fix(services): DbJobAdapter.replay() honours recordRuns — run history off stops accumulating replay rows
#2312
Workflow file for this run
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| # GitHub's closing keywords (`Fixes #123`) only work WITHIN a repository. A PR | |
| # here that says `Fixes objectstack-ai/objectui#456` reads exactly like a | |
| # same-repo close to a human, merges, and leaves that issue open forever — with | |
| # no reference to the PR on the issue's own page either, so the next reader has | |
| # no way to find the fix. | |
| # | |
| # That gap is why v17 verification (#4482) left #4475 and #4478 open after their | |
| # fixes shipped in objectui; both had to be closed by hand. | |
| # | |
| # This job closes the loop. It deliberately has TWO modes and BOTH are visible: | |
| # | |
| # token present -> close the foreign issue and comment with the PR link | |
| # token absent -> comment ON THIS PR naming what still needs closing by hand | |
| # | |
| # The second mode is the point. A workflow that quietly does nothing because a | |
| # secret was never provisioned is the shape this repo keeps having to fix | |
| # (#4449: written, tested, exported, called by nothing). Missing credentials | |
| # must announce themselves. | |
| # | |
| # That second mode is a single `issues.createComment`, and its DELIVERY is | |
| # retried, never assumed (#9575). Until #9575 a transient answer from the | |
| # comments endpoint threw, github-script handed the throw to | |
| # `main().catch(handleError)` -> `core.setFailed`, and the run lost BOTH the | |
| # notice AND — because it sat after the `await` — the `core.warning` that named | |
| # what had been left open. All that remained was `Unhandled error: HttpError` on | |
| # a job nobody opens, and a set of foreign issues no longer on anyone's list. So | |
| # now: the transient class is retried (declared in the step's `retries:` inputs, | |
| # not hand-classified), the work order is announced BEFORE delivery is | |
| # attempted, and a refusal that outlives the retries writes the notice into the | |
| # run's job summary and then FAILS the job. | |
| # | |
| # Failing is deliberate, and it is the opposite of what docs-drift-check.yml | |
| # (#9373) chose for its advisory comment. The difference is a property of this | |
| # job, measured rather than inherited: | |
| # | |
| # - its conclusion is in no required set — the context name `Close issues | |
| # referenced in other repositories` is absent from the registry in | |
| # scripts/check-required-contexts.mjs, and could not be enrolled there | |
| # anyway: that pin's assertions 6 and 7 want a `merge_group:` trigger and an | |
| # unfiltered `pull_request:` trigger, and this file has neither; | |
| # - it runs only AFTER the merge (`pull_request_target: [closed]` plus | |
| # `merged == true`), so its conclusion gates nothing that has not already | |
| # happened; | |
| # - no `workflow_run:` listener in this repo watches it (the only two listen | |
| # for `CI` and `Release`), so a red starts no fan-out. | |
| # | |
| # A red therefore costs one X on an already-merged PR. A green that delivered | |
| # nothing costs the foreign issues this workflow exists to stop losing — and | |
| # looks exactly like the 2000+ green runs where there was simply nothing to | |
| # report. Same trade merge-queue-triage.yml (#9424) made, for the same reason; | |
| # docs-drift-check.yml's opposite choice is right THERE because its conclusion | |
| # is a check on a live PR and its comment is a courtesy, neither of which is | |
| # true here. | |
| name: Cross-repo Issue Closer | |
| # `pull_request_target` (not `pull_request`) because the job needs repository | |
| # secrets, which `pull_request` withholds from fork-originated runs. The usual | |
| # hazard of `pull_request_target` — running untrusted PR code with write | |
| # credentials — does not apply: this job never checks out the head ref and | |
| # never executes anything from the PR. It reads the PR body and calls the | |
| # issues API, nothing else. | |
| on: | |
| pull_request_target: | |
| types: [closed] | |
| permissions: | |
| contents: read | |
| pull-requests: write | |
| jobs: | |
| close-foreign-issues: | |
| name: Close issues referenced in other repositories | |
| if: github.event.pull_request.merged == true | |
| runs-on: ubuntu-latest | |
| steps: | |
