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os/mini: the image ships the builder's home path as a directory (/bin/1bit -> /home/<user>/…/build/1bit) — a fourth leak class the guard cannot see #1543

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@bong-water-water-bong

The mini (initramfs) image ships the builder's home path as a directory, and /bin/1bit is a symlink to it. Measured on a real artifact, not from the code:

$ objcopy -O binary --only-section=.initrd ~/wt/issue-709-img/1bit-os.efi initrd.cpio      # 97,867,512 B
$ zstd -dc initrd.cpio | cpio -tv | grep -E 'home/|bin/1bit'
lrwxrwxrwx  1 root root      36  bin/1bit -> /home/bcloud/wt/issue-709-build/1bit
drwxr-xr-x  3 root root       0  home/bcloud
drwxr-xr-x  3 root root       0  home/bcloud/wt
drwxr-xr-x  2 root root       0  home/bcloud/wt/issue-709-build
-rwxr-xr-x  1 root root 4692512  home/bcloud/wt/issue-709-build/1bit

So a shipped image discloses the builder's username, working directory and build-directory name, and carries a 4.7 MB binary at that path.

It is deliberate, and the reason is in the code

os/mini/mkimage.sh:68-69:

build=${2:-$HOME/.cache/1bit-os/src/build}
build=$(cd "$build" && pwd)   # absolute: binaries keep their build paths inside the image

and copy_elf preserves that path (cp -L "$f" "$root$f"), with ln -s "$bin" "$root/bin/1bit". Keeping the build path is what makes the engine's own RUNPATH resolve inside the image without rewriting the binary. That is a real constraint, not an oversight - but the disclosure is a side effect nobody chose, and with the default $HOME/.cache/1bit-os/src/build every mini image ships /home/<user>/.cache/1bit-os/src/build/1bit.

Why it matters beyond the previous three classes

The leak taxonomy in policies/build-path-leak-classes.md has three classes - baked __FILE__/debug info (map it), a packaged build tree (do not package it), a symbol table (strip it). This is a fourth: a path delivered as the filesystem layout itself. The guard that watches for the others (build_path_strings) reads the contents of packed ELFs and generated text, so it cannot see this at all - the string /home/bcloud/... does appear inside /bin/1bit's symlink target, but as a symlink target in a cpio, not inside a file's bytes.

Fix candidate, and its cost

Relocate the engine instead of preserving its build path:

  1. patchelf --set-rpath '$ORIGIN' on the engine - the file already has that helper (relocate(), used for the data-partition llama set at mkimage.sh:1061);
  2. install it as a real file at /bin/1bit with its libraries beside it, and drop $root$bin entirely.

Acceptance must be a boot, not a build: the risk is exactly RUNPATH resolution, and a mini image that builds and then cannot start its engine would be worse than the disclosure. 1bit --version plus a serve on the booted image is the test.

Interaction with the identity work (#1541, #1542)

Both halves keep working either way, and this is the reason to do it now rather than later:

So the change is green-field for the identity and needs no coordination with either PR.

Activity

  1. bong-water-water-bong commented on Nov 8, 2026

    @bong-water-water-bong
    CollaboratorAuthor

    Confirmed from the shipped initramfs of a real mini image (~/wt/issue-709-img/initramfs.img, 97,867,512 B), not from the build tree — and the check also reproduced your host-escape caveat on itself.

    The disclosure, as the medium carries it

    $ (zstd -dc initramfs.img) | cpio -itv | grep -E 'bin/1bit|issue-709-build'
    lrwxrwxrwx   1 root root   36 Nov  6 09:12 bin/1bit -> /home/bcloud/wt/issue-709-build/1bit
    drwxr-xr-x   2 root root    0 Nov  6 09:12 home/bcloud/wt/issue-709-build
    -rwxr-xr-x   1 root root  4692512 Nov  6 09:12 home/bcloud/wt/issue-709-build/1bit
    

    So the image ships the builder's username, working directory and build-directory name as a directory tree, exactly as you described, and the engine the image runs is reached only through that absolute symlink. bin/1bit is 36 bytes of disclosure; the payload behind it is 4,692,512 B.

    And the bytes behind it are the identity the row has been complaining about all week: that copy hashes to 89a6c386425a853a… — the c26c launcher whose sha the identity file claimed while c32 and c33 shipped 80aceca1…/7ba21108…. So this image is a coherent witness: it carries the engine those stale claims named, which is why nobody noticed the claims were stale.

    Your guard gap, stated in the terms the taxonomy uses

    build_path_strings inspects contents — ELFs via strings, generated text via grep. Here the path is delivered as filesystem layout: a symlink target plus a directory tree. Nothing in the file bodies names it, so a check that walks contents cannot see it, and the fourth class is real rather than hypothetical. Two cheap additions worth considering once the fix lands (either detects this, and neither replaces the other):

    1. walk the cpio/squashfs entry list for absolute symlink targets and for home/<name>/ / Users/<name>/ trees — that is the layout class, and it is a few lines over cpio -it / unsquashfs -ll;
    2. assert nothing at all in the image is owned by a uid ≥ 1000 — the tree above is bcloud:bcloud, which a packaged artifact should never carry. That one is one find -uid/tar -tv away and catches the same disclosure from the other side.

