diff --git a/src/Makefile.test.include b/src/Makefile.test.include
index 44ef47bd7999..70443412e772 100644
--- a/src/Makefile.test.include
+++ b/src/Makefile.test.include
@@ -124,6 +124,7 @@ BITCOIN_TESTS =\
   test/governance_inv_tests.cpp \
   test/governance_superblock_tests.cpp \
   test/governance_validators_tests.cpp \
+  test/governance_vote_processing_tests.cpp \
   test/governance_vote_sync_tests.cpp \
   test/governance_vote_wire_tests.cpp \
   test/coinjoin_inouts_tests.cpp \
diff --git a/src/test/governance_vote_processing_tests.cpp b/src/test/governance_vote_processing_tests.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..77e2705e8ae7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/test/governance_vote_processing_tests.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,384 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2026 The Dash Core developers
+// Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying
+// file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.
+
+#include <consensus/amount.h>
+#include <evo/chainhelper.h>
+#include <evo/deterministicmns.h>
+#include <governance/governance.h>
+#include <governance/object.h>
+#include <governance/vote.h>
+#include <index/txindex.h>
+#include <interfaces/chain.h>
+#include <key.h>
+#include <key_io.h>
+#include <masternode/meta.h>
+#include <masternode/sync.h>
+#include <messagesigner.h>
+#include <netfulfilledman.h>
+#include <primitives/transaction.h>
+#include <script/standard.h>
+#include <timedata.h>
+#include <uint256.h>
+#include <util/strencodings.h>
+#include <util/time.h>
+#include <validation.h>
+#include <validationinterface.h>
+
+#include <test/util/index.h>
+#include <test/util/masternode.h>
+#include <test/util/setup_common.h>
+
+#include <boost/test/unit_test.hpp>
+
+#include <chrono>
+#include <memory>
+#include <string>
+#include <vector>
+
+using namespace std::chrono_literals;
+
+namespace {
+// TestChainSetup only accepts checkpointed chain lengths, so 107 blocks plus
+// -dip3params=109:500 is the shortest chain a ProRegTx can be mined on. Same setup as
+// TestChainDIP3Setup in evo_deterministicmns_tests.cpp.
+constexpr int DIP3_ACTIVATION_HEIGHT{109};
+
+void SignWithVotingKey(CGovernanceVote& vote, const CKey& key)
+{
+    std::vector<unsigned char> sig;
+    BOOST_REQUIRE(CMessageSigner::SignMessage(vote.GetSignatureString(), sig, key));
+    vote.SetSignature(sig);
+}
+
+void SignWithOperatorKey(CGovernanceVote& vote, const CBLSSecretKey& key)
+{
+    // Vote signatures are always basic-scheme, regardless of the currently active BLS scheme:
+    // CGovernanceVote::CheckSignature() deserializes and verifies with legacy=false.
+    vote.SetSignature(
+        key.Sign(vote.GetSignatureHash(), /*specificLegacyScheme=*/false).ToByteVector(/*specificLegacyScheme=*/false));
+}
+
+// A chain with one registered masternode whose voting (ECDSA) and operator (BLS) keys are known
+// to the test, so votes can be signed for real and CGovernanceVote::CheckSignature is actually
+// reached. Without a populated masternode list every CGovernanceVote::IsValid() call would
+// short-circuit at GetMNByCollateral and no signature would ever be verified.
+struct GovernanceVoteSetup : public TestChainSetup {
+    CKey mn_voting_key;
+    CBLSSecretKey mn_operator_key;
+    COutPoint mn_collateral;
+    SimpleUTXOMap utxos;
+    //! Fixed so a proposal can be rebuilt bit-for-bit (and keep its hash) once its fee tx is known.
+    int64_t proposal_time{0};
+    std::string proposal_payment_address;
+
+    GovernanceVoteSetup() :
+        TestChainSetup(DIP3_ACTIVATION_HEIGHT - 2, CBaseChainParams::REGTEST, {"-dip3params=109:500"})
+    {
+        // A failed BOOST_REQUIRE below throws, and a throwing constructor means no destructor runs.
+        // Tear the globals down by hand so one broken invariant here doesn't leave a live tx index
+        // (and a dangling m_node reference in it) for every later test in the binary.
