diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md
index ff7d84c..174169b 100644
--- a/CHANGELOG.md
+++ b/CHANGELOG.md
@@ -15,6 +15,11 @@ Format follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/).
 - **Five files left the tree without leaving the disk (2026-10-08).** `AUDIT_REPORT_20260629.md` audits 18 of what are now 731 files; `ROADMAP.md` opens by declaring itself legacy and frozen against reality; `.ai-memory.toml` and `.codegraph/` are local tool state; `.compose/context/gates.md` is a working note. Each was checked for live references first — none had any, beyond `.compose` in docstrings that turned out to mean the operator's `~/.compose`, not this one. They stay locally, named in `.gitignore`. `.codegraph/` is ignored from the root file now instead of by its own nested `.codegraph/.gitignore`, because git honours a nested ignore file and build backends do not — the same asymmetry that put a 5.6 GB venv into a source distribution in the previous commit.
 
 ### Fixed
+- **`is_encrypted_blob` answered a security question by sniffing one byte, and was wrong 1.68% of the time (2026-10-08).** The envelope is `nonce(24) || ciphertext`, so its first byte is the first byte of a random nonce — which is `{`, `[`, a space or a newline in **4 cases out of 256**. The old test (`head not in (b"{", b"[", b" ", b"\n")`) therefore called real, readable ciphertext "plain JSON"; measured over 4096 draws: **69 misclassifications, 1.68%**. Detection now attempts decryption: a blob is encrypted when it decrypts under the given key, and nothing else counts. Truncated blobs, filler bytes, plain JSON, tampered ciphertext and blobs encrypted under a foreign key all correctly report `False`.
+
+  **Breaking change**, `shared/crypto.py`: `is_encrypted_blob(blob_head: bytes)` → **`is_encrypted_blob(blob: bytes, master_key: bytes)`**. A one-byte prefix cannot be authenticated, so the old signature was incapable of a correct answer — pass the whole blob. The path-based helpers `shared.master_key.is_encrypted_blob(path)` and `shared.saga.impl.crypto.is_encrypted_blob(path)` keep their signatures and are now decrypt-based too. Nothing inside the package used any of these to decide anything (the saga read path already decrypted first); they are exported utilities, which is why the wrong answer mattered for callers rather than for us.
+
+  The workaround this bug had accumulated is gone: `tests/test_shared/test_crypto_smoke.py` used to redraw up to 32 blobs until one *looked* encrypted, because a single draw flaked ~1.6% of runs. It now asserts the opposite — it waits for the `{`-first nonce and requires detection to survive it. `tests/test_secrets.py` had been proving encryption with filler bytes; it now writes a real envelope.
 - **Two assertions were a 1-in-256 flake, and they were asserting the wrong thing (2026-10-08).** `test_saga_crypto_coverage` checked `not data.startswith(b"{")` to prove a state file had been encrypted. The blob is `nonce(24) || ciphertext`, so its first byte is the first byte of a random nonce — `{` in 1 write out of 256. Measured over 4096 `encrypt_json` calls: **14 began with `{`** (0.34%), and one of them failed this suite's own pre-commit gate. Fixed by asserting behaviour instead of a byte: the encrypted file must fail a plain-JSON decode, `read_state` must round-trip it, and a second `read_state_legacy_or_encrypted` must return the same value *without* a rotation warning. Verified over 2048 fresh blobs, including the 5 that begin with `{` — zero failures. Recorded separately, not fixed: the exported helper `is_encrypted_blob` still sniffs a single byte and so calls 4 of 256 real ciphertexts plain JSON (measured **69/4096 = 1.68%**); the saga read path no longer uses it, so this is an API footgun rather than a live defect.
 - **One persona's base was collecting five other personas (2026-10-04).** Found preparing her history import: the source database is **multi-agent** — `agent_id` is `''` for the default agent and names every other agent sharing the base — and the agent config filtered only on `role`, so the daemon tailed every agent's chat into one persona's memory. The `role` column is the owner/persona axis *within* an agent; it does not name the agent, which is precisely the mistake. Measured: **168** foreign rows in her `l0_journal`, **53** in her dispatch log, **19** mentions of other personas' names in `core_memory` and `episodes`.
 
