|
| 1 | + |
| 2 | +""" |
| 3 | +Implements the E91 quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol. |
| 4 | +This protocol uses the principles of quantum entanglement and the violation of |
| 5 | +Bell's inequality to securely distribute a secret key |
| 6 | +between two parties (Alice and Bob) and to detect |
| 7 | +the presence of an eavesdropper (Eve). |
| 8 | +
|
| 9 | +How it works: |
| 10 | +1. A source (Charlie) generates pairs of entangled qubits in a Bell |
| 11 | + state and sends one qubit of each pair to Alice and the other to Bob. |
| 12 | +2. Alice and Bob each independently and randomly choose to measure their |
| 13 | + incoming qubits in one of three predefined measurement bases. |
| 14 | +3. After all measurements are complete, they communicate over a public |
| 15 | + channel to compare the bases they chose for each qubit. |
| 16 | +4. They divide their measurement results into two sets: |
| 17 | + a) Cases where their chosen bases were "compatible" are used to |
| 18 | + generate a secret key. Due to entanglement, their results in these |
| 19 | + cases should be perfectly correlated. |
| 20 | + b) Cases where their bases were "incompatible" are used to test for |
| 21 | + eavesdropping by calculating the CHSH inequality parameter 'S'. |
| 22 | +5. Quantum mechanics predicts that for an entangled system, |S| can reach |
| 23 | + 2*sqrt(2) (~2.828), whereas any classical (or eavesdropped) system is |
| 24 | + bound by |S| <= 2. If their calculated S-value significantly violates |
| 25 | + the classical bound, they can be confident that no eavesdropping |
| 26 | + occurred and their generated key is secure. |
| 27 | +""" |
| 28 | + |
| 29 | +import numpy as np |
| 30 | +import qiskit |
| 31 | +import random |
| 32 | +from qiskit import ClassicalRegister, QuantumCircuit, QuantumRegister |
| 33 | +from qiskit_aer import AerSimulator |
| 34 | + |
| 35 | + |
| 36 | +def e91_protocol(n_bits: int = 2000) -> dict: |
| 37 | + """ |
| 38 | + Simulates the E91 QKD protocol for a specified number of bits. |
| 39 | +
|
| 40 | + Args: |
| 41 | + n_bits: The total number of entangled pairs to be generated and |
| 42 | + measured. This determines the potential length of the raw key. |
| 43 | +
|
| 44 | + Returns: |
| 45 | + A dictionary containing the simulation results: |
| 46 | + - "alice_key": Alice's final, sifted secret key. |
| 47 | + - "bob_key": Bob's final, sifted secret key. |
| 48 | + - "s_value": The calculated CHSH inequality parameter 'S'. |
| 49 | + - "eavesdropper_detected": A boolean indicating if |S| <= 2. |
| 50 | + - "key_match": A boolean indicating if Alice's and Bob's keys match. |
| 51 | + - "key_length": The final length of the sifted keys. |
| 52 | + """ |
| 53 | + |
| 54 | + if not isinstance(n_bits, int): |
| 55 | + raise TypeError("Number of bits must be an integer.") |
| 56 | + if n_bits <= 0: |
| 57 | + raise ValueError("Number of bits must be > 0.") |
| 58 | + if n_bits > 10000: |
| 59 | + raise ValueError("Number of bits is too large to simulate efficiently.") |
| 60 | + |
| 61 | + # Define the measurement angles for Alice and Bob's bases. |
| 62 | + # The keys correspond to the basis name, and values are angles in radians. |
| 63 | + alice_bases = {'A1': 0, 'A2': np.pi / 8, 'A3': np.pi / 4} |
| 64 | + bob_bases = {'B1': np.pi / 8, 'B2': np.pi / 4, 'B3': 3 * np.pi / 8} |
| 65 | + |
| 66 | + # Lists to store the choices and results for each bit. |
| 67 | + alice_chosen_bases, bob_chosen_bases = [], [] |
| 68 | + alice_results, bob_results = [], [] |
| 69 | + |
| 70 | + # Get the quantum simulator backend. |
| 71 | + backend = AerSimulator() |
| 72 | + |
| 73 | + for _ in range(n_bits): |
| 74 | + # Alice and Bob randomly choose their measurement bases. |
| 75 | + alice_basis_name = random.choice(list(alice_bases.keys())) |
| 76 | + bob_basis_name = random.choice(list(bob_bases.keys())) |
| 77 | + alice_angle = alice_bases[alice_basis_name] |
| 78 | + bob_angle = bob_bases[bob_basis_name] |
| 79 | + |
| 80 | + # Create a quantum circuit for one entangled pair. |
| 81 | + qr = QuantumRegister(2, 'q') |
| 82 | + cr = ClassicalRegister(2, 'c') |
| 83 | + circuit = QuantumCircuit(qr, cr) |
| 84 | + |
| 85 | + # Create a Bell state |Φ+⟩ = (|00⟩ + |11⟩)/sqrt(2) |
