The environment issues its own sessions and enforces their capabilities. Cloud identity and relay credentials belong to a separate trust boundary, described in T3 Connect. A relay token is never an environment login.
Pairing delegates a set of scopes. Exchanging a bootstrap credential can narrow
that grant but cannot widen it. Ordinary pairing does not grant access-management
or relay-management authority. Creating another pairing link requires both
access:write and every scope being delegated. The
auth handlers enforce this at issuance;
client labels and device metadata have no authorization role.
The access read model contains pairing metadata, never recoverable pairing secrets. Only the creation response returns the raw credential. Otherwise read access to the connections list would become a way to acquire another client's authority.
Browser cookies, bearer tokens, and DPoP tokens adapt the same scoped session model. DPoP binds a token to a client's proof key; an invalid proof must fail rather than fall back to bearer authentication. The OAuth token-exchange vocabulary gives these grants a familiar meaning, but the environment does not implement a general-purpose OAuth authorization server.
Bearer and DPoP clients obtain short-lived WebSocket tickets through authenticated HTTP so long-lived tokens stay out of socket URLs. Browser sessions can authenticate the upgrade with their cookie. A successful handshake grants no extra authority: every RPC declares a required scope.
Desktop restarts forget the previous local bearer token, so its reusable bootstrap grant replaces earlier sessions for the same subject and method. Revocation and insertion share a database transaction; a failed replacement must leave the old credential usable. Pairing and browser sessions do not follow this replacement rule.
Projects are organizational boundaries, not filesystem sandboxes.
orchestration:read permits reading files the server account can read, including
absolute paths outside a project. This lets clients display artifacts that an
agent writes in a temporary directory. Relative paths and writes still follow
the workspace path rules.
Signed asset URLs are bearer credentials. A URL for media on the host grants access to one canonical file and its device/inode identity, not its containing directory. Asset access rechecks the opened file's identity when serving it, so atomic replacement requires a new URL while editing the same file in place does not. An HTML file authorized this way cannot load sibling assets; directory-scoped workspace previews are a separate grant. Clients should share the authored file reference so they do not disclose the temporary URL's credential.
Host videos can change in place. Their HTTP
responses omit cache validators because file
metadata cannot prove byte-for-byte identity for If-Range. Adding weak
validators would turn native-player seeks into full downloads.