Skip to content

Commit eb2abed

Browse files
zimingttkxClaude Opus 4.6
zimingttkx
and
Claude Opus 4.6
committed
MAESTRO: Reset security audit pipeline to continue vulnerability discovery
Security Gate Decision: CONTINUE - SEC-001 (SQL Injection via order_by) IMPLEMENTED - No PENDING CRITICAL/HIGH items with EASY/MEDIUM remediability - ALL_TACTICS_EXHAUSTED marker NOT present in VULNERABILITIES.md - 6 tactics still to search: Hardcoded Secrets, Auth Issues, XSS, Crypto, Access Control, Dependencies Reset documents 1-4 to continue the pipeline for next iteration. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
1 parent 065774a commit eb2abed

10 files changed

Lines changed: 1157 additions & 16 deletions

‎.idea/csv-editor.xml‎

Lines changed: 0 additions & 16 deletions
This file was deleted.

‎Auto Run Docs/LOOP_00001_ATTACK_SURFACE.md‎

Lines changed: 114 additions & 0 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
1+
# Attack Surface Map - Loop 00001
2+
3+
## Scan Results Summary
4+
5+
| Scan Type | Tool Used | Critical | High | Medium | Low |
6+
|-----------|-----------|----------|------|--------|-----|
7+
| Dependencies | Manual | - | - | - | - |
8+
| Secrets | Manual | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
9+
| Static Analysis | Manual | 0 | 1 | 2 | 1 |
10+
11+
## Entry Points
12+
13+
### API Endpoints
14+
| Endpoint | Method | Auth Required | Input Sources |
15+
|----------|--------|---------------|---------------|
16+
| `/api/v1/predict` | POST | No | JSON Body |
17+
| `/api/v1/predict/file` | POST | No | Multipart File |
18+
| `/api/v1/predict/url` | POST | No | JSON Body (URL) |
19+
| `/api/v1/explain` | POST | No | JSON Body |
20+
| `/api/v1/train` | POST | No | None |
21+
| `/health` | GET | No | None |
22+
| `/ready` | GET | No | None |
23+
| `/metrics` | GET | No | None |
24+
25+
### External Integrations
26+
- MongoDB Atlas (via MONGO_DB_URL)
27+
- ModelExplain (SHAP)
28+
- URLFeatureExtractor (external WHOIS/DNS lookups)
29+
- WebContentExtractor (BeautifulSoup HTTP requests)
30+
31+
## Security-Sensitive Code Locations
32+
33+
### Authentication
34+
- No authentication middleware found in API endpoints
35+
- `config.yaml` has `authentication.enabled: false`
36+
- CORS configured with `allow_origins: ["*"]` and `allow_credentials: true`
37+
38+
### Authorization
39+
- No authorization middleware found
40+
- No role-based access control
41+
42+
### Cryptography
43+
- `networksecurity/firewall/captcha.py` uses `secrets` module (secure)
44+
- `config.yaml` specifies AES256 encryption
45+
46+
### Database Access
47+
- `networksecurity/stats/traffic_logger.py` - SQLite with parameterized queries (mostly safe)
48+
- MongoDB via pymongo
49+
50+
### File Operations
51+
- `networksecurity/api/app.py` - CSV file upload handling
52+
53+
### Command Execution
54+
- No shell command execution found in main code
55+
56+
## Trust Boundaries
57+
58+
```
59+
[User Browser] --HTTPS--> [FastAPI Server] --Internal--> [SQLite/MongoDB]
60+
|
61+
+--> [External APIs (WHOIS, DNS, HTTP)]
62+
```
63+
64+
## Data Flow Diagram
65+
66+
User input flows through:
67+
1. FastAPI endpoints (request validation via Pydantic)
68+
2. Model prediction logic
69+
3. Traffic logging (SQLite)
70+
4. Optional external API calls (URLFeatureExtractor)
71+
72+
## High-Risk Areas
73+
74+
1. **No Authentication** - All API endpoints are publicly accessible
75+
2. **CORS Misconfiguration** - `allow_credentials: true` with `allow_origins: ["*"]`
76+
3. **SQL Injection** - Potential order_by parameter injection in traffic_logger.py
77+
4. **Hardcoded Secrets** - Placeholder keys in k8s config
78+
79+
## Investigation Tactics
80+
81+
### Tactic 1: Injection Flaws [SEARCHED]
82+
- **Target:** SQL Injection, Command Injection, Path Traversal
83+
- **Search Pattern:** String interpolation in queries, os.system, file path concatenation
84+
- **Files to Check:** traffic_logger.py, api/app.py, url_feature_extractor.py
85+
86+
### Tactic 2: Hardcoded Secrets
87+
- **Target:** API keys, passwords, tokens in source code
88+
- **Search Pattern:** AKIA*, ghp_*, PRIVATE KEY, password =
89+
- **Files to Check:** deploy/k8s/config.yaml, docs/DEPLOYMENT_GUIDE.md
90+
91+
### Tactic 3: Authentication Issues
92+
- **Target:** Missing auth, weak crypto, timing attacks
93+
- **Search Pattern:** Depends() for auth, MD5/SHA1, direct string comparison
94+
- **Files to Check:** api/app.py, firewall/api.py
95+
96+
### Tactic 4: XSS
97+
- **Target:** innerHTML injection, javascript: URLs
98+
- **Search Pattern:** innerHTML =, href with user input
99+
- **Files to Check:** templates/*.html
100+
101+
### Tactic 5: Insecure Cryptography
102+
- **Target:** Weak hash algorithms, hardcoded IVs
103+
- **Search Pattern:** MD5, SHA1, DES, ECB, Math.random for tokens
104+
- **Files to Check:** Various
105+
106+
### Tactic 6: Access Control Issues
107+
- **Target:** Missing auth middleware, IDOR
108+
- **Search Pattern:** API endpoints without Depends(auth)
109+
- **Files to Check:** api/app.py, firewall/api.py
110+
111+
### Tactic 7: Dependency Vulnerabilities
112+
- **Target:** Known CVEs in dependencies
113+
- **Search Pattern:** Check requirements.txt against CVE databases
114+
- **Files to Check:** requirements.txt

