The first-party TEND Sites extension is reviewed native ESM running in the tend.host panel origin. That makes every imported dependency and shipped byte part of the panel trust boundary. Extension packages therefore include generated SHA-256 integrity entries and request no capability they do not use.
Target repositories, site templates, themes, community components, user content, remote media, preview output, and AI responses are untrusted inputs.
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Never execute target-site or community JavaScript in the panel origin.
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Preview uses a separate origin with no panel cookies, storage, tokens, or ambient credentials.
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Repository paths are relative and confined; reject absolute paths, drive paths, traversal, symlink escape, and unexpected submodules before access.
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Browser code receives no raw Git, filesystem, Docker, SSH, shell, registry, DNS, deployment, or secret authority.
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Every mutation is project-scoped, short-lived, purpose-bound, idempotent, and durably audited by the host.
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AI output is data, never authority. Show an understandable change set before committing source changes.
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Build and preview secrets use explicit purpose-bound delivery and never appear in logs, layers, cache keys, diffs, or AI prompts.
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Fork and pull-request snapshots are untrusted by default and receive neither protected secrets nor production destination authority.
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Starter, adoption, content-index, change-preview, draft, media, localization, library, and preview-policy contracts are evidence only. Creation can cross only the separately granted
sites.createbridge, where the host revalidates the exact plan and archive before its fixed worker initializes source. Temporary execution can cross onlysites.preview, which is actor/project/source/revision/commit/hostname/expiry bound and grants no generic repository or production deployment mutation. -
Passing compatibility or preview checks never grants installation, publishing, or deployment authority.
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Custom-site content mappings never grant ownership of repository templates or renderer code. Structured formats require explicit field mappings, and reviewed visual blocks are enabled only by an adapter that can round-trip them safely.
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Community starter metadata is not trust authority. Only a host-verified immutable commit/tree matching a reviewed catalog entry may proceed to a creation plan; unreviewed entries remain visible but unavailable.
Source adoption is bound to provider installation, repository, immutable commit/tree/archive digests, actor, trust class, size limits, and an explicit expiry. The current pure assessor does not fetch or trust browser-provided repository contents. Authenticated checkout and digest verification remain host responsibilities.
The shared source-control bridge may initiate a host-owned GitHub App manifest flow, reopen GitHub's repository-access selector, or request the host-owned GitLab connection dialog, but it never receives an App private key, installation token, personal access token, or callback code. GitLab.com and explicitly confirmed self-managed instances use an encrypted host credential, exact HTTPS origin matching, bounded responses, and no redirects. Persisting a source selection requires the host to re-inspect it and match the reviewed actor, project, provider, repository, ref, commit, tree digest, archive digest, and typed repository name. The resulting record is evidence, not write, build, deployment, or publishing authority.
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Publishing never replaces the last healthy site until checks pass and the durable deployment operation commits.
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Every project has exactly one explicit canonical source adapter. Customer-server repositories stay outside live containers and disposable build workspaces; external repositories remain bound to an immutable revision. A managed vault is never inferred and requires separate consent.
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Resumable drafts are encrypted, byte- and time-bounded, exact-user/project/base-revision bound, and structurally noncanonical. They grant no commit or publish authority and are purged after commit, discard, retention expiry, project deletion, or account deletion. The current route-free tend.host persistence foundation verifies UTF-8 bytes and SHA-256, requires the exact stored source revision and actor, permits at most seven days and 25 MB per actor/project, and clears ciphertext at terminal purge. Browser delivery remains pending.
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Durability labels come from exact live evidence. Local history without a verified recovery copy is
versioned_only; stale or incomplete source evidence isat_risk. A container image, preview, build cache, successful deployment, or control-plane draft can never promote recovery status.
Draft revisions are bound to one project, entry, committed base revision, and monotonic sequence. Media plans reject unsupported formats and upscaling and require localized alternative text. Translation proposals remain data until reviewed. Library certification never enables installation, and preview evidence always remains separate from deployment authority.
Block definitions forbid panel scripts and reject unknown inspector fields. Preview cleanup remains host-owned even when evidence says cleanup is eligible. Traffic decisions retain the previous artifact unless every required health check passes, and even a passing decision cannot route. AI provider credentials are never browser-visible; request plans expose bounded cost and redaction evidence but cannot send.
Starter files are content-addressed individually and as one canonical revision before use. Markdown frontmatter accepts canonical JSON values rather than executing a general YAML language, rejects duplicate or unsafe keys, and remains bounded. Local content assistance sends nothing and cannot apply suggestions.
Future privileged work must cross the typed host-operation bridge. The extension never receives a raw provider credential, repository URL override, filesystem path, server coordinate, shell command, deployment key, or generic capability bearer. Assigned contexts are short-lived and exact-project/capability/revision bound; canonical intent and idempotency digests bind retries, while monotonic evidence rejects stale or substituted results.
Bundled-starter creation is the first narrow implementation of that bridge. The host constructs the
tar stream itself after enforcing path, count, per-file, total-byte, UTF-8, file-digest, and canonical
revision limits. A digest-pinned Git worker runs with no network, no Linux capabilities,
no-new-privileges, bounded memory/processes/time, and a fixed script; it never executes starter
source. Per-project locks, staging directories, server-side checksum verification, Git fsck, and
durable idempotency evidence make retries safe. The browser receives only opaque repository/source
identity, a commit hash, and a sanitized server display name.
- Official items are reviewed, versioned, and integrity-bound.
- Community items require explicit provenance and certification status.
- Installed items stay pinned to an immutable revision until the user reviews an update.
Schema-driven component options are preferred. Arbitrary editor-time scripts, dynamic evaluation, and remote script injection are forbidden.
External content insertion accepts only canonical HTTPS URLs for reviewed providers. The draft stores a typed provider and content identifier, never iframe/script markup. YouTube and Vimeo player origins are derived by the extension and remain unloaded until the user explicitly requests a preview. X and Twitch are represented as safe outbound cards in this slice.
Do not disclose security vulnerabilities in a public issue. Use the private security-reporting channel configured for the repository or contact security@tend.host.