation is not guaranteed to satisfy `alignof(T)`, so an over-aligned `T` can be placement-constructed at a misaligned address, causing undefined behavior. Use aligned allocation with `std::align_val_t{alignof(T)}` and the matching aligned deallocation in the destructor.</violation>
</file>

<file name="core/build_verify_final/CMakeFiles/cmake.check_cache">

<violation number="1" location="core/build_verify_final/CMakeFiles/cmake.check_cache:1">
P2: This is a CMake-generated build artifact (the file itself says it is generated by cmake) being committed as part of the entire `core/build*` output tree (1216 files, ~28 MB, including binaries and compiler dependency files). Build outputs must not be in version control: every developer's local build regenerates these files (causing constant dirty-tree noise and merge conflicts), the tracked `CMakeCache.txt` bakes in one machine's absolute paths (`/home/adlg/...`), and the artifacts go stale the moment anyone rebuilds. Add `core/build*/` to `.gitignore` and remove all tracked files under `core/build/`, `core/build_baseline/`, `core/build_final/`, `core/build_phase0/`, `core/build_test/`, `core/build_verify/`, `core/build_verify2/`, and `core/build_verify_final/`. If the build configuration needs to be preserved as a baseline, keep only a single documented record (e.g., the relevant `CMakeCache.txt` options or a build log) rather than the generated tree.</violation>
</file>

<file name="core/src/main_hot_path.cpp">

<violation number="1" location="core/src/main_hot_path.cpp:34">
P1: This points `LightweightCLOBClient` at `api.polymarket.com` instead of the documented CLOB host, so authenticated order submissions can fail before reaching the exchange. Keep the CLOB base URL here, or update the client’s route contract consistently if the API host migration is intentional.</violation>
</file>

<file name=".gitignore">

<violation number="1" location=".gitignore:1">
P2: This rewrite drops every existing ignore rule and keeps only `bin/`, a directory that does not exist anywhere in the repo. Generated artifacts the old rules excluded still exist here and are now exposed to `git add .`/`git add -A`: `core/build/` (197 generated CMake/object files), `infra/mutalambda/adapter/__pycache__/` (a `.pyc` is already tracked, and running any of the repo's `.py` tools, e.g. `infra/scripts/mutalambda_optimize.py`, regenerates `__pycache__` entries that no longer match the tracked `cpython-314.pyc`), and the `test_keccak*` binaries. Restore the previous rules; anything already tracked additionally needs `git rm -r --cached` to actually stop being versioned.</violation>
</file>

<file name="core/src/presigned_pool.hpp">

<violation number="1" location="core/src/presigned_pool.hpp:47">
P1: `check_and_invalidate` is never invoked by production code, so submitted orders are never added to or invalidated by this pool and T3-5 is inert. Wire the pool into order submission and order-book update/cancellation paths.</violation>

<violation number="2" location="core/src/presigned_pool.hpp:89">
P1: This filter hides exactly the stale orders that need cancellation after invalidation, leaving callers no pool API to retrieve their IDs. Expose invalid/pending-cancel IDs, or return the IDs invalidated by each operation.</violation>
</file>

<file name="team_remediation/agents/agente_baseline/prompt.md">

<violation number="1" location="team_remediation/agents/agente_baseline/prompt.md:4">
P2: The Rol section tells the agent to create the branch `remediation/compliance`, but that is the integration branch that only the Director merges into per REMEDIACION_COORDINATION_PROTOCOL.md §4.5 ("El Director controla merge a `remediation/compliance`"). This file's own Branch section (line 7) and Deliverable 1 (line 51) name `remediation/00-baseline` as the branch to create, as does the README table. An agent following this prompt could create or commit to the wrong branch. Rename it to `remediation/00-baseline` (or reword as "working branch `remediation/00-baseline`, integración final `remediation/compliance`").</violation>
</file>

