From aa2886d9b0b39d1428056b49bcd0a6bf4dc1879b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: seonghobae <8172694+seonghobae@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Sat, 1 Aug 2026 04:09:26 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Sentinel: Add input validation to prevent information
 disclosure

---
 .jules/sentinel.md |  5 +++++
 R/icci.R           |  4 ++++
 R/vuongtest.R      | 11 +++++++++++
 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+)

diff --git a/.jules/sentinel.md b/.jules/sentinel.md
index bc5c6e1..cce0b8f 100644
--- a/.jules/sentinel.md
+++ b/.jules/sentinel.md
@@ -12,3 +12,8 @@
 **Vulnerability:** Raw `stop()` and `warning()` calls without `call. = FALSE` in `llcont.R` and `vuongtest.R` exposed execution stack/call details when raised.
 **Learning:** While some instances of `stop()` inside `tryCatch()` were previously fixed to hide the call stack, other standalone exceptions and warnings still leaked call context. Security must be consistently applied across the entire codebase.
 **Prevention:** Always set `call. = FALSE` when using `stop()` or `warning()` to enforce a secure-by-default boundary and prevent internal execution paths from being disclosed to the end user.
+
+## 2024-07-25 - Fail securely via early input validation
+**Vulnerability:** Unvalidated arguments (e.g., `adj`, `nested`, `conf.level`) allow malformed types (like strings instead of numeric) to propagate deep into mathematical functions, where they eventually trigger raw R errors (like 'non-numeric argument to binary operator') that leak internal execution contexts and stack traces.
+**Learning:** R's late evaluation and lack of type checking mean that unvalidated arguments fail deep within internal logic, bypassing top-level `stop(..., call. = FALSE)` safeguards and exposing internal code structure.
+**Prevention:** Always strictly validate the type, length, and bounds of user inputs at the very beginning of exported functions (using `stop(..., call. = FALSE)`) to enforce a secure-by-default boundary and fail safely.
diff --git a/R/icci.R b/R/icci.R
index f22278a..bff0379 100644
--- a/R/icci.R
+++ b/R/icci.R
@@ -65,6 +65,10 @@
 #' @export
 icci <- function(object1, object2, conf.level=.95, ll1=llcont, ll2=llcont) {
 
+  if (!is.numeric(conf.level) || length(conf.level) != 1 || is.na(conf.level) || conf.level <= 0 || conf.level >= 1) {
+    stop("conf.level must be a single numeric value strictly between 0 and 1", call. = FALSE)
+  }
+
   ## check objects, issue warnings/errors, get classes/calls
   obinfo <- check.obj(object1, object2)
   callA <- obinfo$callA; classA <- obinfo$classA
diff --git a/R/vuongtest.R b/R/vuongtest.R
index 2bdfbf6..bd3c46b 100644
--- a/R/vuongtest.R
+++ b/R/vuongtest.R
@@ -98,6 +98,17 @@
 #' @export
 vuongtest <- function(object1, object2, nested=FALSE, adj="none", ll1=llcont, ll2=llcont, score1=NULL, score2=NULL, vc1=vcov, vc2=vcov) {
 
+  if (!is.logical(nested) || length(nested) != 1 || is.na(nested)) {
+    stop("nested must be a single logical value", call. = FALSE)
+  }
+  if (!is.character(adj) || length(adj) != 1) {
+    stop("adj must be a single character string ('none', 'aic', or 'bic')", call. = FALSE)
+  }
+  adj <- tolower(adj)
+  if (!(adj %in% c("none", "aic", "bic"))) {
+    stop("adj must be one of 'none', 'aic', or 'bic'", call. = FALSE)
+  }
+
   ## check objects, issue warnings/errors, get classes/calls
   obinfo <- check.obj(object1, object2)
   callA <- obinfo$callA; classA <- obinfo$classA