‎Auto Run Docs/LOOP_00001_PLAN.md‎

Lines changed: 55 additions & 0 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
1+
# Security Remediation Plan - Loop 00001
2+
3+
## Summary
4+
- **Total Findings:** 3
5+
- **Auto-Remediate (PENDING):** 1
6+
- **Manual Review:** 0
7+
- **Won't Do / False Positive:** 0
8+
9+
## Risk Summary
10+
11+
| Severity | Count | Auto-Fix | Manual | Won't Do |
12+
|----------|-------|----------|--------|----------|
13+
| CRITICAL | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
14+
| HIGH | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
15+
| MEDIUM | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
16+
| LOW/INFO | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
17+
18+
---
19+
20+
## PENDING - Ready for Auto-Remediation
21+
22+
### SEC-001: SQL Injection via order_by Parameter
23+
- **Status:** `IMPLEMENTED`
24+
- **Vuln ID:** VULN-001
25+
- **Severity:** HIGH
26+
- **Remediability:** EASY
27+
- **File:** `networksecurity/stats/traffic_logger.py`
28+
- **Line:** 314
29+
- **Issue:** The `order_by` parameter is directly interpolated into the SQL query string without validation. While `order_direction` is safely set to either "DESC" or "ASC", `order_by` accepts any user-supplied string, allowing SQL injection attacks.
30+
- **Fix Applied:** Added ALLOWED_ORDER_COLUMNS frozenset as allowlist and validation in query() method to default to "timestamp" if order_by is not in the allowlist.
31+
- **Files Modified:** `networksecurity/stats/traffic_logger.py`
32+
- **Verified:** Manual testing confirmed SQL injection payloads are blocked and table integrity is maintained.
33+
- **Implemented In:** Loop 00001
34+
35+
---
36+
37+
## Pending Evaluations
38+
39+
The following findings still need to be evaluated:
40+
- **VULN-002:** XSS via innerHTML in Dashboard Template (MEDIUM severity)
41+
- **VULN-003:** No Authentication on API Endpoints (MEDIUM severity)
42+
43+
---
44+
45+
## Remediation Order
46+
47+
Recommended sequence based on severity and dependencies:
48+
49+
1. **SEC-001** - SQL Injection via order_by (HIGH, blocks data integrity)
50+
51+
---
52+
53+
## Dependencies
54+
55+
No dependencies identified yet - will update as remaining findings are evaluated.