<file name="HOT_PATH_AUDIT_REPORT.md">

<violation number="1" location="HOT_PATH_AUDIT_REPORT.md:7">
P2: The "critical" runtime claims in the Summary/verdict are stale: `register_order_no_alloc` does populate `open_order_index_` (order_manager.hpp ~line 157); `ExecutionEngine::init_eip712_domain()` calls `signer_.set_domain("EIP712Domain(...)", domain_data)` with the Polymarket name hash and verifyingContract, so the production domain separator is not all zeros; `process_submit_queue` loops on `!shutdown_.load(...)` with `std::atomic<bool> shutdown_{false}`, so there is no join deadlock; `market_exposure` is computed from `params.size` (execution_engine.cpp:273); `check_rate_window()` sums all 60 buckets in a loop (risk_engine.hpp); the payload tail uses `append_str("\",\"exp\":\"0\",\"t\":0}", 18)` with the correct 18-byte length; and the secondary index uses `StringHash`/`StringEqual` with a `thread_local` key buffer, not an allocating `make_index_key`. Please correct Issues 6-9, 14-16 and the "12 NOT Actually Fixed" count and CRITICAL FAIL verdict so the report matches the code it describes.</violation>

<violation number="2" location="HOT_PATH_AUDIT_REPORT.md:25">
P2: The "Build Integrity" section is inaccurate against the current tree. `core/include/transparent_string_hash.hpp` exists (included at `order_manager.hpp:17`), `register_order_no_alloc` is declared at `core/include/order_manager.hpp:118` and called at `execution_engine.cpp:325`, `core/CMakeLists.txt` has `find_package(CURL/OpenSSL)` + `find_library(SECP256K1_LIBRARY)` and `target_link_libraries` for all three, `infra/docker/Dockerfile.prod:53` already copies `/app/build/bin/crowdintel_bot`, and `test_signer`/`latency_bench`/`l2_backtester` plus the `../tests/test_*.cpp` glob are registered as CMake targets. Re-verify each claim against the current checkout (or clearly label this report as documenting a pre-remediation snapshot); as written, the CRITICAL build-breaking verdict misrepresents the repository.</violation>

<violation number="3" location="HOT_PATH_AUDIT_REPORT.md:421">
P1: The P0 instruction changes the length to 17 even though the literal is 18 bytes; applying it still removes the final `}` and leaves malformed JSON. Correct the audit instruction to preserve length 18.</violation>
</file>

<file name="team_remediation/agents/agente_riesgo/prompt.md">

<violation number="1" location="team_remediation/agents/agente_riesgo/prompt.md:117">
P2: El punto de integración accede a `balances.usdc` y `balances.pol`, pero el `struct Balance` de T2-4 define los campos `usdc_balance` y `pol_balance`. Tal como está, el snippet no compila. Alinea los nombres en un solo lugar.</violation>

<violation number="2" location="team_remediation/agents/agente_riesgo/prompt.md:120">
P2: El snippet llama a `telemetry_.log_risk_block(...)`, pero `telemetry_` es la telemetría de la Fase 6 (AGENTE_OBS, `core/src/telemetry.hpp`) y esta fase solo depende de la Fase 0. El agente de la Fase 2 no tendrá `ExecutionEngine::telemetry_` ni el método `log_risk_block` (la API de la Fase 6 usa `log(EventType::RISK_BLOCKED, ...)`). El snippet no compila al ejecutarse la fase. Marca la llamada como TODO de la Fase 6 y deja solo `return risk_result;`.</violation>
</file>

<file name="VERIFICATION_FINAL.md">

<violation number="1" location="VERIFICATION_FINAL.md:45">
P1: The report calls exposure fixed, but `run_tick()` checks only the current order value and omits existing positions. A later order can pass individually while cumulative exposure exceeds the cap.</violation>

<violation number="2" location="VERIFICATION_FINAL.md:122">
P2: The rate-window complexity is described two ways that contradict each other and the code. Critical Audit Fixes #7 correctly says the fix "sums all 60 buckets" (O(60)), but here it is claimed as "O(1) via modular indexing". check_rate_window (risk_engine.hpp:284) iterates all WINDOW_BUCKETS=60 buckets with a clock read and reset_if_stale per bucket on every pre_trade_check, so the check is O(60), not O(1) — the stated O(64)→O(1) win did not happen. Align this section with the O(60) description.</violation>

