diff --git a/docs/SELF-HOSTING.md b/docs/SELF-HOSTING.md
index 6ad77ca3..11658090 100644
--- a/docs/SELF-HOSTING.md
+++ b/docs/SELF-HOSTING.md
@@ -120,6 +120,19 @@ and supplier links, the planners' library, and the live channel. **The RLS
 policies are what make one couple unable to read another's wedding**, so
 applying them is not optional.
 
+Supabase's Security Advisor will then warn that signed-in people can execute
+sixteen `security definer` functions, and anyone three. That is the design:
+
+- every write goes through one of the sixteen, and each checks who is calling;
+- the three are the guest-link and supplier-link readers and the supplier's
+  Confirm, for whoever holds a link.
+
+**Do not apply the advisor's remedies to them** — revoking `EXECUTE`, or
+switching to `SECURITY INVOKER`. Done to `is_wedding_member`, either one stops
+every signed-in person reading their own wedding. The hosted project met
+exactly that; see D8 in the
+[database review](superpowers/specs/2026-09-29-database-review.md).
+
 ## 5. Build and start
 
 ```sh
diff --git a/docs/superpowers/specs/2026-09-29-database-review.md b/docs/superpowers/specs/2026-09-29-database-review.md
index 171e22ff..c802efed 100644
--- a/docs/superpowers/specs/2026-09-29-database-review.md
+++ b/docs/superpowers/specs/2026-09-29-database-review.md
@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ Findings are marked as they are elsewhere:
 | D5 | Smaller foreign keys have no index either: `invites.wedding_id` and `created_by`, a planner's `wedding_members.user_id`, `wedding_documents.updated_by`, and each link's `published_by`. Every one is on a table of a few rows per wedding, so a scan there costs nothing that matters. No action. | Traced |
 | D6 | The first five migrations build the passphrase schema that the ninth removes, so a fresh install creates and drops it. That is harmless. Squashing them is not worth the risk to existing deployments, which track what they have applied by file name. No action. | Traced |
 | D7 | **`remove_member` did not refuse a caller with no session.** It decided whether a caller may remove someone with `p_user_id <> auth.uid()`. With nobody signed in, `auth.uid()` is null, that comparison is null, and the `if` it guarded was skipped. Called that way, it removed the member, and with the last one gone, the wedding. In plain Postgres `anon` cannot call it: it is revoked from `public` and granted only to `authenticated`. But a Supabase project also grants new functions to `anon` by default privileges, which `revoke … from public` does not undo. Whether the hosted project was exposed can be checked there with `select has_function_privilege('anon', 'public.remove_member(uuid,uuid)', 'execute')`. **Fixed either way:** the function refuses a caller with no session first. And every function meant for signed-in people is revoked from `anon` by name, proved against a stand-in for Supabase's defaults. | Reproduced |
+| D8 | **The hosted project had drifted from the migrations, and no signed-in person could read their wedding.** Found 2026-09-30, with every migration recorded as applied. `is_wedding_member` could not be executed by `authenticated`, and ran as its caller (`security invoker`); `delete_my_account` could not be executed by `authenticated` either. Every migration says otherwise, and none changes them. Those are two of the Security Advisor's own remedies for its warnings about these functions; what applied them is not in the project's logs, which reach back to 2026-09-20. The effect is in them: signing in on 2026-09-29, every read of the wedding came back 403, `permission denied for function is_wedding_member`. With the grant back but still run as its caller, the check asks the policy that asks the check, and reads failed with `stack depth limit exceeded`. **Fixed on the hosted project** by `20260930155142_member_grants` and `20260930155610_member_definer`, which change nothing where the functions never drifted. The first also takes the trigger function `announce_wedding_document` from `anon` and `authenticated`, which Postgres already refused to run outside a trigger. Every other function's definition matches the migrations, byte for byte once the dashboard's `\r\n` line endings are set aside. The self-hosting guide now warns against the advisor's remedies for these functions. | Reproduced on the hosted project (both refusals, the recursion, and each fixed); PGlite test of the drift and the fix |
 
 ## The proposal: keep the structure, bound the history
 
diff --git a/suite/lib/documents/history.migrations.test.ts b/suite/lib/documents/history.migrations.test.ts
index 7b5fe2e6..b08d1372 100644
--- a/suite/lib/documents/history.migrations.test.ts
+++ b/suite/lib/documents/history.migrations.test.ts
@@ -7,6 +7,9 @@ import { actAs, everyMigration, userExists } from "@/lib/testing/database";
 
 vi.setConfig({ testTimeout: 60_000, hookTimeout: 60_000 });
 
+const MEMBER_GRANTS = join(process.cwd(), "..", "supabase", "migrations", "20260930155142_member_grants.sql");
+const MEMBER_DEFINER = join(process.cwd(), "..", "supabase", "migrations", "20260930155610_member_definer.sql");
+
 let db: PGlite;
 beforeEach(async () => {
   db = await everyMigration();
@@ -119,6 +122,7 @@ test("with Supabase's default grants, nobody signed out may call a function mean
   await db.exec("grant execute on all functions in schema public to anon, authenticated;");
   await db.exec(readFileSync(join(process.cwd(), "..", "supabase", "migrations", "20260929000008_signed_in_callers.sql"), "utf8"));
   await db.exec(readFileSync(join(process.cwd(), "..", "supabase", "migrations", "20260929000007_bounded_history.sql"), "utf8"));
+  await db.exec(readFileSync(MEMBER_GRANTS, "utf8"));
 
   const can = async (role: string, fn: string) =>
     (await db.query<{ ok: boolean }>("select has_function_privilege($1, $2, 'execute') as ok", [role, fn])).rows[0]!.ok;
@@ -140,7 +144,37 @@ test("with Supabase's default grants, nobody signed out may call a function mean
   }
   expect(await can("authenticated", "public.wedding_role_count(uuid,text)")).toBe(false);
   expect(await can("authenticated", "public.remove_member(uuid,uuid)")).toBe(true);
+  // A trigger function is nobody's to call.
