CLI

Install with dotnet tool install -g SimpleSign.Cli.

PDF Signatures

# Sign a PDF
simplesign sign contract.pdf --cert mycert.pfx --password secret --tsa http://timestamp.digicert.com

# Claimed signing time, document information, a larger /Contents and structured signer metadata
simplesign sign contract.pdf --cert mycert.pfx --password secret \
    --signing-time 2026-11-09T10:00:00-03:00 --doc-info Title=Contract --contents-size 32768 \
    --signer-id 12345678909 --signer-id-type CPF --legal-basis "Lei 14.063/2020" --commitment origin

# Explicit signature policy (signature-policy-identifier with the document's hash)
simplesign sign contract.pdf --cert mycert.pfx --password secret \
    --policy-oid 1.2.3.4.5 --policy-hash 9F86D081884C7D65... --policy-uri https://example.com/policy.der

# B-LTA with a separate archive TSA; accept a lower level when the TSA or revocation data are unreachable
simplesign sign contract.pdf --cert mycert.pfx --password secret --tsa http://timestamp.digicert.com \
    --archival --archive-tsa https://tsa.example.com/tsr --return-lower-level

# A TSA that asks for credentials (also on `cades sign` and `xades sign`; secrets accept env:NAME)
simplesign sign contract.pdf --cert mycert.pfx --password secret --tsa https://tsa.example.com/tsr \
    --tsa-user alice --tsa-password env:TSA_PASSWORD        # or --tsa-token env:TSA_TOKEN, or --tsa-cert client.pfx

# Validate (add --trust to accept your own root CA, --no-system-roots to trust only it, --json for machine-readable output)
simplesign validate signed.pdf
simplesign validate signed.pdf --trust my-root-ca.pem --json

# Sign every PDF of a folder (BatchSigner), four at a time, into folder/signed
simplesign sign-dir contracts/ --cert mycert.pfx --password secret --tsa http://timestamp.digicert.com --max-concurrency 4

# Two-phase signing: the key is elsewhere (browser, token, remote service). See "Two-Phase Signing" below.
simplesign sign contract.pdf --prepare --cert signer.cer --session-key env:SESSION_KEY   # writes .session and .tbs
#   ...the signer hashes contract.pdf.tbs with SHA-256 and signs it (RSA PKCS#1 v1.5, or ECDSA in DER)...
simplesign deferred complete contract.pdf.session --session-key env:SESSION_KEY --signature contract.sig -o signed.pdf

# Validate a directory of signed PDFs
simplesign validate-dir ./documents/

# Inspect
simplesign inspect signed.pdf

# Extract CMS from signed PDF
simplesign extract signed.pdf --output-dir ./extracted

# Convert HTML to PDF (relative images/CSS resolve against the HTML file's folder)
simplesign html-to-pdf page.html --output page.pdf

# ... with an embedded Unicode font, footer, and PDF/A-2b for archiving
simplesign html-to-pdf page.html --font "Noto Sans=NotoSans-Regular.ttf" --footer "{page}/{pages}" --pdfa

# Explain a signature term (omit the term for the full glossary)
simplesign explain ByteRange

# Show version
simplesign version

Visible stamp

--visible draws a stamp on the page; without --page, --pos-x or --pos-y it is placed automatically at the bottom of the page. Everything else is optional:

Option	What it does
`--page`, `--pos-x`, `--pos-y`	Page (1 is the first) and lower-left corner, in points
`--stamp-width`, `--stamp-height`	Fixed size in points (default: computed from the text)
`--text-align left\|center\|right`, `--vertical-align top\|middle\|bottom`	Text alignment
`--no-shrink-to-fit`, `--max-text-length <N>`	Clip instead of shrinking the text; cut longer texts (default 40)
`--signer-display-name <NAME>`, `--extra-line <TEXT>` (repeatable)	The name and more lines of text
`--no-date`, `--hide-reason`, `--hide-location`	Leave the date, reason or location off the stamp (they stay in the signature)
`--signed-by-label`, `--reason-label`, `--location-label`, `--date-label`	The labels
`--date-format`, `--time-zone`, `--date-culture`	How the date is written
`--font`, `--font-size`, `--label-font-size`	A PDF standard font and its sizes
`--text-color`, `--background-color`, `--border-color` (`R,G,B` from 0 to 1), `--border-width`	Colors and border
`--background-image <PNG\|JPEG>`, `--image-fit stretch\|contain\|cover`	An image behind the text
`--qr-url <URL>`	A QR code with a verification URL

simplesign sign contract.pdf --cert mycert.pfx --password secret --visible --page 2 --pos-x 72 --pos-y 72 \
    --stamp-width 220 --stamp-height 70 --vertical-align middle --extra-line "CRM 12345" --date-culture pt-BR