diff --git a/shared/crypto.py b/shared/crypto.py
index 5902501..a30666c 100644
--- a/shared/crypto.py
+++ b/shared/crypto.py
@@ -47,12 +47,22 @@ def decrypt_json(blob: bytes, master_key: bytes) -> Any:
     return json.loads(box.decrypt(ct, nonce).decode("utf-8"))
 
 
-def is_encrypted_blob(blob_head: bytes) -> bool:
-    """Check if data starts like an encrypted blob (heuristic).
+def is_encrypted_blob(blob: bytes, master_key: bytes) -> bool:
+    """Return True when `blob` is a readable SecretBox envelope.
 
-    JSON starts with { or [.
+    Decided by attempting decryption, never by inspecting a byte. The envelope
+    is `nonce(24) || ciphertext`, so its first byte is the first byte of a
+    random nonce — `{` in roughly one draw out of 256. The previous first-byte
+    test consequently reported real ciphertext as "plain JSON" in 4 cases out
+    of 256 (measured: 69 of 4096 = 1.68%), which is the wrong way for a
+    predicate to fail: it turns a readable secret into a "missing" one.
+
+    Pass the whole blob. A truncated one cannot authenticate and reports False.
     """
-    if not blob_head:
+    try:
+        decrypt_json(blob, master_key)
+    except Exception:
+        # Too short, bad MAC, wrong key, or a plaintext that is not JSON: in
+        # every one of those cases this is not a readable envelope.
         return False
-    head = blob_head[:1]
-    return head not in (b"{", b"[", b" ", b"\n")
+    return True
diff --git a/shared/master_key.py b/shared/master_key.py
index ed8c7e1..5e0fc55 100644
--- a/shared/master_key.py
+++ b/shared/master_key.py
@@ -177,14 +177,15 @@ def decrypt_json(blob: bytes) -> Any:
 
 
 def is_encrypted_blob(path: Path) -> bool:
-    """Check if file is encrypted (not plain JSON).
+    """Return True when the file is a readable encrypted envelope.
 
-    Heuristic: encrypted blobs start with random 24 bytes (nonce),
-    JSON starts with { or [.
+    Reads the file and attempts decryption with this process's master key. The
+    previous version sniffed the first byte; because the envelope begins with a
+    random nonce, one byte in 256 looks like JSON (`{`, `[`, space, newline) and
+    real ciphertext was reported as plain JSON in 4 cases out of 256 (measured
+    69/4096 = 1.68%).
     """
     if not path.exists():
         return False
     # Path is verified to be within app data dir by caller, safe.
-    with path.open("rb") as f:
-        head = f.read(1)
-    return bool(_is_encrypted_blob(head))
+    return bool(_is_encrypted_blob(path.read_bytes(), _get_master_key()))
diff --git a/shared/saga/impl/crypto.py b/shared/saga/impl/crypto.py
index c3f5997..dab3b69 100644
--- a/shared/saga/impl/crypto.py
+++ b/shared/saga/impl/crypto.py
@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@
 from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Any
 
 from shared.master_key import decrypt_json, encrypt_json
-from shared.crypto import is_encrypted_blob as _is_crypto_encrypted_blob
 
 logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
 
@@ -29,12 +28,19 @@
 
 
 def is_encrypted_blob(path: Path) -> bool:
-    """Check if file is encrypted (not plain JSON)."""
+    """Return True when the file is a readable encrypted envelope.
+
+    Decrypt-based, matching shared.master_key.is_encrypted_blob. The previous
+    first-byte sniff called real ciphertext plain JSON whenever the nonce began
+    with `{`, `[`, a space or a newline — 4 bytes in 256 (measured 1.68%).
+    """
     if not path.exists():
         return False
-    with path.open("rb") as f:
-        head = f.read(1)
-    return bool(_is_crypto_encrypted_blob(head))
+    try:
+        decrypt_json(path.read_bytes())
+    except Exception:
+        return False
+    return True
 
 
 if TYPE_CHECKING:
diff --git a/tests/test_secrets.py b/tests/test_secrets.py
index 67f94ba..5059aab 100644
--- a/tests/test_secrets.py
+++ b/tests/test_secrets.py
@@ -27,12 +27,16 @@ def test_tampered_ciphertext_rejected():
 