| - name: Close (or report) cross-repo closing keywords | |
| uses: actions/github-script@v9 | |
| env: | |
| # A fine-grained PAT or GitHub App token with `issues: write` on the | |
| # sibling repositories. `GITHUB_TOKEN` cannot do this — it is scoped | |
| # to the repository running the workflow, which is the whole problem. | |
| CROSS_REPO_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.CROSS_REPO_ISSUE_TOKEN }} | |
| with: | |
| # Hand the cross-repo token to the action itself, so `github` IS the | |
| # cross-repo client. `require('@actions/github')` does NOT work here: | |
| # github-script bundles its dependencies and the module is not | |
| # resolvable from the script scope (`MODULE_NOT_FOUND`). Falling back | |
| # to GITHUB_TOKEN keeps the report path able to comment on this PR. | |
| github-token: ${{ secrets.CROSS_REPO_ISSUE_TOKEN || secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }} | |
| # The transient-retry policy, DECLARED rather than hand-written (#9575, | |
| # and the point #9576 records): github-script has accepted these two | |
| # inputs since v6 and every run of this job already echoes their | |
| # defaults into its own log — `retries: 0`, | |
| # `retry-exempt-status-codes: 400,401,403,404,422`. They drive octokit's | |
| # retry plugin, which re-issues any request whose status is not exempt, | |
| # plus network-level failures. Nothing is swallowed: a spent retry still | |
| # throws. This widens how many times a request is ASKED and no verdict | |
| # anywhere. | |
| # | |
| # It is a step input, so it covers the per-target loop below as well as | |
| # the notice. The loop keeps its own `try`/`catch` unchanged — retries | |
| # change how often a target is asked, never whether one unreachable | |
| # target may take the rest down with it. | |
| # | |
| # 403 is dropped from the action's default exempt list on purpose: | |
| # GitHub answers a SECONDARY rate limit with 403 as well as with 429, so | |
| # the status alone cannot separate weather from a permission denial. The | |
| # price is that a genuine denial — a cross-repo PAT without | |
| # `issues: write` on a sibling repo — now takes four attempts per target | |
| # to fail instead of one. It still fails, and the loop still names the | |
| # target it failed on. | |
| # | |
| # 400/401/404/422 stay exempt: a malformed request, a wrong target, or a | |
| # body past GitHub's 65536-character comment limit is this repo's own | |
| # bug. It is answered correctly on the first try and asking again only | |
| # spends runner minutes. | |
| retries: 3 | |
| retry-exempt-status-codes: 400,401,404,422 | |
| script: | | |
| const body = context.payload.pull_request.body || ''; | |
| const prUrl = context.payload.pull_request.html_url; | |
| const thisRepo = `${context.repo.owner}/${context.repo.repo}`; | |
| // GitHub's own keyword set, restricted to the qualified | |
| // `owner/repo#N` form — the bare `#N` form already works natively | |
| // and must not be touched here. | |
| const KEYWORDS = 'close|closes|closed|fix|fixes|fixed|resolve|resolves|resolved'; | |
| const pattern = new RegExp( | |
| `\\b(?:${KEYWORDS})\\s+([\\w.-]+)\\/([\\w.-]+)#(\\d+)\\b`, | |
| 'gi', | |
| ); | |
| // Report credential state on EVERY run, before any early return. | |
| // Otherwise a repository with the secret and one without look | |
| // identical until a cross-repo reference happens to show up — | |
| // which can be days — and "is it configured?" stays unanswerable. | |
| // Presence only; the value is never read into the log. | |
| const token = process.env.CROSS_REPO_TOKEN; | |
| core.info( | |
| `CROSS_REPO_ISSUE_TOKEN: ${token ? 'configured' : 'ABSENT — cross-repo closes will be reported, not performed'}`, | |
| ); | |
| const targets = new Map(); | |
| for (const [, owner, repo, number] of body.matchAll(pattern)) { | |
| const key = `${owner}/${repo}#${number}`; | |
| // Skip same-repo references: GitHub already closed those, and | |
| // closing them again would be a no-op comment on every merge. | |
| if (`${owner}/${repo}`.toLowerCase() === thisRepo.toLowerCase()) continue; | |
| targets.set(key, { owner, repo, number: Number(number) }); | |
| } | |
| if (targets.size === 0) { | |
| core.info('No cross-repository closing keywords in this PR body.'); | |
| return; | |
| } | |
| core.info(`Cross-repo targets: ${[...targets.keys()].join(', ')}`); | |
| if (!token) { | |
