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Hypothesis 3 is not closed by saying that the products are local-first. We need a reproducible acceptance run showing that the Perseus stack can be installed, operated, observed, recovered, and updated inside a disconnected/on-prem deployment boundary.
Iron Bank provides hardening/scanning evidence, but its own documentation says hardened containers do not receive an ATO or CtF; the downstream program remains responsible for authorization. This issue is therefore an evidence and claim-boundary workstream, not an IL5/IL6 certification task.
Current gap
The products have strong local/offline design claims, but the H3 evidence is incomplete:
the Perseus --offline CLI flag is currently a no-op and cannot be treated as an enforcement guarantee;
there is no committed cross-product disconnected acceptance bundle covering Perseus, Vault, and Ledger together;
no reproducible resource envelope, restart/recovery, upgrade/rollback, and denied-egress report has been published for the deployment;
current public wording must distinguish offline-capable/self-hostable from Iron Bank assessed, IL5/IL6 deployable, and ATO-authorized.
Proposed acceptance harness
Run a fixed, synthetic DevSecOps flow in a clean, network-isolated environment:
Install the versioned Perseus, Vault, and Ledger artifacts from an offline bundle.
Verify artifact manifest, checksums, SBOMs, and available signatures/provenance.
Render/query context through Perseus and persist/retrieve evidence through Vault.
Record and verify a Ledger evidence receipt for the synthetic build/deploy trace.
Deny DNS and all egress; capture attempted network calls and classify each as expected/blocked/defect.
Restart each component, reopen state, and verify recovery without external services.
Perform an offline upgrade and rollback using a second versioned bundle.
Measure CPU, memory, disk, startup time, storage growth, and log volume under the declared workload.
Acceptance criteria
Freeze the fixture, versions, platform, network policy, resource limits, and test commands.
Produce a machine-readable manifest with artifact names, versions, digests, SBOM references, and test results.
Prove the core flow succeeds with no external network dependency.
Prove all unexpected network attempts fail closed and are reported.
Record resource envelopes and persistent-state behavior for Perseus, Vault, and Ledger.
Verify restart, backup/restore, upgrade, rollback, and partial-failure behavior.
Publish a claims matrix with explicit ceilings: local/offline-capable, Iron Bank submitted, Iron Bank assessed, customer-platform deployable, and ATO/IL status must remain separate states.
Decide whether --offline should become an enforceable runtime boundary or be removed/renamed in favor of a tested deployment profile; do not leave a no-op flag as implied assurance.
Preserve negative results and failed cells; the evidence bundle must be reproducible from a clean host.
External gates
Platform One onboarding requires a real DoD military/civilian Government POC who can validate mission need. This issue must not invent a POC or submit the form.
A formal IL5/IL6 or ATO claim requires the downstream mission owner/authorizing authority and is outside this local acceptance run.
Non-goals
Handling classified or CUI data in the test fixture.
Claiming that a successful disconnected run is an ATO, IL5/IL6 authorization, or Iron Bank approval.
Replacing customer-specific RMF, Kubernetes, identity, monitoring, or incident-response controls.
Context
Hypothesis 3 is not closed by saying that the products are local-first. We need a reproducible acceptance run showing that the Perseus stack can be installed, operated, observed, recovered, and updated inside a disconnected/on-prem deployment boundary.
Iron Bank provides hardening/scanning evidence, but its own documentation says hardened containers do not receive an ATO or CtF; the downstream program remains responsible for authorization. This issue is therefore an evidence and claim-boundary workstream, not an IL5/IL6 certification task.
Current gap
The products have strong local/offline design claims, but the H3 evidence is incomplete:
--offlineCLI flag is currently a no-op and cannot be treated as an enforcement guarantee;Proposed acceptance harness
Run a fixed, synthetic DevSecOps flow in a clean, network-isolated environment:
Acceptance criteria
--offlineshould become an enforceable runtime boundary or be removed/renamed in favor of a tested deployment profile; do not leave a no-op flag as implied assurance.External gates
Non-goals
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