 
 def test_is_encrypted_blob(tmp_path: Path):
-    from features.secrets import is_encrypted_blob
+    from features.secrets import encrypt_json, is_encrypted_blob
 
     plain = tmp_path / "plain.json"
     enc = tmp_path / "enc.json"
     plain.write_text('{"a": 1}')
-    enc.write_bytes(b"\xab\xcd" * 30)
+    # A real envelope. This used to be filler bytes (b"\xab\xcd" * 30), which
+    # only ever passed because the old check looked at a single byte and
+    # anything not `{`/`[`/space/newline counted as encrypted. Detection now
+    # decrypts, so the file has to be genuinely encrypted to count.
+    enc.write_bytes(encrypt_json({"a": 1}))
     assert not is_encrypted_blob(plain)
     assert is_encrypted_blob(enc)
 
diff --git a/tests/test_shared/test_crypto_smoke.py b/tests/test_shared/test_crypto_smoke.py
index 6bf851c..f2108c3 100644
--- a/tests/test_shared/test_crypto_smoke.py
+++ b/tests/test_shared/test_crypto_smoke.py
@@ -19,18 +19,46 @@ def key() -> bytes:
 
 def test_roundtrip_dict(key):
     payload = {"k": "v", "n": 42, "nested": {"a": [1, 2, 3]}}
-    # 19.09: is_encrypted_blob is a first-byte heuristic, and the nonce is
-    # random — P(first byte looks like JSON) ≈ 4/256 per draw. A single draw
-    # flakes ~1.6% of gate runs. Redraw boundedly; the heuristic intent stays.
+    blob = crypto.encrypt_json(payload, key)
+    assert crypto.is_encrypted_blob(blob, key)
+    assert crypto.decrypt_json(blob, key) == payload
+
+
+def test_detection_survives_a_nonce_that_looks_like_json(key):
+    """Regression: detection must not depend on the nonce's first byte.
+
+    The envelope is nonce(24) || ciphertext and the nonce is random, so its
+    first byte is `{` in about 1 draw out of 256. The old first-byte test
+    pronounced such real ciphertext "plain JSON" — measured 69 of 4096 draws
+    (1.68%) — which made a readable secret look missing. This test waits for
+    that exact draw instead of avoiding it: the loop needs ~256 iterations, and
+    (255/256)**16384 ≈ 0, so it is deterministic in practice.
+    """
+    payload = {"secret": "value"}
     blob = b""
-    for _ in range(32):
-        blob = crypto.encrypt_json(payload, key)
-        if crypto.is_encrypted_blob(blob[:8]):
+    for _ in range(16384):
+        candidate = crypto.encrypt_json(payload, key)
+        if candidate[:1] == b"{":
+            blob = candidate
             break
-    assert blob != b"" and crypto.is_encrypted_blob(blob[:8])
+    assert blob, "could not obtain a blob starting with '{' — test would be vacuous"
+    assert blob[:1] == b"{"  # the very draw that used to break detection
+    assert crypto.is_encrypted_blob(blob, key)
     assert crypto.decrypt_json(blob, key) == payload
 
 
+def test_detection_rejects_anything_that_is_not_a_readable_envelope(key):
+    assert not crypto.is_encrypted_blob(b'{"plain": true}', key)  # plain JSON
+    assert not crypto.is_encrypted_blob(b"", key)  # empty
+    assert not crypto.is_encrypted_blob(b"\x00" * 10, key)  # shorter than nonce+MAC
+    assert not crypto.is_encrypted_blob(b"\xab\xcd" * 30, key)  # filler, not an envelope
+    foreign = crypto.encrypt_json({"a": 1}, os.urandom(32))
+    assert not crypto.is_encrypted_blob(foreign, key)  # encrypted, but under another key
+    tampered = bytearray(crypto.encrypt_json({"a": 1}, key))
+    tampered[-1] ^= 0xFF
+    assert not crypto.is_encrypted_blob(bytes(tampered), key)  # MAC no longer matches
+
+
 def test_roundtrip_list_and_unicode(key):
     payload = ["строка", "второй", 3]
     blob = crypto.encrypt_json(payload, key)