| // Degrade VISIBLY. Someone has to close these by hand, and this | |
| // comment is the only thing that will tell them so. | |
| const list = [...targets.keys()].map((k) => `- \`${k}\``).join('\n'); | |
| const keys = [...targets.keys()].join(', '); | |
| // The work order is announced BEFORE it is delivered, and it names | |
| // the TARGETS rather than only how many there are (#9575). This | |
| // annotation used to sit after the `await` below, which is the same | |
| // as not existing on the one run where it matters: a throw from the | |
| // post skipped it, so a refused notice lost the list AND the count. | |
| // It costs one line of log when delivery succeeds. | |
| core.warning( | |
| `CROSS_REPO_ISSUE_TOKEN is not configured — ${targets.size} issue(s) must be ` | |
| + `closed BY HAND: ${keys}.`, | |
| { title: 'Cross-repo issues left open' }, | |
| ); | |
| const notice = | |
| `### ⚠️ 跨仓库 issue 未被自动关闭\n\n` + | |
| `本 PR 的正文声明了跨仓库关闭关键字，但 GitHub 的关闭关键字**只在同仓库内生效**，` + | |
| `因此以下 issue 仍处于 open 状态，需要**手工关闭**：\n\n${list}\n\n` + | |
| `自动关闭需要仓库 secret \`CROSS_REPO_ISSUE_TOKEN\`（对目标仓库具备 \`issues: write\` 的` + | |
| ` fine-grained PAT 或 GitHub App token）。\`GITHUB_TOKEN\` 只对当前仓库有写权限，无法胜任。\n\n` + | |
| `配置该 secret 后本条提示会自动消失，改为直接关闭目标 issue。\n\n` + | |
| `---\n_Generated by [Claude Code](https://claude.ai/code)_`; | |
| // This comment IS the deliverable, not a courtesy about one — see | |
| // the header. The step's `retries:` have already absorbed a blip by | |
| // the time anything reaches the catch, so what is left there is a | |
| // refusal that outlived them. | |
| try { | |
| await github.rest.issues.createComment({ | |
| owner: context.repo.owner, | |
| repo: context.repo.repo, | |
| issue_number: context.payload.pull_request.number, | |
| body: notice, | |
| }); | |
| core.info( | |
| `Reported ${targets.size} unclosed cross-repo issue(s) on this pull request.`, | |
| ); | |
| } catch (error) { | |
| const kind = typeof error?.status === 'number' | |
| ? `HTTP ${error.status}` | |
| : (error?.code || 'error'); | |
| // Octokit messages usually end in a full stop; ours supplies its own. | |
| const reason = `${kind}: ${String(error?.message || '').replace(/\s*\.\s*$/, '')}`; | |
| try { | |
| await core.summary.addRaw([ | |
| '## ⚠️ 跨仓库关闭提示没能发到 PR 上', | |
| '', | |
| `\`issues.createComment\` 最终被拒绝：\`${reason}\`。`, | |
| '', | |
| `- 下面就是本次运行算出的完整提示 —— PR #${context.payload.pull_request.number} 上没有它。`, | |
| '- 可以直接复制到 PR 上；也可以在 API 恢复后 re-run 本 job。', | |
| '- 真正要做的事情是上面列出的那几个 issue：它们仍是 open，需要手工关闭。', | |
| '- 根治是配置仓库 secret `CROSS_REPO_ISSUE_TOKEN`，之后本分支不再运行。', | |
| '', | |
| '---', | |
| '', | |
| notice, | |
| '', | |
| ].join('\n')).write(); | |
| } catch (summaryError) { | |
| // The summary is the richer channel, the annotation the reliable | |
| // one. Losing the richer one must not restore the silence this | |
| // whole branch exists to break. | |
| core.info(`Could not write the job summary: ${summaryError.message}`); | |
| } | |
| core.setFailed( | |
| `${targets.size} cross-repo issue(s) were left open by this merge and the notice ` | |
| + `saying so could NOT be posted on PR #${context.payload.pull_request.number} ` | |
| + `(${reason}). Close these by hand: ${keys}. The full notice is reproduced in ` | |
| + `this run's job summary; re-run this job to retry delivery.`, | |
| ); | |
| } | |
| return; | |
| } | |
| for (const [key, t] of targets) { | |
| try { | |
| const { data: issue } = await github.rest.issues.get({ | |
| owner: t.owner, repo: t.repo, issue_number: t.number, | |
| }); | |
| if (issue.state === 'closed') { | |
| core.info(`${key} is already closed — skipping.`); | |
| continue; | |
| } | |
| await github.rest.issues.createComment({ | |
| owner: t.owner, repo: t.repo, issue_number: t.number, | |
| body: | |
| `已由 ${thisRepo} 的 ${prUrl} 修复并合并。\n\n` + | |
| `（跨仓库的关闭关键字不会自动生效，本条由 \`cross-repo-issue-closer\` 工作流代为收口。）\n\n` + | |
| `---\n_Generated by [Claude Code](https://claude.ai/code)_`, | |
| }); | |
| await github.rest.issues.update({ | |
| owner: t.owner, repo: t.repo, issue_number: t.number, | |
| state: 'closed', state_reason: 'completed', | |
| }); | |
| core.info(`Closed ${key}.`); | |
| } catch (error) { | |
| // One unreachable target must not swallow the rest, and a | |
| // failure here must not read as success. | |
| core.warning(`Could not close ${key}: ${error.message}`); | |
| } | |
| } |