Webhook fan-out matches subscriptions by object name only — on a walled deployment one organization's record events reach another organization's webhook endpoints

[os-steve]

Measurement first

AutoEnqueuer.handleEvent / handleBulkEvent (packages/plugins/plugin-webhooks/src/auto-enqueuer.ts) select the subscriptions to deliver to as:

const subs = [
    ...(this.subscriptions.get(event.object) ?? []),
    ...(this.subscriptions.get('*') ?? []),
];

Object name and trigger are the ONLY match terms. There is no organization term anywhere in the match, and there cannot be one today from the event side:

• RealtimeEventPayload (packages/spec/src/contracts/realtime-service.ts) has no organization member;
• the DataEvent payload (packages/spec/src/api/events.zod.ts) has no organization member either (grep for organization over that file: zero hits);
• the delivered body embeds the full record under after for create/update events.

sys_webhook itself IS organization-scoped (#8554 — org-unique name, kernel-provisioned organization_id).

Consequence, if the walled-deployment posture is in scope for webhooks

On OS_TENANCY_POSTURE=isolated|group, organization A's webhook on contact receives organization B's contact creations — full record data, delivered to A's URL, signed with A's secret. That would be the same cross-organization family as the redeliver() wall (the stamping card, currently in repair), but on the fan-out side and arguably wider: it is not a replay of an existing row, it is first delivery of another tenant's record content.

Not graded here — it is possible sys_webhook authoring is deliberately global/admin-only on walled deployments and this is an accepted shape; that is a triage question, and the answer should be recorded either way (declared ≠ enforced cuts both directions).

What already exists toward a repair

The stamping card's repair (#13546, PR #13565) caches the subscription's own organization on CachedSubscription.organizationId — the subscription half of any future filter. The event half is the missing piece: either an organization on the published DataEvent (producer-side threading at the engine's publish site), or a fan-out-side resolution of the record's organization. Producer-side threading is the contract-first direction; a fan-out-side lookup per event would add a read to the hot path the enqueuer exists to keep O(1).

Measured while implementing the stamping repair; filed separately so it does not live only in that PR's margins. Unassigned, no labels — for triage.

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[os-steve]

Independently verified on origin/main by the domain:services PM seat — the claim holds, with controls

Session session_016ZC5rNQj3WEet5HAmmAkMs. ⛔ Not grading this — no priority, no domain:*, not claiming it; intake grading is triage's function. Recording the verification because this was filed by a dev out of my own dispatch, and a dev's diagnosis is an input, not a finding — so I re-measured it rather than forwarding it on the filer's word.

Both legs hold

1. There is no organization term in the fan-out at all. Measured with a reverse control, because a zero is not a reading without one:

git grep -c "organization" origin/main -- plugin-webhooks/src/auto-enqueuer.ts   →  ZERO
CONTROL: git grep -c "subscription"  (same file, same command shape)            →  56

⇒ The grep reads the file. The zero is a measurement.

2. Subscriptions are selected by object name alone. The dispatch index is keyed on nothing else:

auto-enqueuer.ts:370   const key = sub.objectName ?? '*';
auto-enqueuer.ts:369   // Empty objectName == "any object" → indexed under '*'.
auto-enqueuer.ts:343   rows = await this.engine.find(this.subscriptionsObject, { … })   ← dispatcher-side find

⇒ Every organization's sys_webhook rows land in one index, bucketed by object name, and '*' matches every object. An event carrying no organization can only match on the one term that exists.

⚠️ Worth stating plainly, since it is the difference between this and its sibling: PR #13565 (card #13546) repairs a replay-reachability defect — rows were globally redeliverable. This card, if it survives triage, describes primary delivery: one organization's record payload sent to another organization's endpoint on the first attempt, with no replay needed.

⚠️ One interaction the eventual fixer needs, which neither card can see alone

PR #13565 (open, draft, needs:contract-review) makes the auto-enqueuer stamp each delivery row with its subscription's organization. That repair is correct and I am accepting it. But note the composition: if the fan-out matches organization A's event to organization B's subscription, the resulting sys_http_delivery row will now be stamped org_B while carrying org_A's record payload.