+        try {
+            SetUp();
+        } catch (...) {
+            TearDown();
+            throw;
+        }
+    }
+
+    ~GovernanceVoteSetup() { TearDown(); }
+
+    void SetUp()
+    {
+        // CGovernanceObject::IsCollateralValid() reads the proposal fee tx out of the tx index;
+        // without it no proposal can ever be accepted, orphan votes included.
+        g_txindex = std::make_unique<TxIndex>(interfaces::MakeChain(m_node), /*n_cache_size=*/1 << 20,
+                                              /*f_memory=*/true);
+        BOOST_REQUIRE(g_txindex->Start());
+        IndexWaitSynced(*g_txindex);
+
+        utxos = BuildSimpleUtxoMap(m_coinbase_txns);
+
+        // Activate DIP3, then register the masternode that votes in these tests.
+        MineBlocks(1);
+        auto protx = CreateProRegTx(*m_node.chainman, utxos, /*port=*/1, payout_script(), coinbaseKey, mn_voting_key,
+                                    mn_operator_key);
+        mn_collateral = COutPoint(protx.GetHash(), 0);
+        MineBlock({protx});
+        BOOST_REQUIRE(tip_mn_list().GetMNByCollateral(mn_collateral) != nullptr);
+
+        BOOST_REQUIRE(m_node.mn_metaman->LoadCache(/*load_cache=*/false));
+        BOOST_REQUIRE(m_node.netfulfilledman->LoadCache(/*load_cache=*/false));
+        // Governance relay and CheckAndRemove() are no-ops until the node considers itself synced.
+        // Two SwitchToNextAsset() calls get there from BLOCKCHAIN; the bound is just a loop guard.
+        for (int i = 0; i < 5 && !m_node.mn_sync->IsSynced(); ++i) {
+            m_node.mn_sync->SwitchToNextAsset();
+        }
+        BOOST_REQUIRE(m_node.mn_sync->IsSynced());
+
+        m_node.govman = std::make_unique<CGovernanceManager>(*m_node.mn_metaman, *m_node.chainman,
+                                                             *m_node.chain_helper->superblocks, *m_node.dmnman,
+                                                             *m_node.mn_sync);
+        BOOST_REQUIRE(m_node.govman->LoadCache(/*load_cache=*/false));
+
+        proposal_time = TicksSinceEpoch<std::chrono::seconds>(GetAdjustedTime());
+        CKey payment_key;
+        payment_key.MakeNewKey(true);
+        proposal_payment_address = EncodeDestination(PKHash(payment_key.GetPubKey()));
+    }
+
+    void TearDown()
+    {
+        // govman holds a reference into chain_helper, so it must go first (matches PrepareShutdown
+        // ordering in init.cpp).
+        m_node.govman.reset();
+        if (g_txindex) {
+            SyncWithValidationInterfaceQueue();
+            g_txindex->Stop();
+            g_txindex.reset();
+        }
+    }
+
+    CScript coinbase_script() const { return GetScriptForRawPubKey(coinbaseKey.GetPubKey()); }
+
+    //! Masternode payouts and the proposal fee change must go to a P2PKH script (bad-protx-payee
+    //! rejects the raw-pubkey coinbase script, IsCollateralValid() rejects anything else).
+    CScript payout_script() const { return GetScriptForDestination(PKHash(coinbaseKey.GetPubKey())); }
+
+    CDeterministicMNList tip_mn_list() const { return m_node.dmnman->GetListAtChainTip(); }
+
+    void MineBlock(const std::vector<CMutableTransaction>& txns)
+    {
+        const CBlock block = CreateAndProcessBlock(txns, coinbase_script());
+        const CBlockIndex* tip{WITH_LOCK(::cs_main, return m_node.chainman->ActiveChain().Tip())};
+        BOOST_REQUIRE_EQUAL(tip->GetBlockHash(), block.GetHash());
+        m_node.dmnman->UpdatedBlockTip(tip);
+        SetMockTime(GetTime() + 1);
+        IndexWaitSynced(*g_txindex);
+    }
+
+    void MineBlocks(int num_blocks)
+    {
+        for (int i = 0; i < num_blocks; ++i) {
+            MineBlock({});
+        }
+    }
+
+    //! The proposal both the orphan vote and the fee tx below commit to. The object hash
+    //! deliberately excludes the collateral hash, so the same proposal can be built first with an
+    //! empty collateral (to learn its hash) and again once the fee tx paying to that hash exists.