CAdES Signatures

# CAdES-B-B (basic)
simplesign cades sign document.pdf --cert mycert.pfx

# CAdES-B-T (with timestamp)
simplesign cades sign document.pdf --cert mycert.pfx \
    --tsa http://timestamp.digicert.com --level timestamped

# CAdES-B-LT (long-term with LTV)
simplesign cades sign document.pdf --cert mycert.pfx \
    --tsa http://timestamp.digicert.com --level longterm --chain chain.pem

# CAdES-B-LTA (with archival timestamp)
simplesign cades sign document.pdf --cert mycert.pfx \
    --tsa http://timestamp.digicert.com --level archive

# Enveloped mode — data embedded inside the CMS (.p7m)
simplesign cades sign document.pdf --cert mycert.pfx --content-type enveloped

# Signer location, role and a description of the content
simplesign cades sign document.pdf --cert mycert.pfx \
    --signer-country BR --signer-locality "São Paulo" --signer-postal-address "Av. Paulista, 1000" \
    --signer-role Director --mime-type application/pdf --content-description "Contract"

# Roles vouched for by a third party (embedded as given, not verified)
simplesign cades sign document.pdf --cert mycert.pfx \
    --attribute-certificate role.ac --signed-assertion assertion.xml

# Timestamp the content before signing
simplesign cades sign document.pdf --cert mycert.pfx \
    --tsa http://timestamp.digicert.com --content-timestamp

# Carry the policy document in the signature (its SHA-256 goes in the policy identifier)
simplesign cades sign document.pdf --cert mycert.pfx \
    --policy-oid 1.2.3.4.5 --policy-document policy.der --policy-specification 1.2.3.4.5.1

# B-LT asking the CRL before OCSP (also on `sign` and `xades sign`)
simplesign cades sign document.pdf --cert mycert.pfx \
    --tsa http://timestamp.digicert.com --level longterm --revocation-preference crl

# Add a second signer of the same content, or countersign the first signer
simplesign cades sign document.pdf.p7s --cosign --data document.pdf --cert second.pfx --password secret
simplesign cades sign document.pdf.p7s --countersign --signer-index 0 --cert notary.pfx --password secret

# Claimed signing time, RSASSA-PSS and an extended form (-C, -X-L or -A; also on xades sign)
simplesign cades sign document.pdf --cert mycert.pfx --password secret --signing-time 2026-11-09T10:00:00Z \
    --signature-algorithm rsassa-pss --tsa http://timestamp.digicert.com --level longterm --extended-form extended-long

# Validate a CAdES signature
simplesign cades validate document.pdf.p7s --data document.pdf

# Validate with custom trust anchors (the operating system's roots stay trusted; add --no-system-roots to trust only these)
simplesign cades validate document.pdf.p7s --data document.pdf --trust root-ca.pem

cades validate checks every signer and countersignature. With --json, signatures lists them (signer-1, signer-2…, each with its counterSignatures: signer-1.1…); the top-level fields are those of the first signer. The exit code is 0 only when all are valid.

XAdES Signatures

# XAdES-B-B enveloped (default form)
simplesign xades sign invoice.xml --cert mycert.pfx

# XAdES-B-T detached
simplesign xades sign data.xml --cert mycert.pfx \
    --tsa http://timestamp.digicert.com --level timestamped \
    --form detached --data-uri data.xml

# XAdES-B-LT enveloping
simplesign xades sign data.xml --cert mycert.pfx \
    --tsa http://timestamp.digicert.com --level longterm \
    --form enveloping --chain chain.pem

# Production place and Canonical XML 1.0 instead of Exclusive C14N
simplesign xades sign invoice.xml --cert mycert.pfx \
    --place-city "São Paulo" --place-state SP --place-country BR --canonicalization inclusive

