From b0cc6f46feed0a2f4ebe4a8d9a873005ed3bddb3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Marko Ivankovic Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2026 10:57:45 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] ci: the signing key behind a tag-only environment, no stored tokens - apt and dnf deploy to the `release` environment, which only `v*` tags can deploy to, so its secret is out of reach of a workflow on a branch - every checkout sets persist-credentials: false - the gh-pages pushes take the token from the environment through a credential helper, not in the URL on git's command line - the release is created with gh rather than a third-party action, so no code from outside GitHub runs in the job that writes it - RELEASING.md: the environment, the tag ruleset and the allowed actions Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01FNs394W7GMp53qrHNPrACN --- .github/workflows/ci.yml | 20 +++++++ .github/workflows/release.yml | 102 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- .github/workflows/test.yml | 2 + RELEASING.md | 42 ++++++++++++-- 4 files changed, 135 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-) diff --git a/.github/workflows/ci.yml b/.github/workflows/ci.yml index c882e32..ec69420 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/ci.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/ci.yml @@ -59,6 +59,8 @@ jobs: runs-on: ubuntu-latest steps: - uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1 + with: + persist-credentials: false - uses: taiki-e/install-action@682ce6c3c696a4cd5168a05f98e51aa02b877941 # v2.89.1 with: @@ -74,6 +76,8 @@ jobs: runs-on: ubuntu-latest steps: - uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1 + with: + persist-credentials: false # Must equal `rust-version` in Cargo.toml. Given as an input rather # than as the action's `@1.88.0` ref: the action is pinned to a commit @@ -100,6 +104,8 @@ jobs: runs-on: ubuntu-latest steps: - uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1 + with: + persist-credentials: false - uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@686976e191b89faba57d3206551f0f330d8cb249 # stable - uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@d1527c8f67ef9af357290475d4af4b0fab8f12e0 # v2.9.3 # nextest rather than `cargo test`, for the retries in @@ -166,6 +172,8 @@ jobs: runs-on: ubuntu-latest steps: - uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1 + with: + persist-credentials: false - uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@686976e191b89faba57d3206551f0f330d8cb249 # stable - uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@d1527c8f67ef9af357290475d4af4b0fab8f12e0 # v2.9.3 with: @@ -197,6 +205,8 @@ jobs: runs-on: ubuntu-latest steps: - uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1 + with: + persist-credentials: false - name: Install Rust uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@686976e191b89faba57d3206551f0f330d8cb249 # stable @@ -240,6 +250,8 @@ jobs: runs-on: ubuntu-latest steps: - uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1 + with: + persist-credentials: false - uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@686976e191b89faba57d3206551f0f330d8cb249 # stable with: targets: x86_64-unknown-linux-musl @@ -369,6 +381,8 @@ jobs: runs-on: ubuntu-latest steps: - uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1 + with: + persist-credentials: false - uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@686976e191b89faba57d3206551f0f330d8cb249 # stable with: targets: x86_64-unknown-linux-musl @@ -465,6 +479,8 @@ jobs: runs-on: ubuntu-latest steps: - uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1 + with: + persist-credentials: false - uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@686976e191b89faba57d3206551f0f330d8cb249 # stable - uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@d1527c8f67ef9af357290475d4af4b0fab8f12e0 # v2.9.3 - uses: taiki-e/install-action@682ce6c3c696a4cd5168a05f98e51aa02b877941 # v2.89.1 @@ -491,6 +507,8 @@ jobs: runs-on: ubuntu-latest steps: - uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1 + with: + persist-credentials: false - name: Each .SRCINFO matches its PKGBUILD run: python3 -B packaging/aur/srcinfo.py --check @@ -501,6 +519,8 @@ jobs: runs-on: ubuntu-latest steps: - uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1 + with: + persist-credentials: false - uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@686976e191b89faba57d3206551f0f330d8cb249 # stable - uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@d1527c8f67ef9af357290475d4af4b0fab8f12e0 # v2.9.3 - run: cargo publish --dry-run diff --git a/.github/workflows/release.yml b/.github/workflows/release.yml index 40ad380..3544037 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/release.