<violation number="3" location="VERIFICATION_FINAL.md:177">
P1: `register_order_no_alloc` is not allocation-free: it constructs `std::string` values for the client ID, market slug, and index key. Because `run_tick()` calls it before queueing, the documented zero-allocation hot-path claim is false.</violation>

<violation number="4" location="VERIFICATION_FINAL.md:208">
P1: `signer_.sign_order()` runs directly inside `run_tick()` before the asynchronous queue, so its `std::vector` allocation is on the hot path, not a cold/background path. Update this constraint or move signing off `run_tick()`.</violation>
</file>

<file name="core/include/rate_limiter.hpp">

<violation number="1" location="core/include/rate_limiter.hpp:90">
P2: The lazy refill store is not atomic with token consumption, so under concurrency it can clobber another thread's decrement and inflate the token count. Example (rate=1/s): two threads both refill; thread A wins the `last_refill_ns_` CAS, loads `tokens_ == 1.0`; thread B (whose refill CAS lost) CAS-decrements to 0.0 and returns true; A then stores `1.0 + 1.0 = 2.0`, overwriting B's decrement. Final is 2.0 instead of 1.0 — one extra token leaked, loosening the advertised rate limit beyond `burst_`. Fix by folding the refill and the decrement into a single CAS loop that reads `last_refill_ns_`/`tokens_` and atomically applies both, so no thread's update is lost.</violation>
</file>

<file name="team_remediation/README.md">

<violation number="1" location="team_remediation/README.md:48">
P2: This schedule parallelizes phases that all modify `core/src/execution_engine.cpp`. Merging them can silently lose the risk, net-EV, or compliance gate; serialize that integration or assign one owner.</violation>
</file>

<file name="team_remediation/agents/agente_qa/prompt.md">

<violation number="1" location="team_remediation/agents/agente_qa/prompt.md:33">
P1: This scan cannot establish that the repository or commits contain no secrets: it excludes most paths and file types, and `git diff` does not inspect history. Use a repo-wide tracked-file and history-aware secret scan.</violation>
</file>

<sub>Note: This PR contains a large number of files. cubic selects up to 200 of the highest-priority eligible files for this review, so some files may not have been reviewed.

Re-trigger cubic</sub>

[cubic-dev-ai]

24 existing issues remain and 33 new issues found across 1284 files

Prompt for AI agents (unresolved issues)

Check if these issues are valid — if so, understand the root cause of each and fix them. If appropriate, use sub-agents to investigate and fix each issue separately.


<file name="core/include/tick_result.hpp">

<violation number="1" location="core/include/tick_result.hpp:27">
P3: `tick_result_str` has no callers in the repository, so this new helper is dead code and currently does not provide the promised logging behavior. Remove it or route the existing result logging through this helper.</violation>
</file>

<file name="core/src/balance_checker.hpp">

<violation number="1" location="core/src/balance_checker.hpp:115">
P3: This header is not self-contained because it declares `std::atomic` without including `<atomic>`. Add the direct standard-library include instead of relying on `lightweight_client.hpp`'s transitive dependency.</violation>
</file>

<file name="team_remediation/agents/agente_obs/prompt.md">

<violation number="1" location="team_remediation/agents/agente_obs/prompt.md:52">
P2: T6-2 and T6-3 specify alerts and metrics (daily loss, consecutive 429, latency P99, position divergence, feed dead, realized+unrealized PnL, USDC/POL balance, TickResult counters) but define no interface for feeding these values into Telemetry. Without it the agent will invent call shapes that don't match the phase 2-4 components (RiskEngine, OrderManager, BalanceChecker, latency_bench), and the `ticks/` counters may be duplicated with the atomic counters already present in core/src/telemetry.hpp. Add a short 'Interfaces' section naming the producer component and call signature for each input.</violation>
</file>