# More files signed with the document: one inside the signature, one referenced by URI
simplesign xades sign invoice.xml --cert mycert.pfx \
    --embed-object attachment.pdf,application/pdf --external-object terms.txt=terms.txt,text/plain

# Timestamp the signed data before signing; carry the policy document in the signature
simplesign xades sign invoice.xml --cert mycert.pfx \
    --tsa http://timestamp.digicert.com --data-objects-timestamp \
    --policy-oid 1.2.3.4.5 --policy-document policy.xml --policy-specification https://example.com/policy-syntax

# Roles vouched for by a third party (embedded as given, not verified)
simplesign xades sign invoice.xml --cert mycert.pfx \
    --attribute-certificate role.ac --signed-assertion assertion.xml

# Countersign a signature of an already signed document (--countersign-id picks one of several)
simplesign xades sign signed.xml --cert witness.pfx --countersign --output countersigned.xml

# SigningCertificate V1 for older validators, the data's MIME type, and a PKCS#11 token as the key
simplesign xades sign invoice.xml --pkcs11-lib auto --signing-certificate-v1 --data-mime-type application/xml

# Validate a XAdES signature
simplesign xades validate signed.xml

# Validate a signature with external data objects: give each by its URI
simplesign xades validate signed.xml --external-object terms.txt=terms.txt

# Validate detached with original data
simplesign xades validate signed.xml --data data.xml

# Validate with custom trust anchors (the operating system's roots stay trusted; add --no-system-roots to trust only these)
simplesign xades validate signed.xml --trust root-ca.pem

xades validate checks every ds:Signature of the document and their countersignatures. With --json, signatures lists them, each with its counterSignatures; the top-level fields are those of the first. The exit code is 0 only when all are valid.

Two-Phase Signing

When the private key is on another machine, sign, cades sign and xades sign take --prepare: the command does not sign. It runs the signing policy and writes the session (<input>.session, or --session) and the data to sign (<input>.tbs, or --to-sign). Every other option of the command keeps its meaning — level, TSA, field and appearance, signed attributes, signature policy, co-signature and countersignature.

# Phase one. --cert is the signer's certificate without a key (DER or PEM); --chain adds its chain.
simplesign sign contract.pdf --prepare --cert signer.cer --chain chain.pem --session-key env:SESSION_KEY \
    --tsa http://timestamp.digicert.com --ltv --reason "Approved"
simplesign cades sign report.pdf --prepare --cert signer.cer --session-key env:SESSION_KEY --content-type enveloped
simplesign xades sign signed.xml --prepare --cert signer.cer --session-key env:SESSION_KEY --countersign

# The signer hashes the .tbs file with the digest algorithm the command printed and signs it:
# RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 or PSS, or ECDSA as a DER SEQUENCE { r, s }.

# Phase two, for the three formats: the format is read from the session.
simplesign deferred complete contract.pdf.session --session-key env:SESSION_KEY --signature contract.sig -o signed.pdf

Option	On	What it does
`--prepare`	`sign`, `cades sign`, `xades sign`	Prepare instead of signing. Not with `--password`, a token, a cloud certificate or `--output`.
`--session-key <KEY>`	prepare and complete	The HMAC key of the session: 32 bytes or more as hex or base64, or `env:NAME`. The same key completes it.
`--session`, `--to-sign`	prepare	Where the session and the data to sign go.
`--content-outside-session`	`cades sign --prepare`	Keep the content out of the session; give it to `deferred complete --content`.
`--detached-data-outside-session`	`xades sign --prepare`	Keep the detached document and external data objects out of the session; give them to `deferred complete --detached-data` and `--external-object URI=PATH`.
`--signature <PATH>`	`deferred complete`	The raw signature of the data to sign.
`--tsa`, `--archive-tsa` with `--tsa-user`, `--tsa-token` or `--tsa-cert`	`deferred complete`	The TSA of phase one again, only to give its credentials: they are never stored in the session.
`--signing-policy`, `--trust`, `--expected-tsa`, `--audit-log`	`deferred complete`	The checks of the TSA certificate; the signer was checked in phase one.
`--json`	prepare and complete	The paths and algorithms of phase one; the requested and achieved levels of phase two.