+    CGovernanceObject MakeProposal(const uint256& collateral_hash) const
+    {
+        const std::string data{
+            strprintf("{\"type\":1,\"name\":\"test-proposal\",\"start_epoch\":%d,\"end_epoch\":%d,\"payment_amount\":1.0,\"payment_address\":\"%s\",\"url\":\"https://dash.org\"}",
+                      proposal_time, proposal_time + 100000, proposal_payment_address)};
+        return CGovernanceObject{uint256{}, /*revision=*/1, proposal_time, collateral_hash, HexStr(data)};
+    }
+
+    //! Burns the proposal fee to an OP_RETURN committing to the object hash, the way
+    //! `gobject prepare` does, and buries it under the confirmations the collateral check needs.
+    uint256 ConfirmProposalCollateral(const uint256& govobj_hash)
+    {
+        CMutableTransaction tx;
+        // IsCollateralValid() rejects the fee tx unless every output is P2PKH or unspendable, so
+        // the change cannot go back to the burn script.
+        const auto spent = FundTransaction(*m_node.chainman, tx, utxos,
+                                           CScript() << OP_RETURN << ToByteVector(govobj_hash),
+                                           GOVERNANCE_PROPOSAL_FEE_TX, /*script_change=*/payout_script());
+        SignTransaction(tx, spent, coinbaseKey);
+
+        MineBlock({tx});
+        MineBlocks(GOVERNANCE_FEE_CONFIRMATIONS - 1);
+        return tx.GetHash();
+    }
+
+    //! A vote's hash covers everything but its signature, so votes that should be distinguishable
+    //! (e.g. a re-signed vote) need distinct timestamps.
+    CGovernanceVote MakeVote(const uint256& parent_hash, vote_signal_enum_t signal, vote_outcome_enum_t outcome,
+                             std::chrono::seconds time_offset = 0s) const
+    {
+        CGovernanceVote vote{mn_collateral, parent_hash, signal, outcome};
+        vote.SetTime(GetAdjustedTime() + time_offset);
+        return vote;
+    }
+};
+} // namespace
+
+BOOST_FIXTURE_TEST_SUITE(governance_vote_processing_tests, GovernanceVoteSetup)
+
+// A vote that arrives before its parent object must be kept and replayed once the object shows up,
+// otherwise every vote that races ahead of its proposal is lost for good.
+BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(orphan_vote_is_cached_and_applied_when_parent_arrives)
+{
+    auto& govman = *m_node.govman;
+
+    // Build the proposal but keep it out of the manager: the vote arrives first.
+    const uint256 parent_hash{MakeProposal(uint256{}).GetHash()};
+    BOOST_REQUIRE(!govman.HaveObjectForHash(parent_hash));
+
+    CGovernanceVote vote{MakeVote(parent_hash, VOTE_SIGNAL_FUNDING, VOTE_OUTCOME_YES)};
+    SignWithVotingKey(vote, mn_voting_key);
+    // Guard: the orphan gate rejects a vote it cannot verify against the masternode list, so if
+    // the masternode or its signature were not recognized every check below would fail at once.
+    // Requiring validity up front turns that diffuse failure into one pointed at the setup.
+    BOOST_REQUIRE(vote.IsValid(tip_mn_list(), /*useVotingKey=*/true));
+
+    CGovernanceException exception;
+    uint256 hash_to_request;
+    BOOST_CHECK(!govman.ProcessVote(vote, exception, hash_to_request));
+    BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(exception.GetType(), GOVERNANCE_EXCEPTION_WARNING);
+    BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(exception.GetNodePenalty(), 0);
+    // The caller uses this to ask the sending peer for the missing object.
+    BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(hash_to_request, parent_hash);
+    BOOST_CHECK(govman.GetOrphanVoteObjectHashes() == std::vector<uint256>{parent_hash});
+
+    const uint256 collateral_hash{ConfirmProposalCollateral(parent_hash)};
+    CGovernanceObject proposal{MakeProposal(collateral_hash)};
+    BOOST_REQUIRE_EQUAL(proposal.GetHash(), parent_hash);
+    govman.AddGovernanceObject(proposal, /*peer_str=*/"");
+    BOOST_REQUIRE(govman.HaveObjectForHash(parent_hash));
+
+    // The orphan vote is now applied to the object it was waiting for and is no longer pending.