‎Auto Run Docs/LOOP_00001_VULNERABILITIES.md‎

Lines changed: 97 additions & 0 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
1+
# Security Vulnerabilities - Loop 00001
2+
3+
## Summary
4+
- **Total Findings:** 3
5+
- **Critical:** 0
6+
- **High:** 1
7+
- **Medium:** 2
8+
- **Low/Info:** 0
9+
10+
---
11+
12+
## VULN-001: SQL Injection via order_by Parameter
13+
- **Type:** SQL Injection
14+
- **File:** `networksecurity/stats/traffic_logger.py`
15+
- **Line:** 314
16+
- **Severity:** HIGH
17+
- **Evidence:**
18+
```python
19+
query = f'''
20+
SELECT * FROM traffic_logs
21+
WHERE {where_clause}
22+
ORDER BY {order_by} {order_direction}
23+
LIMIT ? OFFSET ?
24+
'''
25+
```
26+
The `order_by` parameter is directly interpolated into the SQL query string without validation or parameterization. While `order_direction` is safely set to either "DESC" or "ASC", `order_by` accepts any user-supplied string.
27+
- **Attack Scenario:** An attacker could pass `order_by = "timestamp; DROP TABLE traffic_logs; --"` causing a SQL injection attack to delete the traffic_logs table.
28+
- **Remediation:** Validate `order_by` against an allowlist of permitted column names. Use parameterized queries where possible.
29+
30+
---
31+
32+
## VULN-002: XSS via innerHTML in Dashboard Template
33+
- **Type:** Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
34+
- **File:** `templates/dashboard.html`
35+
- **Line:** 271
36+
- **Severity:** MEDIUM
37+
- **Evidence:**
38+
```javascript
39+
tbody.innerHTML = logs.data.map(l=>`<tr><td>${new Date(l.timestamp).toLocaleTimeString('zh-CN',{hour:'2-digit',minute:'2-digit'})}</td><td>${l.source_ip}</td>...
40+
```
41+
User-controlled data from the server (`l.source_ip`, `l.threat_type`, etc.) is directly interpolated into innerHTML without sanitization. If this data contains malicious scripts, they would be executed in the victim's browser.
42+
- **Attack Scenario:** An attacker who can influence logged data (e.g., via crafted source_ip or threat_type) could inject malicious JavaScript that executes when an admin views the dashboard.
43+
- **Remediation:** Use textContent instead of innerHTML for dynamic data, or sanitize all user data before inserting into the DOM.
44+
45+
---
46+
47+
## VULN-003: No Authentication on API Endpoints
48+
- **Type:** Access Control Issue
49+
- **File:** `networksecurity/api/app.py`
50+
- **Line:** 157-168
51+
- **Severity:** MEDIUM
52+
- **Evidence:** The FastAPI application has no authentication middleware. All endpoints (`/api/v1/predict`, `/api/v1/train`, etc.) are publicly accessible without any API key or token validation. The config at `config.yaml` line 153-155 shows `authentication.enabled: false`.
53+
- **Attack Scenario:** An unauthenticated attacker can:
54+
- Query the threat detection model with arbitrary data
55+
- Trigger expensive model training jobs
56+
- Access internal system information via `/metrics` and `/health`
57+
- **Remediation:** Enable authentication in `config.yaml` and implement proper authentication middleware (API key, JWT, or OAuth2).
58+
59+
---
60+
61+
## Findings by Category
62+
63+
| Category | Count | Critical | High | Medium | Low |
64+
|----------|-------|----------|------|--------|-----|
65+
| Injection | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
66+
| Secrets | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
67+
| Auth | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
68+
| XSS | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
69+
| Crypto | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
70+
| Access Control | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
71+
| Dependencies | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
72+
73+
## Categories Searched
74+
75+
- [x] Injection Flaws [SEARCHED]
76+
- [ ] Hardcoded Secrets
77+
- [ ] Authentication Issues
78+
- [ ] Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
79+
- [ ] Insecure Cryptography
80+
- [ ] Access Control Issues
81+
- [ ] Dependency Vulnerabilities
82+
83+
## Dependency Vulnerabilities
84+
85+
From automated dependency scans:
86+
87+
| Package | Version | Vulnerability | Severity | Fix Version |
88+
|---------|---------|---------------|----------|-------------|
89+
| - | - | - | - | - |
90+
91+
## Potential False Positives
92+
93+
- **VULN-002** - The data displayed in dashboard.html comes from server-side logs. While XSS is theoretically possible, the actual exploitability depends on whether an attacker can inject malicious content into the logged fields (source_ip, threat_type).
94+
95+
## ALL_TACTICS_EXHAUSTED
96+
97+
Not yet - only Injection Flaws has been searched so far.