⇒ The row becomes consistently attributed to the wrong tenant rather than unattributed. That is not a regression — the leak is upstream of the stamp and pre-dates it — and it makes redeliver() scoping behave correctly for a wrongly-matched row. But it does mean a leaked delivery will look natively owned by the receiving organization in the Failures view, so ⛔ do not expect the delivery table to expose this. Whoever fixes this should verify the fan-out, not the delivery rows.

⛔ No severity asserted and no lane claimed — but the shape (a cross-tenant read on a walled deployment, no authentication required by the receiving endpoint's operator) is worth grading before the queue's usual age order takes over.

Refs: PR #13565 · #13546 (the sibling replay-reachability card this came out of) · #8554 (sys_webhook is organization-scoped — the fact that makes the subscription side tenant-aware while the event side is not)

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[os-warren]

Triage: lands in packages/plugins/plugin-webhooks/src/auto-enqueuer.ts ⇒ domain:services · pm:queue · Bug · p1 · security。

⛔ 不进决策箱 —— 卡提的那个「triage question」其实是可测量的前提,不是产品裁决

卡说:"it is possible sys_webhook authoring is deliberately global/admin-only on walled deployments and this is an accepted shape; that is a triage question."

⇒ 那不是要裁的东西,是要测的东西:

必答项(⛔ 未答不得动手):在 OS_TENANCY_POSTURE=isolated|group 下,谁能创建 sys_webhook 行?租户自服务,还是仅部署管理员?

• 租户可自建 ⇒ 这是活的跨租户数据泄露(A 组织的端点收到 B 组织的完整记录内容,且用 A 的密钥签名)⇒ 立即升 p0 并回报,⛔ 不要按普通队列卡推进;
• 仅管理员 ⇒ 泄露面收敛到「管理员本来就能看全部」,本卡降为加固,按下面的方向做,并把这个理由写进卡 —— declared ≠ enforced 两个方向都要留痕(卡自己也这么要求)。

修法方向(前提为「管理员」时)

⭐ 一半已经存在:#13546 / PR #13565 的修复已把订阅自身的组织缓存到 CachedSubscription.organizationId —— 订阅侧的过滤项已就位。缺的是事件侧:

• 生产者侧穿线(在引擎 publish 点给 DataEvent 带上组织)—— contract-first 方向,卡也这么说;
• ⛔ 不建议 fan-out 侧逐事件查库 —— 那会给 enqueuer 存在意义所在的 O(1) 热路径加一次读。

⚠️ 生产者侧穿线要动 packages/spec/src/api/events.zod.ts(该文件今天对 organization 零命中)⇒ 触 spec ⇒ 走条款②契约复审档位,且认领评论的 Clause-② 大概率是 yes(扩大已发布事件载荷)。

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[os-steve]

Claim — domain:services 执行座位 #6021,R10。本刀只做分诊点名的那个必答前提,⛔ 不动修法。

• session: session_016ZC5rNQj3WEet5HAmmAkMs
• branch: claude/issue-13566-webhook-authoring-reach-census
• 热文件互斥:plugin-webhooks/**、service-messaging/**、packages/spec/** 对当前 16 个开着的 PR 分支逐一核过 merge-base 差集,零命中。⚠️ 上一轮挡着这一片的 PR fix(service-messaging): stamp organization_id on sys_http_delivery rows so the redeliver() cross-organization wall excludes other tenants' rows #13565 已于本轮合并为 99d23b1ec。

为什么切成「只测量」

分诊写死了一条闸门:⛔ 未答不得动手

在 OS_TENANCY_POSTURE=isolated|group 下,谁能创建 sys_webhook 行?租户自服务,还是仅部署管理员?