+    auto stored = govman.FindConstGovernanceObject(parent_hash);
+    BOOST_REQUIRE(stored != nullptr);
+    BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(stored->GetAbsoluteYesCount(tip_mn_list(), VOTE_SIGNAL_FUNDING), 1);
+    BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(govman.GetCurrentVotes(parent_hash, mn_collateral).size(), 1U);
+    BOOST_CHECK(govman.GetOrphanVoteObjectHashes().empty());
+    // Known gap, pinned here so a fix has to update this test: CheckOrphanVotes() applies the
+    // vote to the object but never indexes it in cmapVoteToObject, so the vote inv it relays
+    // during the replay cannot be served to a peer that requests it.
+    BOOST_CHECK(!govman.HaveVoteForHash(vote.GetHash()));
+
+    // A peer re-sending the same vote must not be punished for it.
+    CGovernanceException replay_exception;
+    uint256 replay_hash_to_request;
+    BOOST_CHECK(!govman.ProcessVote(vote, replay_exception, replay_hash_to_request));
+    BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(replay_exception.GetNodePenalty(), 0);
+    BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(stored->GetAbsoluteYesCount(tip_mn_list(), VOTE_SIGNAL_FUNDING), 1);
+}
+
+// Votes are only counted if they carry a signature from a registered masternode.
+BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(unsigned_and_unknown_masternode_votes_are_rejected)
+{
+    auto& govman = *m_node.govman;
+
+    const CGovernanceObject proposal{MakeProposal(uint256::ONE)};
+    const uint256 parent_hash{proposal.GetHash()};
+    govman.AddGovernanceObjectForTesting(proposal);
+    BOOST_REQUIRE(govman.HaveObjectForHash(parent_hash));
+
+    // Forged signature: right masternode, wrong key.
+    CKey attacker_key;
+    attacker_key.MakeNewKey(true);
+    CGovernanceVote forged{MakeVote(parent_hash, VOTE_SIGNAL_FUNDING, VOTE_OUTCOME_YES)};
+    SignWithVotingKey(forged, attacker_key);
+
+    CGovernanceException exception;
+    uint256 hash_to_request;
+    BOOST_CHECK(!govman.ProcessVote(forged, exception, hash_to_request));
+    BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(exception.GetType(), GOVERNANCE_EXCEPTION_PERMANENT_ERROR);
+    BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(exception.GetNodePenalty(), 20);
+    BOOST_CHECK(!govman.HaveVoteForHash(forged.GetHash()));
+
+    // Re-sending a vote already known to be invalid is still punished, without re-verifying it.
+    CGovernanceException repeat_exception;
+    BOOST_CHECK(!govman.ProcessVote(forged, repeat_exception, hash_to_request));
+    BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(repeat_exception.GetType(), GOVERNANCE_EXCEPTION_PERMANENT_ERROR);
+    BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(repeat_exception.GetNodePenalty(), 20);
+
+    // Forged operator signature: right masternode, wrong BLS key. A non-funding signal, so the
+    // operator-key (BLS) verification path is the one that must reject it.
+    CBLSSecretKey attacker_operator_key;
+    attacker_operator_key.MakeNewKey();
+    CGovernanceVote forged_bls{MakeVote(parent_hash, VOTE_SIGNAL_VALID, VOTE_OUTCOME_YES)};
+    SignWithOperatorKey(forged_bls, attacker_operator_key);
+
+    CGovernanceException forged_bls_exception;
+    BOOST_CHECK(!govman.ProcessVote(forged_bls, forged_bls_exception, hash_to_request));
+    BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(forged_bls_exception.GetType(), GOVERNANCE_EXCEPTION_PERMANENT_ERROR);
+    BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(forged_bls_exception.GetNodePenalty(), 20);
+    BOOST_CHECK(!govman.HaveVoteForHash(forged_bls.GetHash()));
+
+    // Correctly signed, but the outpoint belongs to no masternode.