| 86 | + circuit.h(qr[0]) |
| 87 | + circuit.cx(qr[0], qr[1]) |
| 88 | + |
| 89 | + # Apply rotations to simulate measurements in the chosen bases. |
| 90 | + # We use RY gates, which rotate around the Y-axis of the Bloch sphere. |
| 91 | + circuit.ry(-2 * alice_angle, qr[0]) |
| 92 | + circuit.ry(-2 * bob_angle, qr[1]) |
| 93 | + |
| 94 | + # Measure the qubits. |
| 95 | + circuit.measure(qr, cr) |
| 96 | + |
| 97 | + # Execute the circuit and get the result. |
| 98 | + job = backend.run(circuit, shots=1) |
| 99 | + result = list(job.result().get_counts().keys())[0] |
| 100 | + |
| 101 | + # Store choices and results. Qiskit's bit order is reversed. |
| 102 | + alice_chosen_bases.append(alice_basis_name) |
| 103 | + bob_chosen_bases.append(bob_basis_name) |
| 104 | + alice_results.append(int(result[1])) |
| 105 | + bob_results.append(int(result[0])) |
| 106 | + |
| 107 | + # Sift for generating the secret key. |
| 108 | + # The key is formed when Alice and Bob choose compatible bases. |
| 109 | + alice_key, bob_key = [], [] |
| 110 | + for i in range(n_bits): |
| 111 | + is_A2B1 = alice_chosen_bases[i] == 'A2' and bob_chosen_bases[i] == 'B1' |
| 112 | + is_A3B2 = alice_chosen_bases[i] == 'A3' and bob_chosen_bases[i] == 'B2' |
| 113 | + if is_A2B1 or is_A3B2: |
| 114 | + alice_key.append(alice_results[i]) |
| 115 | + bob_key.append(bob_results[i]) |
| 116 | + |
| 117 | + # Sift for the CHSH inequality test (Eve detection). |
| 118 | + # We use four specific combinations of bases for the test: a = A1, a' = A3 | b = B1, b' = B3 |
| 119 | + chsh_correlations = {'ab': [], 'ab_': [], 'a_b': [], 'a_b_': []} |
| 120 | + |
| 121 | + for i in range(n_bits): |
| 122 | + a_val = 1 if alice_results[i] == 0 else -1 |
| 123 | + b_val = 1 if bob_results[i] == 0 else -1 |
| 124 | + product = a_val * b_val # +1 if correlated, -1 if anti-correlated |
| 125 | + |
| 126 | + alice_basis = alice_chosen_bases[i] |
| 127 | + bob_basis = bob_chosen_bases[i] |
| 128 | + |
| 129 | + if alice_basis == 'A1' and bob_basis == 'B1': |
| 130 | + chsh_correlations['ab'].append(product) |
| 131 | + elif alice_basis == 'A1' and bob_basis == 'B3': |
| 132 | + chsh_correlations['ab_'].append(product) |
| 133 | + elif alice_basis == 'A3' and bob_basis == 'B1': |
| 134 | + chsh_correlations['a_b'].append(product) |
| 135 | + elif alice_basis == 'A3' and bob_basis == 'B3': |
| 136 | + chsh_correlations['a_b_'].append(product) |
| 137 | + |
| 138 | + # Calculate the expectation value (average correlation) for each combination. |
| 139 | + E = {} |
| 140 | + for key, values in chsh_correlations.items(): |
| 141 | + E[key] = np.mean(values) if values else 0 |
| 142 | + |
| 143 | + # Calculate the S-value: S = E(a,b) - E(a,b') + E(a',b) + E(a',b') |
| 144 | + s_value = E['ab'] - E['ab_'] + E['a_b'] + E['a_b_'] |
| 145 | + |
| 146 | + # Check for eavesdropper: |S| > 2 indicates security. |
| 147 | + eavesdropper_detected = abs(s_value) <= 2 |
| 148 | + |
| 149 | + return { |
| 150 | + "alice_key": "".join(map(str, alice_key)), |
| 151 | + "bob_key": "".join(map(str, bob_key)), |
| 152 | + "s_value": s_value, |
| 153 | + "eavesdropper_detected": eavesdropper_detected, |
| 154 | + "key_match": alice_key == bob_key, |
| 155 | + "key_length": len(alice_key) |
| 156 | + } |
| 157 | + |
| 158 | + |
| 159 | +if __name__ == "__main__": |
| 160 | + # num_bits is initialized to 2000 |
| 161 | + num_bits = 2000 |
| 162 | + results = e91_protocol(num_bits) |
| 163 | + |
| 164 | + print(f"Total bits simulated: {num_bits}") |
| 165 | + print(f"CHSH S-value: {results['s_value']:.4f}") |
| 166 | + print(f"Eavesdropper detected: {results['eavesdropper_detected']}") |
| 167 | + print(f"Final key length: {results['key_length']}") |
| 168 | + print(f"Keys match: {results['key_match']}") |
| 169 | + |
| 170 | + if not results['eavesdropper_detected'] and results['key_match'] and results['key_length'] > 0: |
| 171 | + print("\nProtocol successful! Secret key generated securely.") |
| 172 | + print(f" Alice's key: {results['alice_key']}") |
| 173 | + print(f" Bob's key: {results['bob_key']}") |
| 174 | + else: |
| 175 | + print("\nProtocol failed or eavesdropper detected. Key discarded.") |
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