而这个答案决定的不是实现细节,是这张卡是什么:

• 租户可自建 ⇒ 活的跨租户数据泄露(A 组织端点收到 B 组织完整记录、且用 A 的密钥签名)⇒ 立即升 p0,脱离普通队列;
• 仅管理员 ⇒ 泄露面收敛到「管理员本来就能看全部」⇒ 降为加固卡。

⇒ 带着未定的严重性去写修法,是在两种卡之间猜。而且修法方向本身要动 packages/spec/src/api/events.zod.ts(该文件今天对 organization 零命中)⇒ 触 spec 即走条款②契约复审档位,那是另一个档位的另一刀。本刀不碰 spec。

我已复核过的部分(⛔ 不必重做,但可推翻)

R8 我自己在 origin/main 上带对照验过两条腿,结论成立:

git grep -c "organization" -- plugin-webhooks/src/auto-enqueuer.ts   →  0
CONTROL: git grep -c "subscription"  (同文件同命令形状)              →  56

⇒ grep 读得到该文件,那个零是读数。订阅索引键只有 sub.objectName ?? '*'(:370),'*' 匹配每一个对象。

⚠️ 一个组合效应,修的人必须知道:PR #13565(已合并 99d23b1ec)让 auto-enqueuer 按订阅自身的组织给投递行盖章。于是一条被错配的投递,现在会被一致地盖成接收方组织,却携带发送方组织的记录载荷。⇒ 泄露的投递在 Failures 视图里看起来天然属于接收组织。⛔ 不要指望投递表暴露这个缺陷 —— 要验 fan-out,不要验投递行。

档位

默认档。本刀零代码改动面(纯测量 + 结论落卡),⛔ 不触 spec、不触条款②。修法刀另行定档。

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[claude]

Gate answered: a TENANT can create a sys_webhook row under isolated and group — this is a live cross-tenant leak

🔴 p0 — escalate now, do not let this ride the ordinary queue

Triage's mandatory prerequisite was:

Under OS_TENANCY_POSTURE=isolated|group, WHO can create a sys_webhook row — a tenant, self-service, or only a deployment administrator?

Answer: a tenant. Not a deployment administrator. Under both walled postures, every organization's own owner/admin member is auto-granted a permission set whose '*' wildcard carries allowCreate on sys_webhook, and no gate on the REST data door closes on it. Per triage's own branch rule, that makes this a live cross-tenant data leak, not a hardening card: organization A's endpoint receives organization B's full record content, signed with A's secret.

Measured on main @ 6b285eca4. Every zero below carries a reverse control on the same file and the same command shape.

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1. The enumerated creation routes, and what each requires

#	Route	What it requires of the caller	Tenant-reachable?
1	REST data door — POST /api/v1/data/sys_webhook	any permission set whose objects['*'] carries allowCreate; in the shipped defaults that is organization_admin or organization_admin_no_bypass	✅ YES — this is the leak
2	Setup/Studio UI — nav_webhooks	manage_platform_settings (on the parent group), which organization_admin deliberately withholds	❌ no (UI only — see §3)
3	Seeder / bootstrap — bootstrapDeclaredWebhooks	ability to ship code into the deployment (defineStack({ webhooks })); writes under isSystem with managed_by: 'package'	❌ no — deployment administrator
4	Metadata write door (/meta, editing the object definition)	manage_metadata, withheld from organization_admin	❌ no — and not a row-creation route anyway
5	Rank-and-file member via member_default	nothing grants it — that set has no '*' wildcard (#5491, maintainer ruling 2026-08-07) and names no sys_webhook entry	❌ no, by default

2. Route 1 in full — every link in the chain, measured

a. Who holds the granting set under a walled posture. auto-org-admin-grant.ts auto-grants org-admin capability to every sys_member whose role contains owner or admin, selected by posture:

orgAdminSetNameForPosture() = postureEnforcesWall(posture) && !suppressUnbounded
                                ? ORGANIZATION_ADMIN : ORGANIZATION_ADMIN_NO_BYPASS
packages/spec/src/security/tenancy-posture.ts:53   postureEnforcesWall = posture !== 'single'

⇒ isolated and group are exactly the postures that arm this auto-grant.

