diff --git a/debian/changelog b/debian/changelog
index 569979b..aed527b 100644
--- a/debian/changelog
+++ b/debian/changelog
@@ -1,3 +1,9 @@
+systemd (255.2-4deepin37) unstable; urgency=medium
+
+  * Make the transmit timestamp in timesyncd requests fully random to improve security against off-path attackers
+
+ -- deepin-ci-robot <packages@deepin.org>  Wed, 17 Jun 2026 06:07:57 +0800
+
 systemd (255.2-4deepin36) unstable; urgency=medium
 
   * fix wrong error variable in log_error_errno()
diff --git a/debian/patches/fix-timesyncd-randomize-transmit-timestamp.patch b/debian/patches/fix-timesyncd-randomize-transmit-timestamp.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..50d1446
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/fix-timesyncd-randomize-transmit-timestamp.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+From 678bd12cfc1a7f3f0d074ac9c52f0b06ec601618 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: David Venhoek <david@tweedegolf.com>
+Date: Fri, 26 Jan 2024 10:40:03 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] timesyncd: make the transmit timestamp in requests fully
+ random
+
+This improves security against off-path attackers, and avoids leaking
+the current system time.
+
+diff --git a/src/timesync/timesyncd-manager.c b/src/timesync/timesyncd-manager.c
+index bb37de9f25..8e0eda0797 100644
+--- a/src/timesync/timesyncd-manager.c
++++ b/src/timesync/timesyncd-manager.c
+@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
+ #include "network-util.h"
+ #include "ratelimit.h"
+ #include "resolve-private.h"
++#include "random-util.h"
+ #include "socket-util.h"
+ #include "string-util.h"
+ #include "strv.h"
+@@ -78,13 +79,6 @@ static double ts_to_d(const struct timespec *ts) {
+         return ts->tv_sec + (1.0e-9 * ts->tv_nsec);
+ }
+ 
+-static uint32_t graceful_add_offset_1900_1970(time_t t) {
+-        /* Adds OFFSET_1900_1970 to t and returns it as 32-bit value. This is handles overflows
+-         * gracefully in a deterministic and well-defined way by cutting off the top bits. */
+-        uint64_t a = (uint64_t) t + OFFSET_1900_1970;
+-        return (uint32_t) (a & UINT64_C(0xFFFFFFFF));
+-}
+-
+ static int manager_timeout(sd_event_source *source, usec_t usec, void *userdata) {
+         _cleanup_free_ char *pretty = NULL;
+         Manager *m = ASSERT_PTR(userdata);
+@@ -126,20 +120,22 @@ static int manager_send_request(Manager *m) {
+         }
+ 
+         /*
+-         * Set transmit timestamp, remember it; the server will send that back
+-         * as the origin timestamp and we have an indication that this is the
+-         * matching answer to our request.
+-         *
+-         * The actual value does not matter, We do not care about the correct
+-         * NTP UINT_MAX fraction; we just pass the plain nanosecond value.
++         * Generate a random number as transmit timestamp, to ensure we get
++         * a full 64 bits of entropy to make it hard for off-path attackers
++         * to inject random time to us.
+          */
+-        assert_se(clock_gettime(CLOCK_BOOTTIME, &m->trans_time_mon) >= 0);
+-        assert_se(clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &m->trans_time) >= 0);
+-        ntpmsg.trans_time.sec = htobe32(graceful_add_offset_1900_1970(m->trans_time.tv_sec));
+-        ntpmsg.trans_time.frac = htobe32(m->trans_time.tv_nsec);
++        random_bytes(&m->request_nonce, sizeof(m->request_nonce));
++        ntpmsg.trans_time = m->request_nonce;
+ 
+         server_address_pretty(m->current_server_address, &pretty);
+ 
++        /*
++         * Record the transmit timestamp. This should be as close as possible to
++         * the send-to to ensure the timestamp is reasonably accurate
++         */
++        assert_se(clock_gettime(CLOCK_BOOTTIME, &m->trans_time_mon) >= 0);
++        assert_se(clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &m->trans_time) >= 0);
++
+         len = sendto(m->server_socket, &ntpmsg, sizeof(ntpmsg), MSG_DONTWAIT, &m->current_server_address->sockaddr.sa, m->current_server_address->socklen);
+         if (len == sizeof(ntpmsg)) {
+                 m->pending = true;
+@@ -457,9 +453,8 @@ static int manager_receive_response(sd_event_source *source, int fd, uint32_t re
+ 
+         m->missed_replies = 0;
+ 
+-        /* check our "time cookie" (we just stored nanoseconds in the fraction field) */
+-        if (be32toh(ntpmsg.origin_time.sec) != graceful_add_offset_1900_1970(m->trans_time.tv_sec) ||
+-            be32toh(ntpmsg.origin_time.frac) != (unsigned long) m->trans_time.tv_nsec) {
++        /* check the transmit request nonce was properly returned in the origin_time field */
++        if (ntpmsg.origin_time.sec != m->request_nonce.sec || ntpmsg.origin_time.frac != m->request_nonce.frac) {
+                 log_debug("Invalid reply; not our transmit time. Ignoring.");
+                 return 0;
+         }
+diff --git a/src/timesync/timesyncd-manager.h b/src/timesync/timesyncd-manager.h
+index 8cbb91d907..f444787489 100644
+--- a/src/timesync/timesyncd-manager.h
++++ b/src/timesync/timesyncd-manager.h
+@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ struct Manager {
+         /* last sent packet */
+         struct timespec trans_time_mon;
+         struct timespec trans_time;
++        struct ntp_ts request_nonce;
+         usec_t retry_interval;
+         usec_t connection_retry_usec;
+         bool pending;
+
diff --git a/debian/patches/series b/debian/patches/series
index f669e80..f7d15b4 100644
--- a/debian/patches/series
+++ b/debian/patches/series
@@ -47,3 +47,4 @@ fix-byte-order-conversion.patch
 update-po-file-about-bo-and-ug.patch
 fix-double-free.patch
 fix-wrong-err-log.patch
+fix-timesyncd-randomize-transmit-timestamp.patch