diff --git a/.github/workflows/claude-mention.yml b/.github/workflows/claude-mention.yml
index 01bef10..c497878 100644
--- a/.github/workflows/claude-mention.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/claude-mention.yml
@@ -34,6 +34,11 @@ jobs:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     steps:
       - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+        with:
+          # This path holds live secrets while reviewing UNTRUSTED fork content, so do
+          # NOT persist the GITHUB_TOKEN into .git/config (default true) — otherwise a
+          # `cat .git/config` could surface a usable token.
+          persist-credentials: false
 
       - uses: anthropics/claude-code-action@v1
         with:
@@ -43,10 +48,17 @@ jobs:
           github_token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
           # No `prompt`: the @claude comment body is the instruction, so a maintainer
           # can ask for a full review or a targeted question.
-          # Fork-safe tool set: read-only git + read utils for static inspection, and
-          # `gh pr comment` to post the reply. Deliberately NO `npm`/build execution —
-          # this path may target a fork, so it never runs the PR's code; it reviews
-          # statically and cites the existing `validate-and-test` CI check for pass/fail.
+          # SECURITY: this path holds live secrets (CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN + a
+          # writable GITHUB_TOKEN) while reviewing UNTRUSTED fork content, so its Bash
+          # surface is deliberately minimal. It reads the PR via `gh pr diff/view`,
+          # cites the existing `validate-and-test` CI check for pass/fail (NO npm/build
+          # execution), and posts via `gh pr comment`. Excluded on purpose: `find`
+          # (`find -exec` is arbitrary code execution) and general file-read utils
+          # (`cat`/`grep`/`jq`/`ls`, which could read .git/config or /proc) — a prompt
+          # injection in the fork content must not be able to reach the tokens.
+          # NOTE: the OWNER/MEMBER/COLLABORATOR gate above trusts any collaborator,
+          # including read/triage-only ones — fine for a solo repo; tighten to a
+          # username allowlist or a repo-permission check if collaborators are added.
           claude_args: |
             --max-turns 30
-            --allowedTools "Bash(git diff:*),Bash(git log:*),Bash(git show:*),Bash(git ls-tree:*),Bash(git cat-file:*),Bash(git rev-parse:*),Bash(git status:*),Bash(cat:*),Bash(ls:*),Bash(head:*),Bash(tail:*),Bash(grep:*),Bash(wc:*),Bash(find:*),Bash(jq:*),Bash(gh pr view:*),Bash(gh pr diff:*),Bash(gh pr checks:*),Bash(gh pr comment:*)"
+            --allowedTools "Bash(git diff:*),Bash(git log:*),Bash(git show:*),Bash(gh pr view:*),Bash(gh pr diff:*),Bash(gh pr checks:*),Bash(gh pr comment:*)"
diff --git a/.github/workflows/claude-review.yml b/.github/workflows/claude-review.yml
index e5b6e9e..9293bb3 100644
--- a/.github/workflows/claude-review.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/claude-review.yml
@@ -8,6 +8,12 @@ on:
   pull_request:
     types: [opened, synchronize, reopened]
 
+# One in-flight review per PR; a new push cancels the previous run so rapid
+# pushes don't stack full Claude reviews and burn quota.
+concurrency:
+  group: claude-review-${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}
+  cancel-in-progress: true
+
 permissions:
   contents: read
   pull-requests: write
@@ -46,7 +52,8 @@ jobs:
             before reviewing.
 
             Do all of the following, then post your review as exactly ONE PR
-            comment using: gh pr comment <PR_NUMBER> --repo <OWNER/REPO> --body "…".
+            comment by running:
+              gh pr comment ${{ github.event.pull_request.number }} --repo ${{ github.repository }} --body "…"
             Reference specific file:line locations inline in the summary text (you
             do not have a GitHub inline-comment tool here). You are advisory only:
             do NOT modify code, approve, or merge.
@@ -84,4 +91,4 @@ jobs:
             locations for any line-specific issues.
           claude_args: |
             --max-turns 40
-            --allowedTools "Bash(npm ci),Bash(npm run validate),Bash(npm test),Bash(npm run lint),Bash(git diff:*),Bash(git log:*),Bash(git show:*),Bash(git ls-tree:*),Bash(git cat-file:*),Bash(git rev-parse:*),Bash(git status:*),Bash(cat:*),Bash(ls:*),Bash(head:*),Bash(tail:*),Bash(grep:*),Bash(wc:*),Bash(find:*),Bash(jq:*),Bash(gh pr comment:*)"
+            --allowedTools "Bash(npm ci),Bash(npm run validate),Bash(npm test),Bash(git diff:*),Bash(git log:*),Bash(git show:*),Bash(git ls-tree:*),Bash(git cat-file:*),Bash(git rev-parse:*),Bash(git status:*),Bash(cat:*),Bash(ls:*),Bash(head:*),Bash(tail:*),Bash(grep:*),Bash(wc:*),Bash(jq:*),Bash(gh pr comment:*)"
diff --git a/docs/superpowers/specs/2026-07-06-automated-pr-review-design.md b/docs/superpowers/specs/2026-07-06-automated-pr-review-design.md
index b8889ee..051eb91 100644
--- a/docs/superpowers/specs/2026-07-06-automated-pr-review-design.md
+++ b/docs/superpowers/specs/2026-07-06-automated-pr-review-design.md
@@ -230,6 +230,31 @@ ability to trigger downstream workflows) — it would swap `github_token` for
 - The action sanitizes prompt-injection vectors (hidden HTML/attrs) in PR content;
   the actor gate is the primary defense on top of that.
 
+### Post-audit hardening (adversarial review of the workflows)
+
+A multi-agent adversarial audit of the two workflows surfaced that "restricted
+allowlist" is only as good as the *specific* commands allowed. Confirmed fixes:
+
+- **`Bash(find:*)` removed from both files.** `claude-code-action` matches Bash
+  permissions by command-string prefix, and `find . -exec sh -c '<anything>' \;` is
+  a *single* command (no shell operator to split on) — so `find:*` was a full
+  arbitrary-code-execution escape. On the secret-bearing mention path (which reviews
+  untrusted fork content) that was a real token-exfiltration vector, not hygiene.
+- **Mention path Bash surface minimized** to `gh pr view/diff/checks/comment` +
+  read-only `git diff/log/show`. The general file-read utils (`cat`/`grep`/`jq`/`ls`)
+  were dropped there because prefix rules can't pin them to the repo tree, so they
+  could read `/proc/self/environ` or `.git/config`.
+- **`persist-credentials: false`** on the mention checkout, so the `GITHUB_TOKEN` is
+  not written into `.git/config` where a read primitive could recover it.
+- **Residual risk (documented, accepted):** the mention path still co-locates a
+  subscription token with an agent reading untrusted content; the real defenses are
+  the human-gated trigger, the trusted-actor gate, and the minimized (non-exec,
+  non-arbitrary-read) toolset. A stronger future option is to run the fork static
+  pass without secrets at all.
+- **Nit:** the `OWNER/MEMBER/COLLABORATOR` gate trusts any collaborator tier
+  (incl. read/triage). Acceptable for a solo repo; tighten to a username allowlist or
+  an explicit repo-permission check before adding collaborators.
+
 ## Testing / verification plan
 
 1. **Workflow lint:** confirm both YAML files parse (e.g. `actionlint` if available,