‎Auto Run Docs/SECURITY_LOG_网络安全项目助手_2026-04-02.md‎

Lines changed: 39 additions & 0 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
1+
# Security Log - 网络安全项目助手
2+
3+
## Loop 00001 - 2026-04-02
4+
5+
### Vulnerabilities Remediated
6+
7+
#### SEC-001: SQL Injection via order_by Parameter
8+
- **Status:** IMPLEMENTED
9+
- **Severity:** HIGH
10+
- **Type:** SQL Injection
11+
- **File:** `networksecurity/stats/traffic_logger.py`
12+
- **Fix Description:**
13+
Added an allowlist (`ALLOWED_ORDER_COLUMNS`) of permitted column names for the ORDER BY clause. The `query()` method now validates the `order_by` parameter against this allowlist and defaults to "timestamp" if an invalid value is provided.
14+
- **Before:** `order_by` was directly interpolated into the SQL query string via f-string, allowing SQL injection attacks.
15+
- **After:** `order_by` is validated against a frozenset of allowed column names; invalid values default to "timestamp".
16+
- **Verification:**
17+
- [x] Code review passed - allowlist validation added
18+
- [x] Functionality tested - valid order_by values work correctly
19+
- [x] Vulnerability no longer exploitable - SQL injection payloads are blocked
20+
- [x] Automated test confirmed - table integrity maintained after injection attempts
21+
22+
---
23+
24+
## [2026-04-02] - Loop 00001 Complete
25+
26+
**Agent:** 网络安全项目助手
27+
**Project:** C:\Users\Administrator\PycharmProjects\Network-Security-Based-On-ML
28+
**Loop:** 00001
29+
**Status:** No PENDING fixes available (CRITICAL/HIGH severity with EASY/MEDIUM remediability)
30+
31+
**Summary:**
32+
- Items IMPLEMENTED: 1 (SEC-001 SQL Injection via order_by)
33+
- Items WON'T DO: 0
34+
- Items PENDING - MANUAL REVIEW: 0
35+
- Items PENDING (LOW severity or HARD remediability): 2 (VULN-002 XSS, VULN-003 No Auth - both MEDIUM severity)
36+
37+
**Recommendation:** All automatable security fixes with CRITICAL/HIGH severity have been implemented. Remaining items (VULN-002, VULN-003) are MEDIUM severity and may require manual review.
38+
39+
---

0 commit comments

Comments
 (0)