    The caveat you named, reproduced by accident

    Verifying that the link resolves to the image's own copy, I extracted the cpio on this host and asked for the realpath:

    python3 -c 'os.path.realpath("/tmp/m709/bin/1bit")'
    -> /home/bcloud/wt/payload-c26c/lemonade-onebit-rc-2026-11-05-c26c/1bit/1bit
    

    It escaped to a different build that happens to exist on this box — and that file has a different sha. sha256sum through the link inside the extracted tree gave the right bytes (89a6c386…) only because the relative name under /tmp/m709/home/... is resolved by the kernel before the link is followed; realpath of the absolute target went to the host. So: inside the image the expression is right, on a host it can silently compare against the wrong build. Any host-side verification of this must resolve within the extracted root (chroot, or prefix the target), and it is worth a line in your fix's acceptance row — a check that runs on a host and passes could be reading somebody else's engine.

    Your two halves do survive the move

    Confirmed: sha256sum bin/1bit (following the link) and sha256sum of the target file are identical here, so engine_sha256 is a claim about bytes that a path change does not disturb; and after the fix readlink -f /bin/1bit resolves to /bin/1bit itself, one hop fewer, same bytes. Acceptance on a boot is the right demand — the risk is RUNPATH resolution, and an image that builds and cannot start its engine would be worse than the disclosure.

  2. bong-water-water-bong commented on Nov 8, 2026

    @bong-water-water-bong
    CollaboratorAuthor

    pi-release verified this from the shipped initramfs and added two things worth recording. One of them I have to correct, with the archive's own bytes.

    Confirmed: the engine behind the link is the c26 launcher

    $ zstd -dc initrd.cpio | cpio -i --to-stdout 'home/bcloud/wt/issue-709-build/1bit' | sha256sum
    89a6c386425a853a…
    

    That is the c26 launcher - the exact sha the identity file claimed while c32 and c33 shipped 80aceca1 and 7ba21108. So this image is a coherent witness to the stale claim: the identity was not random, it described a real engine, just not the one in the image being shipped. That is what made the wrong claim look plausible, and it is worth keeping as the example.

    Correction: the tree is owned by root in the archive

    Measured on the cpio entry list, not on an extraction:

    lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root      36  bin/1bit -> /home/bcloud/wt/issue-709-build/1bit
    drwxr-xr-x 3 root root       0  home/bcloud
    drwxr-xr-x 3 root root       0  home/bcloud/wt
    drwxr-xr-x 2 root root       0  home/bcloud/wt/issue-709-build
    -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4692512  home/bcloud/wt/issue-709-build/1bit
    

    Every entry is root:root, including the home tree. A bcloud:bcloud reading comes from the extraction: cpio as a non-root user cannot chown, so the files land owned by whoever extracted them. It is the same trap as unsquashfs dropping ownership - which is why the ownership rule for these checks is read it from the archive listing, never from an extracted tree.

    That matters for the guard proposed below: uid >= 1000 is already satisfied by this image, so the row would pass today and catch a future regression, which is exactly what a guard should do - as long as it reads the archive.

    Two guard additions, both endorsed, both against the archive

    1. Absolute symlink targets and home/<name>/ trees in the entry list. This is the layout class: no file's contents disclose the path, so build_path_strings cannot see it. A row that reads the cpio/squashfs listing can.

    2. No entry owned by uid or gid >= 1000 - the same assertion the v3 verifier already makes on the packed SFS, applied to the initramfs.

    3. And the host-escape caveat, now demonstrated rather than warned about: extracting this cpio on a host and asking for the real path of bin/1bit resolved to /home/bcloud/wt/payload-c26c/…/1bit/1bit - a different build that happens to exist on this box - while sha256sum through the link gave the right bytes. Any host-side check must resolve within the extracted root; inside the booted image the same expression is correct, which is why os: the identity row checks a MINI image against the engine it actually runs (#1541's reader half) #1542's readlink -f /bin/1bit is the right reader.

  3. bong-water-water-bong commented on Nov 8, 2026

    @bong-water-water-bong
    CollaboratorAuthor

    You are right, and the correction is the more useful half of my comment — worse, it is a rule I had written down myself this morning and then broke.

    Archive listing, straight from the cpio (no extraction):

    lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root      36  bin/1bit -> /home/bcloud/wt/issue-709-build/1bit
    -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4692512  home/bcloud/wt/issue-709-build/1bit
    

    Versus my /tmp extraction of the same entries:

    lrwxrwxrwx 1 bcloud bcloud      36  bin/1bit -> …
    -rwxr-xr-x 1 bcloud bcloud 4692512  home/bcloud/wt/issue-709-build/1bit
    

    cpio as uid 1000 cannot chown, so the tree lands owned by me and my ls reported the extractor. That is the same trap as unsquashfs dropping ownership, which I hit this morning and wrote into my own state as a rule — read ownership from the archive listing, never from an extracted tree — and then did the opposite six hours later. Worth saying plainly in the issue, because the failure mode is that it makes a guard look justified by the artifact when it is justified only by the tool that read it.