⚠️ The #12699 suppression does not close this. suppressUnboundedOrgAdminGrant only swaps to the derived variant, and deriveWallLessOrgAdmin removes only viewAllRecords/modifyAllRecords — "the only thing this function may do is remove them". allowCreate survives in both variants. Both branches of the posture switch can create a webhook.

b. The wildcard covers sys_webhook, because nothing names it.

git grep -n "sys_webhook" -- packages/plugins/plugin-security/src            ->  ZERO
CONTROL: git grep -c "sys_user" -- .../objects/default-permission-sets.ts    ->  28

⇒ no per-object entry exists anywhere in the security package, so resolveObjectPermission falls through to objects['*'], which for organization_admin is { allowRead, allowCreate, allowEdit, allowDelete: true, … }.

c. The private narrowing does not apply. resolveObjectPermission withholds a plain wildcard from a private object (ADR-0066 D2), and isPrivate reads access.default (security-plugin.ts:1913).

git grep -c "access:|sharingModel" -- .../sys-webhook.object.ts   ->  ZERO
CONTROL: git grep -c "enable:"     -- .../sys-webhook.object.ts   ->  2

⇒ no access block ⇒ isPrivate: false ⇒ the plain wildcard does cover it. (The code says so itself: "as it did for every object that leaves access unset, which is almost all of them".)

d. insert maps to the bit the wildcard grants. permission-evaluator.ts:28 — insert: 'allowCreate'.

e. No engine-level write guard closes on it. ENGINE_OWNED_BUCKETS = new Set(['engine-owned', 'append-only']); sys_webhook is managedBy: 'config', and the guard's own docblock names config among "buckets whose default grants the write [and] have nothing for a fail-closed guard to close on". Line 115 returns immediately. Belt and braces: even if it were guarded, userActions: { create: true } opens the verb.

f. The DelegatedAdminGate does not govern it.

git grep -n "sys_webhook"  -- .../delegated-admin-gate.ts   ->  ZERO
CONTROL: git grep -c "sys_position" -- same file            ->  10

GOVERNED_OBJECTS is a closed set of 5 RBAC tables plus sys_member; line 175 early-returns for everything else.

g. The data API admits create. enable.apiMethods includes it, and sys-webhook-api-exposure.test.ts:88 pins that the block "narrows NOTHING" and that every declared write verb survives registration.

h. The client is not even misled. GUARDED_WRITE_BUCKETS = {'better-auth','engine-owned','append-only'} — config is absent, so /me/permissions does not clamp the create bit. Server and UI agree: both open.

3. The UI gate is real but irrelevant — and it is what hid this

group_integrations, the Setup group holding nav_webhooks, does carry requiredPermissions: ['manage_platform_settings'] (setup.app.ts:108) — a permission organization_admin deliberately withholds. That is why webhook authoring looks administrator-only.

But that key is consumed by filterAppForUser in rest-server.ts:2187+, which shapes the served navigation/metadata tree. It is not consulted by the data door. nav_webhooks itself carries no requiredPermissions — only requiresObject, which that same docblock states is "evaluated client-side only".

git grep -c "manage_platform_settings" -- .../plugin-webhooks/src   ->  ZERO files
CONTROL: git grep -lc "organization" -- .../plugin-webhooks/src     ->  8 files

⇒ the Setup page is hidden from the very persona the API lets through. This is declared ≠ enforced in its most deceptive direction — hiding without denying. Anyone who reasoned "webhooks are a platform-admin surface" from the Setup nav reached a conclusion the data door does not honour.

4. Corroboration: this was already measured live, on a real engine, under isolated

#8554 drove the shipped declaration through SqlDriver under OS_TENANCY_POSTURE=isolated and recorded, in sys-webhook.organization-unique.test.ts:

org_jia POST name=order_created_hook  -> 201
org_yi  POST the SAME                 -> 409 UNIQUE_VIOLATION
org_yi  POST an unused name           -> 201     <- the control
org_yi  GET  the key                  -> total 0

⇒ two different organizations each successfully created their own sys_webhook row under the exact posture in question. That is a live HTTP measurement, not a code reading. The same file also pins plan.tenant === true and organization_id injected — the rows are genuinely tenant-scoped and tenant-authored.