The session is authenticated, not encrypted, and holds the document: keep it on the server. deferred prepare is the earlier, PDF-only form of sign --prepare and stays available.

Validation Output

contract-signed.pdf  1/1 valid
├── Document
│   ├── Signatures: 1 user + 0 timestamps
│   ├── Encrypted:  No
│   ├── DocMDP:     Not locked
│   ├── PDF/A:      None
│   └── ✓ DSS (embedded)
└── Signature1  ✓ VALID
    ├── Signer:       CN=Jane Doe, O=Acme Corp
    ├── SubFilter:    ETSI.CAdES.detached
    ├── PAdES:        B-T (Timestamp)
    ├── Certificate
    │   ├── Subject:        CN=Jane Doe, O=Acme Corp
    │   ├── Issuer:         DigiCert SHA2 Assured ID CA
    │   ├── Serial:         0A:1B:2C:3D
    │   ├── Key:            RSA 2048-bit
    │   ├── Valid:          2024-01-01 – 2026-01-01
    │   └── NonRepudiation: ✓
    ├── ESS CertV2:   ✓
    ├── Validation
    │   ├── Integrity:  ✓ Valid
    │   ├── Signature:  ✓ Valid
    │   ├── Chain:      ✓ Valid
    │   ├── Revoked:    ✓ Not revoked (OCSP)
    │   └── Timestamp:  ✓ 2025-04-28 14:30:00 UTC
    ├── Timestamp
    │   ├── Time:       2025-04-28 14:30:00 UTC
    │   ├── TSA:        CN=DigiCert Timestamp 2023
    │   └── Token Size: 4.2 KB
    ├── Algorithm:    SHA-256
    ├── Byte Range:   [0, 1234, 5678, 9012]  ✓
    └── Signed at:    2025-04-28 14:30:00 UTC

Trust Profiles

A trust profile sets, under one name, the policy and the trust of a trust framework. Each comes from its package (IofeProfile, EidasProfile, IcpBrasilProfile, GovBrProfile; the library takes them with WithProfile and ValidationOptions.Profile); simplesign profiles lists them:

Profile	Signing policy	Validation policy	Trust
`iofe`	`iofe`	`iofe`	INDECOPI's trusted list, checked against the signer bundled with `SimpleSign.Peru.Iofe`
`eidas`	`eidas`	`eidas`	The EU LOTL and its national lists, checked against the signers bundled with `SimpleSign.Europe.Eidas` (pivot LOTLs followed); `validate` shows each signature's qualification (QESig, AdESig-QC…) — see eidas.md
`icp-brasil`	`icp-brasil`	`icp-brasil`	The AC Raiz roots and the ICP-Brasil chain validation
`gov-br`	— (Gov.br signs on its own service)	`govbr`	The Gov.br roots and their chain validation
`sandbox`	`default`	`default`	A running SimpleSign Sandbox's LOTL (`--sandbox URL`)

simplesign sign contrato.pdf --output assinado.pdf --cert cert.pfx --password "$PFX_PASSWORD" --profile iofe --tsa <ACT URL>
simplesign validate assinado.pdf --profile iofe
simplesign validate documento.pdf --profile icp-brasil --trust-profile gov-br

An explicit option wins: --signing-policy / --policy over the profile's policy, --tsl / --lotl over its trust.
--trust-profile NAME (repeatable) adds another profile's trust; the policy stays --profile's.
--sandbox URL reads a running Sandbox once: its origins, LDAP and HTTPS chain are allowed (as --allow-origin, --allow-ldap, --tls-trust would), --profile sandbox trusts its LOTL, and --profile iofe reads the Sandbox's list the IOFE way instead of INDECOPI's (to test INDECOPI's rules with the Sandbox's certificates).