+    CKey stranger_key;
+    stranger_key.MakeNewKey(true);
+    CGovernanceVote stranger{COutPoint{uint256S("42"), 0}, parent_hash, VOTE_SIGNAL_FUNDING, VOTE_OUTCOME_YES};
+    stranger.SetTime(GetAdjustedTime());
+    SignWithVotingKey(stranger, stranger_key);
+
+    CGovernanceException stranger_exception;
+    BOOST_CHECK(!govman.ProcessVote(stranger, stranger_exception, hash_to_request));
+    BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(stranger_exception.GetType(), GOVERNANCE_EXCEPTION_PERMANENT_ERROR);
+    BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(stranger_exception.GetNodePenalty(), 20);
+
+    // A vote dated too far in the future is rejected even with a valid signature.
+    CGovernanceVote from_the_future{MakeVote(parent_hash, VOTE_SIGNAL_FUNDING, VOTE_OUTCOME_YES, 2h)};
+    SignWithVotingKey(from_the_future, mn_voting_key);
+
+    CGovernanceException future_exception;
+    BOOST_CHECK(!govman.ProcessVote(from_the_future, future_exception, hash_to_request));
+    BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(future_exception.GetType(), GOVERNANCE_EXCEPTION_PERMANENT_ERROR);
+    BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(future_exception.GetNodePenalty(), 20);
+
+    auto stored = govman.FindConstGovernanceObject(parent_hash);
+    BOOST_REQUIRE(stored != nullptr);
+    BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(stored->GetAbsoluteYesCount(tip_mn_list(), VOTE_SIGNAL_FUNDING), 0);
+    BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(stored->GetAbsoluteYesCount(tip_mn_list(), VOTE_SIGNAL_VALID), 0);
+}
+
+// Funding a proposal is the one decision reserved for the voting key; every other signal may be
+// signed by the operator (BLS) key. Mixing the two up must not be accepted either way around.
+//
+// Rate checks are live on this path (unlike the orphan replay above, which disables them), so each
+// vote below has to be the first *accepted* one for its (masternode, signal) pair: a rejected vote
+// leaves last_update at epoch 0, but a second accepted vote for the same signal would be turned
+// away by the 1h GOVERNANCE_UPDATE_MIN limit instead of the rule under test.
+BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(proposal_funding_votes_require_the_voting_key)
+{
+    auto& govman = *m_node.govman;
+
+    const CGovernanceObject proposal{MakeProposal(uint256::ONE)};
+    const uint256 parent_hash{proposal.GetHash()};
+    govman.AddGovernanceObjectForTesting(proposal);
+    auto stored = govman.FindConstGovernanceObject(parent_hash);
+    BOOST_REQUIRE(stored != nullptr);
+
+    // Operator key on a funding vote: valid BLS signature, wrong key for this signal.
+    CGovernanceVote funding_by_operator{MakeVote(parent_hash, VOTE_SIGNAL_FUNDING, VOTE_OUTCOME_YES)};
+    SignWithOperatorKey(funding_by_operator, mn_operator_key);
+    BOOST_REQUIRE(funding_by_operator.IsValid(tip_mn_list(), /*useVotingKey=*/false));
+
+    CGovernanceException exception;
+    uint256 hash_to_request;
+    BOOST_CHECK(!govman.ProcessVote(funding_by_operator, exception, hash_to_request));
+    BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(exception.GetType(), GOVERNANCE_EXCEPTION_PERMANENT_ERROR);
+    BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(exception.GetNodePenalty(), 20);
+    BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(stored->GetAbsoluteYesCount(tip_mn_list(), VOTE_SIGNAL_FUNDING), 0);
+
+    // Voting key on a funding vote: accepted and counted. Dated a second later so it is a vote in
+    // its own right rather than the rejected one above with a different signature glued on.
+    CGovernanceVote funding_by_voting_key{MakeVote(parent_hash, VOTE_SIGNAL_FUNDING, VOTE_OUTCOME_YES, 1s)};
+    SignWithVotingKey(funding_by_voting_key, mn_voting_key);
+
+    CGovernanceException funding_exception;
+    BOOST_CHECK(govman.ProcessVote(funding_by_voting_key, funding_exception, hash_to_request));
+    BOOST_CHECK(govman.HaveVoteForHash(funding_by_voting_key.GetHash()));
+    BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(stored->GetAbsoluteYesCount(tip_mn_list(), VOTE_SIGNAL_FUNDING), 1);
+
+    // Operator key on a non-funding signal: accepted and counted.
