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32 lines (32 loc) · 1.68 KB
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# zcode-proxy in a container: one published port serves the data plane and the
# panel together, because the panel is mounted on the proxy's own listener.
services:
zcode-proxy:
image: ghcr.io/awsl1414/zcode-proxy:latest
ports:
- "8080:8080"
volumes:
# Mount the directory, not config.yaml alone: accounts.json, apikeys.json,
# users.json and policy.json (plus the runtime-written requests.jsonl,
# activities.jsonl and control.port) are written next to it, so backing up or
# moving this one directory carries the whole install.
# The directory may not exist yet; the entrypoint creates it and gives it
# to PUID:PGID so the unprivileged proxy can write config.yaml.
- ./data:/data
environment:
# The uid/gid the proxy process runs as. The entrypoint starts as root,
# takes ownership of ./data and the captcha cache in HOME, then drops to
# these ids. Defaults to 1000:1000, which is the image's `bun` user.
# Match the host directory to them only if you want to avoid the chown,
# for example `sudo chown -R 1001:1001 data` for PUID=1001.
# To keep the container off root, delete these two and add
# `user: "1001:1001"` to the service instead; that skips the ownership
# fix and needs ./data to be writable already.
PUID: "1000"
PGID: "1000"
# Encryption seed for the account, API-key and user stores. Pick one
# random string now and never change it: a different seed cannot decrypt
# the files it wrote, so every imported account would have to be added
# again.
ZCODE_PROXY_CREDENTIAL_SECRET: "change-me-to-a-fixed-random-string"
restart: unless-stopped