<file name="core/include/order_book.hpp">

<violation number="1" location="core/include/order_book.hpp:75">
P1: `is_stale` only checks the newer of bid/ask timestamps, so one side can be stale while this still reports fresh. Compare each side age to `max_age_ns` and mark stale when either side is too old.</violation>

<violation number="2" location="core/include/order_book.hpp:78">
P1: `is_stale()` compares timestamps from an RDTSC-based contract with a `steady_clock` value, so live books can be falsely blocked or stale books can pass depending on the timestamp source. Normalize updates and the comparison to one clock and epoch.</violation>

<violation number="3" location="core/include/order_book.hpp:99">
P1: `walk_asks` multiplies two 1e6-scaled values without rescaling, so per-level liquidity is inflated by 1e6 and traversal decisions become incorrect. Rescale by `1'000'000` using a 128-bit intermediate to avoid overflow.</violation>

<violation number="4" location="core/include/order_book.hpp:112">
P2: `walk_asks()` returns a scaled liquidity ratio, not a VWAP, and reports partial liquidity as fillable. Fix the fixed-point accounting and return `(0, 0)` whenever the requested stake cannot be fully filled.</violation>
</file>

<file name="core/src/alpha_receiver.hpp">

<violation number="1" location="core/src/alpha_receiver.hpp:29">
P1: `ev_per_dollar` uses fixed-point scaling, but the hot path consumes it as an unscaled dollar value; a normal positive signal therefore saturates Kelly sizing and distorts profitability. Normalize by `1e6` at the boundary or keep this field in the engine’s existing units.</violation>

<violation number="2" location="core/src/alpha_receiver.hpp:30">
P1: The hot path ignores the signal’s explicit `side` and derives direction from EV sign, so valid signals can be submitted on the opposite side. Validate and use `signal->side` when building the order.</violation>

<violation number="3" location="core/src/alpha_receiver.hpp:31">
P1: `valid` defaults to false, but the hot path never checks it before processing, so default-constructed invalid signals can still trade. Reject invalid signals before sizing and submission, or remove this flag from the contract.</violation>
</file>

<file name="core/src/presigned_pool.hpp">

<violation number="1" location="core/src/presigned_pool.hpp:60">
P2: A missing best quote is represented by price `0`, but this guard fails open and keeps the order valid. Invalidate when `current_ref` is zero (and reject malformed zero-price orders) so a missing book cannot leave stale orders eligible.</violation>
</file>

<file name="core/src/main_prod.cpp">

<violation number="1" location="core/src/main_prod.cpp:67">
P2: The production entrypoint retains an unzeroized private-key copy for the process lifetime, while `EIP712Signer` keeps another copy. Use a zeroizing key container and clear every copy, including signer storage, during teardown.</violation>

<violation number="2" location="core/src/main_prod.cpp:82">
P1: The production loop cannot shut down cleanly on SIGTERM, so deployment termination skips listener and submission cleanup and can leave exchange orders unmanaged. Install a signal-driven stop flag and perform cancellation/cleanup before returning.</violation>
</file>

<file name="INTEGRATION_POLYWHALES_PLAN.md">

<violation number="1" location="INTEGRATION_POLYWHALES_PLAN.md:88">
P2: Several components listed as pending work (`Add ...`, `Need to add ...`, and the Phase A rows) already exist in the tree and should be marked (DONE) like the kill-switch row: `OrderBookL2::is_stale()` (order_book.hpp:70, 90s default) and `walk_asks()` VWAP helper (order_book.hpp:82) are already implemented with a comment "Adapted from Polywhales copclob"; `pre_trade_check` already enforces the 35-70¢ entry band via `is_price_in_entry_band` (risk_engine.hpp:66, 174-176; fields `min_price_micros`/`max_price_micros` in market_config.hpp:42-43); paper trading evidence is already recorded (`record_paper_fill`/`record_paper_skip`, telemetry.hpp:220-254); jurisdiction checks already exist (`ComplianceGuard::verify_jurisdiction`, compliance_guard.hpp:119-125). As written, Phase A scope and the Files-to-Modify table misrepresent the remaining work and invite re-implementation.</violation>