Signing Policy

sign, cades sign, xades sign, sign-dir and deferred prepare/complete check the certificate before signing. --signing-policy chooses the checks: a JSON file, or a built-in name (simplesign policy export signing --preset NAME writes it out):

Value	Checks
`default`	Validity of every certificate of the chain, key usage digitalSignature or nonRepudiation, RSA ≥ 2048 bits, SHA-2/SHA-3
`strict`	`default` plus the revocation of the whole chain (CRL/OCSP); give the chain up to the root
`minimal`	Only the dates of the signing certificate (tests and migrations)
`iofe`	INDECOPI's guide v4.0: `strict`, CRLs with nextUpdate, no SHA-1 in the chain, the signer and every TSA chained to a trust anchor, TSA valid and not revoked
`eidas`	`strict`, the signer and every TSA chained to a trust anchor (the EU lists), TSA valid and not revoked, a warning on a non-qualified certificate (QcCompliance)

What the policy checks against comes from these options:

Option	Means
`--trust <file>` (repeatable), `--trust-dir <dir>`, `--tsl <url\|file> --tsl-signer <file>` [`--tsl-profile iofe`]	The trust anchors the signer and each TSA must chain to (`ProspectiveCertificateChain`); `--tsl-profile iofe` reads the list as `IofeExtension` does (INDECOPI's `unspecified` TSAs too, never a code-signing certificate)
`--expected-tsa <file>`	The certificate the TSA must sign with; a timestamp from another is refused (`TimestampUntrusted`)
`--audit-log <file>`	Appends a hash-chained record of each signature made or refused; `simplesign audit verify <file>` checks the chain

augment <file> --level BT|BLT|BLTA --tsa URL raises an existing PAdES, CAdES or XAdES signature (the format is read from the file): a document time-stamp, a DSS and a new document time-stamp for a PDF; the signature time-stamp, validation data and archive time-stamp for CAdES and XAdES. --data gives a detached signature's data (B-LTA needs it), --signature-id picks a ds:Signature, --renew renews a B-LTA, --json prints the levels before and after.

validate --policy takes a file or default, strict (time-stamps out of order and an unavailable signature policy fail), iofe, icp-brasil or govbr.

A refusal prints the reason (KeyTooWeak, KeyUsageNotPermitted, ChainCertificateNotValid, CertificateRevoked, RevocationStatusUnknown, AlgorithmNotPermitted, UntrustedRoot, TimestampUntrusted, TimestampCertificateRevoked…) and what to do about it. simplesign explain <TERM> explains the ETSI sub-indications of a validation report, such as CRYPTO_CONSTRAINTS_FAILURE_NO_POE.

JSON result

With --json, sign, cades sign and xades sign print one JSON object instead of text, for scripts and test runners:

{ "success": true, "format": "pades", "output": "contract_signed.pdf", "signer": "CN=…",
  "requestedLevel": "B-LT", "achievedLevel": "B-LT", "warnings": [], "error": null }

A refusal is "success": false with "error": { "type": "SigningException", "reason": "CertificateRevoked", "message": "…" }; the exit code is not 0.

Network

The library refuses requests to localhost and private addresses (the SSRF guard). To use a local test environment, such as the SimpleSign Sandbox, every command accepts:

Option	Environment variable	Effect
`--allow-origin <URL>` (repeatable)	`SIMPLESIGN_ALLOW_ORIGINS` (comma-separated)	A loopback origin (scheme, host, port) the TSA, CRL, OCSP and AIA requests may reach
`--allow-ldap`	`SIMPLESIGN_ALLOW_LDAP=true`	CRLs over `ldap://`
`--tls-trust <PEM>`	`SIMPLESIGN_TLS_TRUST`	A root, and its intermediates, accepted for HTTPS next to the system's

curl -s http://localhost:5300/chain.pem > sandbox-chain.pem
simplesign sign contract.pdf --cert revoked-ocsp.pfx --password sandbox --signing-policy strict-signing-policy.json --json \
  --allow-origin http://localhost:5300 --allow-origin https://localhost:5301 --allow-origin ldap://localhost:5302 \
  --allow-ldap --tls-trust sandbox-chain.pem

Validation Policy, Trust Store and Verification Report

validate, validate-dir, cades validate and xades validate share these options:

Option	What it does
`--policy <file>`	Validation policy: JSON, root `ValidationConstraints`; see ADR 0024
`--policy-signer <cert>`	The policy must be signed with this certificate (detached CMS in `<policy>.p7s`)
`--trust-dir <dir>`	Folder of trust anchor certificates (`.cer`, `.crt`, `.der`, `.pem`)
`--trust-dir-signer <cert>`	The folder must carry `manifest.json` (SHA-256 of every file) signed with this certificate
`--tsl <url\|file>` + `--tsl-signer <cert>`	Trusted list (ETSI TS 119 612 / TS 102 231): its active CA and TSA services become trust anchors. An expired list (here or under `--lotl`) is kept: the policy's `TLNotExpired` judges it (WARN by default, FAIL in `iofe`), as EU DSS does
`--tsl-profile iofe`	Read `--tsl` as INDECOPI's list (`IofeExtension.DefaultListOptions`): its `unspecified` TSAs become anchors too, code-signing certificates never; without `--tsl-signer`, INDECOPI's bundled signer is used
`--profile NAME`, `--trust-profile NAME`, `--sandbox URL`	A trust profile (see Trust Profiles)
`--lotl <url>` + `--lotl-signer <cert>`	List of trusted lists (e.g. the EU LOTL): the national lists it points to are checked with the certificates it gives and their CA and TSA services become trust anchors; `--lotl-territory PT` (repeatable) loads only some
`--lang es`	Write the verification report in Spanish
`--check-revocation` (CAdES, XAdES)	Check the revocation of the signer and TSA chains
`--level basic\|timestamps\|lt\|lta`	How much is validated: the signature and chain only, plus signature timestamps, plus revocation and long-term data, plus archive timestamps (default)
`--revocation-strategy ocsp-first\|crl-first`	Which revocation source is asked first (default `ocsp-first`); the other one answers when the first gives nothing
`--etsi-report <file>`	Write the ETSI TS 119 102-2 signature validation report (XML, namespace `http://uri.etsi.org/19102/v1.2.1#`)
`--simple-report <file>`	Write the simple report (JSON): per signature the indication, sub-indication, signer, times, policy, errors and warnings
`--html-report <file>`	Write a readable report (one self-contained HTML page): per signature the result and its reason, integrity of the signed data, claimed and proved signing time, signer certificate with its public key (PEM) and SHA-256 fingerprint, timestamps, revocation data, policy, errors and warnings
`--report-language <code>`	Language of the HTML report: `en` (default), `pt` or `es`
`--revocation-for-untrusted`	Also check the revocation of chains that do not reach a trust anchor (off by default)

Every signature gets a verification report: the indication (TOTAL-PASSED, TOTAL-FAILED, INDETERMINATE), the ETSI EN 319 102-1 sub-indication, the signer's public key (algorithm, size, SHA-256 of the SubjectPublicKeyInfo and the PEM) and each check of the validation. With --json the same data is in subIndication, publicKey and constraints.

simplesign validate contrato.pdf --policy iofe --tsl tsl-pe.xml --tsl-signer indecopi-tsl.cer --tsl-profile iofe --lang es

A policy file lists constraints grouped by what they apply to, each with a level; a constraint left out is not evaluated, and one SimpleSign does not evaluate yet is reported as NOT_CHECKED. Start from the default (simplesign policy export validation -o policy.json) and change what you need:

{
  "ValidationConstraints": {
    "Name": "INDECOPI",
    "Description": "Key usage required; obsolete algorithms fail.",
    "SignatureConstraints": {
      "BasicSignatureConstraints": {
        "SigningCertificate": {
          "NotExpired": { "Level": "FAIL" },
          "KeyUsage": { "Level": "FAIL", "Id": [ "digitalSignature", "nonRepudiation" ] }
        }
      }
    },
    "Cryptographic": {
      "Level": "FAIL",
      "AcceptableDigestAlgo": { "Algo": [ "SHA1", "SHA256", "SHA384", "SHA512" ] },
      "MiniPublicKeySize": { "Algo": [ { "Value": "RSA", "Size": 2048 } ] },
      "AlgoExpirationDate": {
        "Format": "yyyy-MM-dd",
        "Algo": [ { "Value": "SHA1", "Date": "2012-08-01" }, "SHA256", "SHA384", "SHA512", { "Value": "RSA", "Size": 2048 } ]
      }
    }
  }
}

--signing-policy <file> on the sign commands takes the signing policy (root SigningConstraints, see PAdES signing); simplesign policy export signing writes the default one.

timestamp verify also tells whether the tsa name of the token matches the TSA certificate (RFC 3161 §2.4.2).

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