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/release.yml @@ -15,10 +15,15 @@ on: env: CARGO_TERM_COLOR: always -# Read-only by default; only the two jobs that publish get write, and only -# `attest` can mint an OIDC token. The build job runs the third-party actions -# that compile the binaries the apt job then signs, and none of them needs to -# push anything or to prove who it is. +# Read-only by default; only the three jobs that publish (`release`, `apt`, +# `dnf`) get write, and only `attest` can mint an OIDC token. The build job +# runs the third-party actions that compile the binaries the publishing jobs +# then sign, and none of them needs to push anything or to prove who it is. +# +# Every checkout sets `persist-credentials: false`. Nothing here pushes +# through a checkout, and left at its default it writes the job's token +# into `.git/config` for anything that runs afterwards to read; in `apt` +# and `dnf` that token can write to the repository. permissions: contents: read @@ -30,6 +35,8 @@ jobs: runs-on: ubuntu-latest steps: - uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1 + with: + persist-credentials: false - name: Tag must match Cargo.toml version run: | manifest="$(cargo metadata --no-deps --format-version 1 \ @@ -91,6 +98,8 @@ jobs: cc: CC_aarch64_unknown_linux_musl steps: - uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1 + with: + persist-credentials: false - uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@686976e191b89faba57d3206551f0f330d8cb249 # stable with: @@ -241,7 +250,7 @@ jobs: # Its own job, so the two permissions it needs are held by nothing but # first-party actions: `id-token: write` lets a job mint a token that # proves it is this workflow, and neither the build job's third-party - # toolchain actions nor the release action should be able to. Before + # toolchain actions nor anything in `release` should be able to. Before # `release` rather than after, so a published release always has its # attestations; a failure here stops the release instead of shipping # one that `gh attestation verify` rejects. @@ -292,11 +301,11 @@ jobs: # proves the bytes survived the artifact round trip, and SHA256SUMS # puts every asset of the release in one file for `sha256sum -c`. # - # Not GPG-signed. The only key this workflow holds is the APT - # repository's, and it is imported in the `apt` job alone; bringing it - # into this job would hand it to the third-party release action for - # the sake of a second signature over what the provenance attestation - # already vouches for. + # Not GPG-signed. The only key this workflow holds is the + # repositories', and it is imported in the `apt` and `dnf` jobs alone, + # behind the `release` environment; bringing it into this job too + # would be one more place it is exposed, for the sake of a second + # signature over what the provenance attestation already vouches for. - name: Verify the checksums and write SHA256SUMS working-directory: dist run: | @@ -306,21 +315,38 @@ jobs: sha256sum *.tar.gz *.deb *.rpm > SHA256SUMS cat SHA256SUMS + # With GitHub's own CLI, which the runner image ships, rather than a + # third-party action: this is the one job holding `contents: write` + # over the release, and nothing in it now runs code from outside + # GitHub and this repository. + # + # The notes are the changelog's section for this tag, as + # `verify-version` extracted it, rather than GitHub's generated notes: + # those are a list of commit titles, and the changelog is what is + # written for the people upgrading. It is marked as a pre-release + # while the version is 0.0.x — cargo treats every 0.0.z bump as + # breaking, and the release page should say the same thing the + # version number does — and for a release candidate (`v0.1.0-rc.1`: + # any tag with a semver pre-release part). + # + # A re-run of this job finds the release it made the first time, so it + # replaces the notes and the assets rather than failing on a release + # that exists. - name: Create release - uses: softprops/action-gh-release@efb35369e0ad2afab669f228072c1b0d510eae64 # v3.0.3 - with: - files: dist/* - fail_on_unmatched_files: true - # The changelog's section for this tag, as `verify-version` - # extracted it, rather than GitHub's generated notes: those are a - # list of commit titles, and the changelog is what is written for - # the people upgrading. - body_path: notes/release-notes.md - # Marked as a pre-release while the version is 0.0.x — cargo treats - # every 0.0.z bump as breaking, and the release page should say the - # same thing the version number does — and for a release candidate - # (`v0.1.0-rc.1`: any tag with a semver pre-release part). - prerelease: ${{ startsWith(github.ref_name, 'v0.0.') || contains(github.ref_name, '-') }} + env: + GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }} + PRERELEASE: ${{ startsWith(github.ref_name, 'v0.0.') || contains(github.ref_name, '-') }} + run: | + tag="$GITHUB_REF_NAME" + if gh release view "$tag" --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" >/dev/null 2>&1; then + gh release edit "$tag" --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" \ + --notes-file notes/release-notes.md --prerelease="$PRERELEASE" + gh release upload "$tag" --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" --clobber dist/* + else + gh release create "$tag" --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" --verify-tag \ + --title "$tag" --notes-file notes/release-notes.md \ + --prerelease="$PRERELEASE" dist/* + fi # Republishes the APT repository with this release added to it. # @@ -338,12 +364,16 @@ jobs: needs: release if: ${{ !contains(github.ref_name, '-') }} runs-on: ubuntu-latest + # The signing key is an environment secret, which only a `v*` tag + # can deploy to; see RELEASING.md. + environment: release permissions: contents: write steps: # The tagged tree, for scripts/build-apt-repo.sh and the landing page. - uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1 with: + persist-credentials: false path: source # And the published repository, which holds every previously released @@ -445,6 +475,8 @@ jobs: echo "Both indices carry ${version}, and every Filename: resolves." - name: Publish + env: + GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }} run: | cd pages git config user.name "github-actions[bot]" @@ -455,7 +487,13 @@ jobs: exit 0 fi git commit -m "apt: publish ${GITHUB_REF_NAME}" - git push "https://x-access-token:${{ github.token }}@github.com/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}.git" gh-pages + # The token from the environment, through a credential helper, + # rather than in the URL, which is on git's command line where any + # process in the job can read it. The empty helper first clears + # any the runner configured. + git -c credential.helper= \ + -c credential.helper='!f() { echo username=x-access-token; echo "password=${GH_TOKEN}"; }; f' \ + push "https://github.com/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}.git" gh-pages # Republishes the dnf repository, rpm/ on the same `gh-pages` branch, with # this release's .rpms signed and added. scripts/build-rpm-repo.sh says @@ -470,11 +508,15 @@ jobs: needs: [release, apt] if: ${{ always() && needs.release.result == 'success' && !contains(github.ref_name, '-') }} runs-on: ubuntu-latest + # The signing key is an environment secret, which only a `v*` tag + # can deploy to; see RELEASING.md. + environment: release permissions: contents: write steps: - uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1 with: + persist-credentials: false path: source # Cloned now, after `apt` pushed, so this builds on its commit. Never @@ -554,6 +596,8 @@ jobs: echo "rpm/ lists ${version} for both architectures, signed, and every package resolves." - name: Publish + env: + GH_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }} run: | cd pages git config user.name "github-actions[bot]" @@ -564,4 +608,10 @@ jobs: exit 0 fi git commit -m "dnf: publish ${GITHUB_REF_NAME}" - git push "https://x-access-token:${{ github.token }}@github.com/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}.git" gh-pages + # The token from the environment, through a credential helper, + # rather than in the URL, which is on git's command line where any + # process in the job can read it. The empty helper first clears + # any the runner configured. + git -c credential.helper= \ + -c credential.helper='!f() { echo username=x-access-token; echo "password=${GH_TOKEN}"; }; f' \ + push "https://github.com/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}.git" gh-pages diff --git a/.github/workflows/test.yml b/.github/workflows/test.yml index 3151542..2ba1416 100644 --- a/.github/workflows/test.yml +++ b/.github/workflows/test.yml @@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ jobs: runs-on: ${{ matrix.runner }} steps: - uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1 + with: + persist-credentials: false - name: Install Rust uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@686976e191b89faba57d3206551f0f330d8cb249 # stable diff --git a/RELEASING.md b/RELEASING.md index 7a6f0cd..6392431 100644 --- a/RELEASING.md +++ b/RELEASING.md @@ -64,12 +64,28 @@ index (`repomd.xml.asc`), and publishes the key armoured as `key.asc`, which is `rpm --import` reads. One key for both keeps one thing to back up and one fingerprint to announce. -**2. The repository secret.** Pipe it rather than pasting it, so the private key never -lands in a terminal, a clipboard or a shell history: +**2. The environment and its secret.** The key is a secret of the `release` +environment, not of the repository. A repository secret is readable by any workflow on +any branch that names it — a pushed branch that edits a workflow is enough — while an +environment secret reaches only the jobs that deploy to that environment, and `release` +accepts deployments from `v*` tags alone. The `apt` and `dnf` jobs are its only users. + +Create the environment, once: + +```sh +gh api -X PUT repos/ivankovic/stop-bots/environments/release \ + -F 'deployment_branch_policy[protected_branches]=false' \ + -F 'deployment_branch_policy[custom_branch_policies]=true' +gh api -X POST repos/ivankovic/stop-bots/environments/release/deployment-branch-policies \ + -f name='v*' -f type=tag +``` + +and set the secret in it. Pipe it rather than pasting it, so the private key never lands +in a terminal, a clipboard or a shell history: ```sh gpg --armor --export-secret-keys '' \ - | gh secret set APT_GPG_PRIVATE_KEY --repo ivankovic/stop-bots + | gh secret set APT_GPG_PRIVATE_KEY --env release --repo ivankovic/stop-bots ``` | Secret | Value | @@ -77,8 +93,24 @@ gpg --armor --export-secret-keys '' \ | `APT_GPG_PRIVATE_KEY` | the armoured private key | | `APT_GPG_PASSPHRASE` | its passphrase — leave unset if the key has none, as this one does | -A repository secret is enough; the `apt` job has no environment attached, and an -environment secret would need one added first. +There must be no repository secret of the same name besides it +(`gh secret list --repo ivankovic/stop-bots` shows none): an environment secret wins +over a repository one in the jobs that use the environment, but the repository copy +would still be readable by every other workflow. + +**The tags.** A ruleset, *release tags*, lets only an admin create, move or delete a +`v*` tag, since pushing one is what starts a release. It needs nothing per release: the +admin bypasses it, which `gh api repos/ivankovic/stop-bots/rulesets` lists as +`current_user_can_bypass: always`. + +**Actions.** Settings → Actions allows GitHub's own actions and +`dtolnay/rust-toolchain`, `Swatinem/rust-cache` and `taiki-e/install-action`, and +requires each to be pinned to a commit. An action added to a workflow has to be added +there too, or the run fails before it starts: + +```sh +gh api repos/ivankovic/stop-bots/actions/permissions/selected-actions +``` **Back the private key up somewhere you control.** It exists in the secret store and nowhere else otherwise. Losing it does not break installed clients immediately, but