+    CGovernanceVote valid_by_operator{MakeVote(parent_hash, VOTE_SIGNAL_VALID, VOTE_OUTCOME_YES)};
+    SignWithOperatorKey(valid_by_operator, mn_operator_key);
+
+    CGovernanceException valid_exception;
+    BOOST_CHECK(govman.ProcessVote(valid_by_operator, valid_exception, hash_to_request));
+    BOOST_CHECK(govman.HaveVoteForHash(valid_by_operator.GetHash()));
+    BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(stored->GetAbsoluteYesCount(tip_mn_list(), VOTE_SIGNAL_VALID), 1);
+
+    // A known good vote received twice is dropped quietly, not punished.
+    CGovernanceException duplicate_exception;
+    BOOST_CHECK(!govman.ProcessVote(funding_by_voting_key, duplicate_exception, hash_to_request));
+    BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(duplicate_exception.GetNodePenalty(), 0);
+    BOOST_CHECK_EQUAL(stored->GetAbsoluteYesCount(tip_mn_list(), VOTE_SIGNAL_FUNDING), 1);
+}
+
+BOOST_AUTO_TEST_SUITE_END()
diff --git a/src/test/util/masternode.cpp b/src/test/util/masternode.cpp
index a40ad701d641..0551591a2f94 100644
--- a/src/test/util/masternode.cpp
+++ b/src/test/util/masternode.cpp
@@ -66,6 +66,12 @@ SimpleUTXOMap BuildSimpleUtxoMap(const std::vector<CTransactionRef>& txs)
 
 SimpleUTXOMap FundTransaction(const ChainstateManager& chainman, CMutableTransaction& tx, SimpleUTXOMap& utxos,
                               const CScript& script_payout, CAmount amount)
+{
+    return FundTransaction(chainman, tx, utxos, script_payout, amount, /*script_change=*/script_payout);
+}
+
+SimpleUTXOMap FundTransaction(const ChainstateManager& chainman, CMutableTransaction& tx, SimpleUTXOMap& utxos,
+                              const CScript& script_payout, CAmount amount, const CScript& script_change)
 {
     CAmount change;
     auto inputs = WITH_LOCK(::cs_main, return SelectUTXOs(chainman.ActiveChain(), utxos, amount, change));
@@ -74,7 +80,7 @@ SimpleUTXOMap FundTransaction(const ChainstateManager& chainman, CMutableTransac
     }
     tx.vout.emplace_back(amount, script_payout);
     if (change != 0) {
-        tx.vout.emplace_back(change, script_payout);
+        tx.vout.emplace_back(change, script_change);
     }
     return inputs;
 }
diff --git a/src/test/util/masternode.h b/src/test/util/masternode.h
index 0a894e157a2c..63b715ae3d5a 100644
--- a/src/test/util/masternode.h
+++ b/src/test/util/masternode.h
@@ -20,6 +20,9 @@ using SimpleUTXOMap = std::map<COutPoint, Coin>;
 SimpleUTXOMap BuildSimpleUtxoMap(const std::vector<CTransactionRef>& txs);
 SimpleUTXOMap FundTransaction(const ChainstateManager& chainman, CMutableTransaction& tx, SimpleUTXOMap& utxos,
                               const CScript& script_payout, CAmount amount);
+//! Overload for payout scripts that cannot receive the change, e.g. an OP_RETURN burn.
+SimpleUTXOMap FundTransaction(const ChainstateManager& chainman, CMutableTransaction& tx, SimpleUTXOMap& utxos,
+                              const CScript& script_payout, CAmount amount, const CScript& script_change);
 void SignTransaction(CMutableTransaction& tx, const SimpleUTXOMap& coins, const CKey& coinbase_key);
 CMutableTransaction CreateProRegTx(const ChainstateManager& chainman, SimpleUTXOMap& utxos, int port,
                                    const CScript& script_payout, const CKey& coinbase_key, CKey& owner_key_ret,