<violation number="2" location="INTEGRATION_POLYWHALES_PLAN.md:127">
P3: The same new file appears in both tables with conflicting paths: `core/src/compliance_config.hpp` in Files to Modify vs `core/include/compliance_config.hpp` in Files to Create. Headers in this repo live under `core/include/`, so unify on one path, otherwise the file creation location is ambiguous.</violation>
</file>

<file name="SIMULATION_RESULTS.md">

<violation number="1" location="SIMULATION_RESULTS.md:48">
P3: The "500 ticks → 16-65 fills" range excludes several 500-tick rows in the matrix: T113 (2 fills, 0.4%), T120 (10 fills, 2%), T125 (3 fills, 0.6%). The stated range only holds for the seed=42/$100k/markets 2-10 subset, so it misrepresents the 500-tick results as a whole.</violation>

<violation number="2" location="SIMULATION_RESULTS.md:50">
P2: "2000 ticks → 0 fills (with noise)" cites no run in the matrix. The only 2000-tick row, T129, is noise *off* (and is correctly listed under "Noise Off Behavior" in section 5). Labeling it "with noise" is misleading; a 2000-tick noise-on run was never reported.</violation>
</file>

<file name="docs/PERF_METRICS.md">

<violation number="1" location="docs/PERF_METRICS.md:44">
P3: The new `## 3. Jitter Analysis` heading duplicates the existing `## 3. Throughput`, and sections 4–6 (Memory Profile, Environment-Specific Notes, Profiling Commands) were not shifted, so the outline now reads 1, 2, 3, 3, 4, 5, 6. Renumber Throughput to 4, Memory Profile to 5, Environment-Specific Notes to 6, and Profiling Commands to 7 so every section number is unique and sequential.</violation>
</file>

<file name="MutaLambda">

<violation number="1" location="MutaLambda:1">
P2: The JSON structure is preserved. The fixSuggestion text includes newline characters and backticks; these are kept as literal content within the JSON string and must be properly escaped if the string is embedded in contexts that require escaping. No changes to the substantive content of the violation are made.</violation>
</file>

<file name="core/src/bench_engine.hpp">

<violation number="1" location="core/src/bench_engine.hpp:22">
P3: The comment claims bench_engine.hpp is "only compiled when BUILD_BENCH is enabled", but no BUILD_BENCH option exists. core/CMakeLists.txt adds `add_executable(latency_bench ../tests/benchmarks/latency_bench.cpp)` unconditionally, and latency_bench.cpp is the only file that includes bench_engine.hpp. The hardcoded dummy-key engine is therefore compiled into every default build, so the stated "See CMakeLists.txt" guard is misleading. Either correct the comment to describe the actual build path (compiled only by the always-built latency_bench target, never linked into crowdintel_bot), or add a real BUILD_BENCH option that guards the target so the wording is true.</violation>
</file>

<file name="team_remediation/README.md">

<violation number="1" location="team_remediation/README.md:3">
P3: Target branch disagrees with the rest of the coordination docs. The protocol, manifest, and workflow all designate `remediation/compliance` as the merge target (agents work in `remediation/<fase>/<agente>` and the Director merges to `remediation/compliance`), while this landing page says `main`. Align the README with `remediation/compliance` so agents following it don't branch their work off the wrong base.</violation>
</file>

<file name="README.md">

<violation number="1" location="README.md:117">
P3: Sample output is internally inconsistent: 72 fills out of 2000 signals is 3.6%, not 4.2%. The simulator prints `fill_rate = 100.0 * fills / signals` (tests/sim/paper_trading_main.cpp:384), so a run with 2000 signals and 72 fills always prints 3.6%. Fix one side of the mismatch so the quoted report is reproducible.</violation>

<violation number="2" location="README.md:163">
P3: The line numbers cited in this optimization table are stale/wrong, which matters because the README advertises them as audit evidence. `execution_engine.cpp:474` is retry-decision code; the zero-alloc payload builder is `build_order_payload_fixed` at line 532 (with the `std::array<char,512>` buffer at line 316). `order_manager.hpp:160` is `apply_fill` — the O(1) secondary-index lookup is `has_open_order` at line 191. `risk_engine.hpp:263` is the "Consecutive Rejects" comment; the bucket-based rate-window block starts at line 269. Update each row to the location of the actual code.</violation>
</file>

