diff --git a/.changeset/quiet-queries-verify.md b/.changeset/quiet-queries-verify.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4fc986e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.changeset/quiet-queries-verify.md
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+---
+'@inflowpayai/tap-seller': patch
+---
+
+Preserve original query spelling during TAP signature verification, rejecting changes between literal and
+percent-encoded characters.
diff --git a/conformance/inflow-specs.lock.json b/conformance/inflow-specs.lock.json
index f2f88d7..107576d 100644
--- a/conformance/inflow-specs.lock.json
+++ b/conformance/inflow-specs.lock.json
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
 {
   "repository": "inflowpayai/inflow-specs",
-  "revision": "5edce02da5f612c20f1bbed71b8e406442ecdbda"
+  "revision": "46f65400aa6e5b7a8f719a8378d5f36186e5c94d"
 }
diff --git a/packages/tap-seller/README.md b/packages/tap-seller/README.md
index 77c374b..69d8fb4 100644
--- a/packages/tap-seller/README.md
+++ b/packages/tap-seller/README.md
@@ -20,6 +20,10 @@ empty byte array represents a request with a body and therefore requires signed
 fields. Frameworks that expose only a relative request target must reconstruct the absolute URL from trusted request
 metadata before verification.
 
+Pass the original absolute URL string to preserve the query exactly as received. A `URL` object is also accepted, but
+constructing one can change query spelling, such as converting an apostrophe to `%27`; the verifier cannot recover the
+original spelling from that object. Fragments are not part of the signed HTTP query.
+
 ```ts
 import { createTapVerifier } from '@inflowpayai/tap-seller';
 
@@ -37,8 +41,9 @@ if (facts.intent === 'pay') {
 ```
 
 Successful verification returns the signing key identifier, Ed25519 algorithm, `browse` or `pay` intent, nonce, creation
-and expiration times, and the covered HTTP components. It establishes that a Visa-recognized agent key signed the
-supplied request. It does not identify the buyer, authorize application access, or prove payment.
+and expiration times, and the covered HTTP components. It establishes that a key trusted by the configured resolver
+signed the supplied request; Visa is the default key source. It does not identify the buyer, authorize application
+access, or prove payment.
 
 Use `createTapMiddleware` when a function wrapper fits the application:
 
diff --git a/packages/tap-seller/src/verifier.ts b/packages/tap-seller/src/verifier.ts
index c67d150..b55a040 100644
--- a/packages/tap-seller/src/verifier.ts
+++ b/packages/tap-seller/src/verifier.ts
@@ -150,11 +150,16 @@ function validateTime(input: ParsedInput, now: number): void {
 }
 
 function componentValues(request: TapRequest, url: URL): Map<string, string> {
+  // RFC 9421 signs the original query; URL serialization can percent-encode it.
+  const target = String(request.url);
+  const fragmentStart = target.indexOf('#');
+  const withoutFragment = fragmentStart < 0 ? target : target.slice(0, fragmentStart);
+  const queryStart = withoutFragment.indexOf('?');
   const values = new Map<string, string>([
     ['@method', request.method],
     ['@authority', url.host],
     ['@path', url.pathname],
-    ['@query', url.search === '' ? '?' : url.search],
+    ['@query', queryStart < 0 ? '?' : withoutFragment.slice(queryStart)],
   ]);
   const digest = optionalHeader(request.headers, 'content-digest');
   const contentType =
diff --git a/packages/tap-seller/test/unit/verifier.test.ts b/packages/tap-seller/test/unit/verifier.test.ts
index 8e49231..e75eb78 100644
--- a/packages/tap-seller/test/unit/verifier.test.ts
+++ b/packages/tap-seller/test/unit/verifier.test.ts
@@ -72,6 +72,49 @@ const resolver: TapKeyResolver = {
 };
 
 describe('createTapVerifier', () => {
+  it.each([
+    ["?q=O'Reilly", "?q=O'Reilly", false],
+    ['?q=O%27Reilly', '?q=O%27Reilly', false],
+    ['?q=%23%3F&kind=a&kind=b', '?q=%23%3F&kind=a&kind=b', false],
+    ['?', '', false],
+    ['?', '?', false],
+    ['?', '#fragment?not-a-query', false],
+    ["?q=O'Reilly", "?q=O'Reilly#fragment?not-a-query", false],
+    ['?q=O%27Reilly', "?q=O'Reilly", true],
+    ['?', '', true],
+  ] as const)('preserves signed query %s with input %s (URL object: %s)', async (query, suffix, urlObject) => {
+    const vector = required(vectors.positive[0]);
+    const sample = {
+      ...vector,
+      request: { ...vector.request, query },
+      signatureBase: vector.signatureBase.replace(/^"@query": .*$/m, `"@query": ${query}`),
+    };
+    const originPath = `https://${vector.request.authority}${vector.request.path}`;
+    const suppliedUrl = originPath + suffix;
+    const request = {
+      ...signedParameters(sample, vector.signatureInput.slice(5)),
+      url: urlObject ? new URL(suppliedUrl) : suppliedUrl,
+    };
+    const originalUrl = String(request.url);
+    const next = vi.fn().mockReturnValue('recognized');
+    const verify = createTapMiddleware(
+      createTapVerifier({
+        keyResolver: resolver,
+        clock: () => vector.signatureParameters.created * 1000,
+      }),
+    );
+    const tamperedQuery =
+      query === "?q=O'Reilly" ? '?q=O%27Reilly' : query === '?q=O%27Reilly' ? "?q=O'Reilly" : '?q=changed';
+    await expect(verify({ ...request, url: originPath + tamperedQuery }, next)).rejects.toMatchObject({
+      code: 'SIGNATURE_INVALID',
+    });
+    expect(next).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    await expect(verify(request, next)).resolves.toBe('recognized');
+    await expect(verify(request, next)).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'NONCE_REPLAYED' });
+    expect(next).toHaveBeenCalledOnce();
+    expect(String(request.url)).toBe(originalUrl);
+  });
+
   it('rejects RSA key material even when a custom resolver labels it ed25519', async () => {
     const vector = required(vectors.positive[0]);
     const { privateKey, publicKey: rsaKey } = generateKeyPairSync('rsa', { modulusLength: 2048 });