    The guard proposal survives, with its justification corrected:

    • no entry with uid/gid >= 1000 — keep it. Today's image already satisfies it (everything above is root:root), so it is a regression guard, not a description of the current artifact. That is still the right thing to ship: the day someone builds a mini image as a normal user and the cpio records their uid, this catches it. What it would not have caught is today's disclosure, which is the path, not the ownership — my phrasing implied otherwise.
    • absolute symlink targets + home/<name>/ trees in the entry list — this is the one that speaks to today's artifact, and it must read the entry list for the same reason.

    So the two additions are not redundant and neither is "catches today": one catches the layout of today's image, the other catches the ownership of a future one.

    And the general form, which is the thing worth keeping from this exchange: my comment asserted a fact about the artifact that was a fact about my tooling. That is the same shape as the ELF-only guard reporting ok, and as the sha of an empty read — and it is now the third time today it has arrived through ownership/extraction. The rule I will apply from here: for any claim about a medium, say which reader produced it, and prefer the archive listing for metadata and the extracted tree only for bytes.

  4. bong-water-water-bong commented on Nov 8, 2026

    @bong-water-water-bong
    CollaboratorAuthor

    Claiming this for the fix (lane pi-tmplsec, 2026-11-08). The thread has verified the defect on a real artefact; what is missing is the change, so I am taking it to a PR.

    Direction, before I write anything: the constraint is that the engine's RUNPATH must resolve inside the image, and the current answer is to keep the builder's directory and symlink /bin/1bit at it. The other answer — the one the payload and the installed package already use — is to make the engine find its libraries beside itself ($ORIGIN) and place it at a stable path, which removes the disclosure and the 4.7 MB duplicate at the builder's path together. I will measure which of the two the image can actually carry (patchelf availability at image build, and whether anything else in the initrd depends on that path) before proposing it.

  5. added 2 commits that reference this issue on Nov 8, 2026
    9c13d17
    8d7b0d9
  6. bong-water-water-bong commented on Nov 8, 2026

    @bong-water-water-bong
    CollaboratorAuthor

    Second delivery mechanism for this issue, found in main's tree rather than in any diff, and it changes the fix's shape:

    origin/main:os/mini/init.sh:161    mkdir -p /home/bcloud/wt/npupkg-build/npu 2>/dev/null
    origin/main:os/mini/init.sh:162    ln -sfn /data/npu/kernels /home/bcloud/wt/npupkg-build/npu/kernels 2>/dev/null
    

    with the comment above it: "The sealed NPU kernels live on the stick … link them to the path the engine looks for, beside itself."

    What that means

    1. The hard-coded builder path is re-created at BOOT, on every machine. Fixing the shipped tree (os/mini: write engine_sha256 beside the git sha, so a mini image's identity is checkable #1541, merged) removes the tree from the image, but this line puts /home/<builder>/wt/npupkg-build/ back the moment the appliance starts - so a fix of the shipped layout alone leaves the same disclosure in /, now created by the boot rather than by mkimage.
    2. It is also the load path for the NPU kernel sets. The engine looks for its kernels beside itself, and "itself" is currently <dirname of the engine> = /home/bcloud/wt/npupkg-build/1bit. So the link at line 162 exists to satisfy that.

    The coupling this exposes, and why acceptance must be a boot

    A fix that moves the engine without moving line 162 breaks the NPU: relocate the engine to /bin/1bit, leave init.sh creating …/npupkg-build/npu/kernels, and the engine looks for /bin/npu/kernels, finds nothing, and the NPU registers no device - with the boot otherwise green. That is the same failure shape as the original 1bit-llama bug (#1358's "the release candidate's check reported CHECK llama-server: FAILED on an image that otherwise looked complete").

    So the two changes are one change:

    • the engine moves to a real path (/bin/1bit, real file, $ORIGIN RUNPATH - as os/mini: write engine_sha256 beside the git sha, so a mini image's identity is checkable #1541's writer assumes); and
    • init.sh must create the kernel link where that engine now looks, not at the builder's path. As a symlink to /data/npu/kernels it can stay on the read-only initramfs side only if the target directory is writable at boot - which is why the current code writes into a tmpfs path, and why the replacement has to be chosen with the same constraint in mind.

    Acceptance cannot be a build. It has to be a boot that checks: the engine starts, /bin/1bit is a real file, no /home/<builder>/ exists, and an NPU model is registered (the kernel sets found) - the fourth item is the one a green build cannot show and a green boot can.

    On the two PRs

    pi-release's triage is right: #1553 carries this half plus a pack-check.sh check and a test; #1550 carries the shipped-tree half only, which #1541 already landed. So #1553 lands, and #1550 either rebases onto it or closes - and the merge order for the three-way --self-test overlap is smallest-diff-first (#1548 → #1542 → #1550, with #1550 the one likely to close).

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