+  expect(await can("anon", "public.announce_wedding_document()")).toBe(false);
+  expect(await can("authenticated", "public.announce_wedding_document()")).toBe(false);
   // A link is for anyone who has it.
   expect(await can("anon", "public.read_share(text)")).toBe(true);
   expect(await can("anon", "public.confirm_supplier_link(text)")).toBe(true);
 });
+
+test("on a project that had lost them, a member may again read their wedding and delete their account", async () => {
+  const alex = await userExists(db, "alex@example.com");
+  const wedding = await weddingOf(alex);
+  await save(wedding, "Alex & Sam", 0);
+  // The hosted project as found on 2026-09-30: both grants to signed-in people
+  // gone, and the membership check running as its caller.
+  await db.exec("reset role;");
+  await db.exec("revoke all on function public.is_wedding_member(uuid), public.delete_my_account() from authenticated;");
+  await db.exec("alter function public.is_wedding_member(uuid) security invoker;");
+  await actAs(db, alex);
+  await expect(db.query("select wedding_id from public.wedding_documents")).rejects.toThrow("permission denied for function is_wedding_member");
+  await expect(db.query("select public.delete_my_account()")).rejects.toThrow("permission denied for function delete_my_account");
+
+  // Granted again but still run as its caller, the check asks the policy that
+  // asks the check, without end — the hosted project then refused with "stack
+  // depth limit exceeded". It must run as its owner, which RLS does not bind.
+  await db.exec("reset role;");
+  await db.exec(readFileSync(MEMBER_GRANTS, "utf8"));
+  await db.exec(readFileSync(MEMBER_DEFINER, "utf8"));
+  expect((await db.query("select prosecdef from pg_proc where oid = 'public.is_wedding_member(uuid)'::regprocedure")).rows).toEqual([{ prosecdef: true }]);
+  await actAs(db, alex);
+  expect((await db.query("select wedding_id from public.wedding_documents")).rows).toEqual([{ wedding_id: wedding }]);
+  await db.query("select public.delete_my_account()");
+  await db.exec("reset role;");
+  expect((await db.query("select 1 from public.account_weddings where id = $1", [wedding])).rows).toHaveLength(0);
+});
diff --git a/suite/lib/testing/database.ts b/suite/lib/testing/database.ts
index aa547174..901d69f1 100644
--- a/suite/lib/testing/database.ts
+++ b/suite/lib/testing/database.ts
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ export async function everyMigration(): Promise<PGlite> {
     create or replace function auth.uid() returns uuid
       language sql stable
       as $$ select nullif(current_setting('request.jwt.claim.sub', true), '')::uuid $$;
+    grant usage on schema auth to anon, authenticated;
     create schema if not exists storage;
     create table if not exists storage.buckets (id text primary key, name text not null, public boolean not null default false);
     create table if not exists storage.objects (
diff --git a/supabase/migrations/20260930155142_member_grants.sql b/supabase/migrations/20260930155142_member_grants.sql
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..d5728aa2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/supabase/migrations/20260930155142_member_grants.sql
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+-- Two grants the hosted project had lost, and one it never needed.
+--
+-- On 2026-09-30 the hosted project's `is_wedding_member(uuid)` and
+-- `delete_my_account()` could be executed by `postgres` and `service_role`
+-- only. Every version of 20260902000001_accounts.sql grants both to
+-- `authenticated`, and no migration revokes them; what did is not in the
+-- project's logs. Without the first, every policy that asks it — the wedding,
+-- its members, its document, its history, its links, its files — refuses a
+-- signed-in reader with "permission denied for function is_wedding_member",
+-- which is what signing in on 2026-09-29 met. Without the second, deleting an
+-- account fails. Both are granted again. Where they were never lost, this
+-- changes nothing.
+--
+-- `announce_wedding_document()` is a trigger function: no one calls it, and
+-- Postgres refuses it outside a trigger. Supabase's default privileges left it
+-- executable by `anon` and `authenticated`, as 20260929000008 describes for
+-- the rest; it is revoked from both, so it is plainly no part of the API.
+
+grant execute on function public.is_wedding_member(uuid) to authenticated;
+grant execute on function public.delete_my_account() to authenticated;
+revoke all on function public.announce_wedding_document() from anon, authenticated;
diff --git a/supabase/migrations/20260930155610_member_definer.sql b/supabase/migrations/20260930155610_member_definer.sql
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..9bd08861
--- /dev/null
+++ b/supabase/migrations/20260930155610_member_definer.sql
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+-- The membership check runs as its owner again.
+--
+-- On 2026-09-30 the hosted project's `is_wedding_member(uuid)` was `security
+-- invoker`; 20260902000001_accounts.sql creates it `security definer`, and no
+-- migration changes that. Run as its caller, its read of `wedding_members` is
+-- bound by that table's policy, which asks `is_wedding_member` — which reads
+-- `wedding_members` again, without end. Once 20260930155142_member_grants let
+-- signed-in people call it, every read of a wedding failed with "stack depth
+-- limit exceeded". As its owner, which row-level security does not bind, it
+-- reads the table once. The accounts migration explains why it must.
+
+alter function public.is_wedding_member(uuid) security definer;