<file name="REMEDIATION_MASTER_PLAN.md">

<violation number="1" location="REMEDIATION_MASTER_PLAN.md:5">
P3: The header date (2025-09-25) contradicts the "Synthesized from" line two lines above it, which dates Technical Audit #1 at 2026-09-25 (repeated in the summary table at line 9). A plan dated 2025-09-25 cannot be synthesized from an audit performed one year later; one of the dates is wrong. In-repo artifacts (e.g., HOT_PATH_AUDIT_REPORT.md dated 2025-01-23) suggest the 2026 date is the typo, but reconcile the audit chronology before publication.</violation>

<violation number="2" location="REMEDIATION_MASTER_PLAN.md:41">
P2: This claim is false and inverts the repository layout. `core/src/execution_engine.cpp` exists (609 lines) and contains `run_tick()` (line 198) with the kill-switch check at line 223; no `execution_engine.hpp` exists anywhere in the repo. Yet the plan's own table cites `execution_engine.hpp:110,111,216,227-228,272-274,106-117,126-130,294,301,314` (lines 25, 59, 63, 64, 71, 73) while line 26 cites `execution_engine.cpp:356` — internally contradictory, and every `.hpp` line reference points to a nonexistent file. Since this document is the roadmap the remediation agents follow, these references and the "Reconciling the Discrepancy" rationale built on the false premise will misdirect remediation. Verify each line reference against `core/src/execution_engine.cpp` (e.g., `std::string(market_slug)` is at line 363, not 294/301/314).</violation>

<violation number="3" location="REMEDIATION_MASTER_PLAN.md:63">
P2: C-09's state is mislabeled. The async queue is implemented: `run_tick()` pushes to `submit_queue_` (line 361) and returns without touching the client; the only `client_.submit_order_with_response()` call is at line 457 inside `process_submit_queue()` (the background cold path). Marking C-09 "NOT FIXED" and forwarding it to the P3 remediation item will send agents to re-implement an already-completed fix.</violation>
</file>

<file name="team_remediation/agents/agente_compliance/prompt.md">

<violation number="1" location="team_remediation/agents/agente_compliance/prompt.md:36">
P2: T5-3's `COMPLIANCE_RESOLUTION_WARNING_HOURS` (default 24h) is specified nowhere: ComplianceConfig in T5-2 has no such field, and both `is_market_tradable(token_id)` (T5-1) and `verify_market_active(token_id, cache)` (T5-2) take no hours parameter, so the resolution-proximity gate cannot be implemented as written. Add a `resolution_warning_hours` field to ComplianceConfig and thread it through the market-active check, e.g. `is_market_tradable(token_id, warning_hours)`.</violation>

<violation number="2" location="team_remediation/agents/agente_compliance/prompt.md:66">
P3: `Nuevo TickResult::MARKET_NOT_TRADABLE` assumes an enum that the spec never defines or locates. The enum already exists in core/include/tick_result.hpp (shared with risk_engine.hpp, which returns TickResult); instruct the agent to add the enumerator there, extend `tick_result_str` and any switch over TickResult (telemetry recording, tests), and not to redefine the enum in a new header.</violation>
</file>

<file name="team_remediation/agents/agente_riesgo/prompt.md">

<violation number="1" location="team_remediation/agents/agente_riesgo/prompt.md:40">
P2: The deliverables this prompt marks "(nuevo)" already exist in the repo (`core/include/risk_engine.hpp`, `core/src/balance_checker.hpp`, `core/src/market_config.hpp`, `core/src/execution_engine.cpp`) with a richer, integrated implementation: `pre_trade_check` takes 5 args (with entry-band, feed-dead, and reject-streak checks), and `tick_result.hpp` already has `INSUFFICIENT_BALANCE`/`STALE_BOOK`, which the prompt's 3-arg spec and enum omit. An agent following the prompt literally would overwrite the integrated engine with the simplified spec and break the existing `run_tick` call site. Mark the files as "modificar si existe" and align the spec (signature arity, TickResult members) with the current code.</violation>
</file>