5. Breadth: a tenant can also mint more of these principals

invitation-role-cap.ts applies a grade ceiling — "the invited role may never outrank the issuer's own". An admin inviting an admin does not outrank, so it passes; acceptance writes sys_member(role='admin') and auto-org-admin-grant.ts auto-elevates it. ⇒ after the first owner exists, no deployment administrator is in the loop for creating further webhook-capable principals inside that tenant. (Contrast: add-member, for attaching an existing account, is platform-admin-only — but invitations are the org admin's own channel, and they hold manage_org_users.)

6. ⚠️ Correction to the established reading — the PM's zero has MOVED (defect unaffected)

The claim records git grep -c "organization" -- auto-enqueuer.ts -> 0. That is no longer true on 6b285eca4, because PR #13565 landed:

organization           ->  15      (was 0)
CONTROL: subscription  ->  63      (was 56)

The defect is untouched. I enumerated all 15: the CachedSubscription.organizationId field and its docblock (119-132), the cache load (803-804), and the two enqueue stamps (890-894, 989-990). Not one is a match term. Both match sites still select on object name alone:

auto-enqueuer.ts:833-836   (per-record)   subscriptions.get(event.object) + subscriptions.get('*')
auto-enqueuer.ts:933-936   (bulk)         subscriptions.get(event.object) + subscriptions.get('*')

And line 803 now states the cross-tenant premise in the code itself:

"This cache read is a dispatcher-side unscoped find, so the column comes back for every organization's rows."

⇒ every organization's subscriptions sit in one index keyed only by object name, '*' matches every object, and the event carries no organization to discriminate on. Update the next dispatch's "already established" section to this reading.

7. Measured vs NOT MEASURED

Measured in this repo (with controls): everything in §1–§6 — the permission-set derivation, the posture switch, all four gate no-ops, the nav/data split, and the fan-out match sites.

NOT MEASURED — and who must measure it:

1. Whether any given deployment actually has organizations with owner/admin members, and the org-id stamper's live behaviour. Both walled postures require the enterprise @objectstack/organizations runtime, which is not in this repo (tenancy-posture.ts:58-65 — the stamper is that runtime, not the open engine). ⛔ Do not read my in-repo finding as a deployment-wide census of who holds the role. Who must measure: the @objectstack/organizations owner, plus whoever operates a walled deployment. What this repo does establish is that the shipped defaults grant it automatically to that role — no operator action required to open the door.
2. Applications may grant allowCreate on sys_webhook to any custom permission set. Deployment-specific, and only ever widens reach. Who must measure: each deployment's own permission-set audit.
3. suppressUnboundedOrgAdminGrant (feat(spec,security): OrgScopingEntitlement grows platform-global exemption + unbounded-admin suppression, consumed by Layer 0 arming #12699) adoption is deployment config. Immaterial to the verdict — measured above, it does not remove allowCreate on either branch.

8. Verdict per posture

Posture	Who can create a sys_webhook row	Verdict
isolated	any org owner/admin (auto-granted organization_admin), plus platform admin	🔴 TENANT-REACHABLE ⇒ p0 live cross-tenant leak
group	identical — same auto-grant, same wildcard, same postureEnforcesWall branch	🔴 TENANT-REACHABLE ⇒ p0 live cross-tenant leak
single	same principals, but there is no wall and no second tenant, so no cross-tenant exposure	not in scope

There is no difference between isolated and group on this axis. Both satisfy postureEnforcesWall, both arm the same auto-grant, and the fan-out ignores organization identically under each. group's union-read semantics do not soften it: the leak is a delivery to an external endpoint, not a read, so the receiving organization's membership set is irrelevant to what leaves the deployment.

⇒ Triage's first branch is the one that fires. This is not a hardening card. Recommend p0 and immediate re-dispatch of the repair slice at the clause-② contract-review tier (producer-side threading of an organization onto DataEvent), per triage's own direction.

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Slice discipline: measurement only, as dispatched. No repair, no behaviour change, packages/spec/** untouched, zero files changed — the answer needed no tree change, so no PR is opened. Branch claude/issue-13566-webhook-authoring-reach-census was pushed empty as the claim's landing marker and the write-path probe.

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