<file name="VERIFICATION_FINAL.md">

<violation number="1" location="VERIFICATION_FINAL.md:81">
P3: The "Evidence" line references in this report do not match the current code, so the claims cannot be verified as written. Verified against the current tree: `submit_order_with_response` calls are at execution_engine.cpp:457 and 483, not 403/429 (those are `RiskConfig config_;` and `operator_jurisdiction_`); `process_submit_queue` starts at line 442, not 257-315; the `"exp":"0","t":0}` append is at line 587, not 516; the `register_order_no_alloc` call is at line 325, not 281; `build_order_payload_fixed`/`generate_client_order_id_fixed` are at 532/597, not 474/537; kill switch/signing/order-param build are at 223/312/255, not 182/214/261; `TimeBucket`/`check_rate_window`/`reset_if_stale` are at risk_engine.hpp 276/284/320, not 253/263/283. Update all cited line numbers to the current files so the report's evidence is actually checkable.</violation>
</file>

<file name="team_remediation/agents/agente_econ/prompt.md">

<violation number="1" location="team_remediation/agents/agente_econ/prompt.md:33">
P2: The dynamic-fee formula in T4-1 is underspecified on units and scale. `C × 0.25 × (p·(1−p))²` is dimensionless: with the default C=0.075 its maximum (at p=0.5) is C×0.015625 ≈ 0.0012, and it never uses `notional_usd` even though `compute_dynamic_fee(notional_usd, probability)` takes it — so the spec does not say whether the result is a USD amount, an additive rate, or a multiplier over the maker/taker rate, nor that it should scale with order size. T4-3 then writes `net_ev = edge_usd - fees - slippage - gas_cost` while T4-1 never states which components `compute_fee` covers (base rate, dynamic fee, `base_commission_usd`, gas?), so an agent can put gas/base commission inside `compute_fee` and double-subtract it in net_ev (a defect this ambiguity produced: gas is billed inside `compute_fee` and again by `estimate_gas_cost` in the merged `compute_net_ev`). The mandated test (max near p=0.5) only verifies curve shape and would pass any magnitude or composition. Fix: state units and composition explicitly — e.g. `fees = notional_usd × rate + dynamic_fee_usd + base_commission_usd`, `dynamic_fee_usd = C × notional_usd × 0.25 × (p(1−p))²`, gas only through `gas_cost` — and require a magnitude test at p=0.5.</violation>
</file>

<file name="team_remediation/agents/agente_api/prompt.md">

<violation number="1" location="team_remediation/agents/agente_api/prompt.md:80">
P2: The spec places the only required rate check in ExecutionEngine::run_tick before submit_order, but the T1-2 retry loop inside the client then sends up to 5 more HTTP requests (429/5xx) without re-issuing try_acquire(). With the default 1.0 req/s limit and the delivered backoff starting at 100 ms, retries fire at ~1.4, 3.5, 7, 13, 23 Hz — far above the client's declared limit during exactly the storm the limiter exists to avoid. Require a rate-limit check before each retry attempt (or backoff no shorter than the rate-limit interval).</violation>

<violation number="2" location="team_remediation/agents/agente_api/prompt.md:93">
P2: The prescribed test relies entirely on assert(), but core/CMakeLists.txt adds -DNDEBUG via add_compile_options and the test executables added afterward inherit it. With NDEBUG defined, assert() is compiled to a no-op and its expressions are never evaluated, so the test never calls try_acquire() and always passes under ctest regardless of implementation. Use plain checks that fail the process (e.g., count failures and return them from main) so the test is not compiled out.</violation>
</file>

<sub>Note: This PR contains a large number of files. cubic selects up to 200 of the highest-priority eligible files for this review, so some files may not have been reviewed.
Requires human review: Auto-approval blocked because this review re-detected 30 unresolved issues already reported by Cubic.

Re-trigger cubic</sub>