Responsible disclosure: 8 P0 findings in trader/trading/ and trader/messaging/ (14-day window)

[jaimenbell]

Responsible Disclosure — 8 P0 findings in trader/trading/ and trader/messaging/

Hi @9600dev — I'm writing from Bell Operations LLC (a trading-bot audit service, currently in early operation). I audited 9600dev/mmr at commit 07559fb9 as part of our launch process — we pick well-known public repos and run our full review lane before taking paid clients.

This is a responsible-disclosure notice. We found 8 P0-severity bugs across two clusters. We are giving you a 14-day window (until 2026-06-05) before publishing a sanitized writeup. We are not asking for anything — just flagging what we found so you have the chance to patch first.

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Cluster A — Order Execution (6 P0s)

ID	Title	File:Line
M-01	BUY debug discount double-applied — 19% realized instead of intended 10%	trader/trading/executioner.py:219-221
M-02	sanity_check_order is a no-op stub returning True unconditionally	trader/trading/order_validator.py:29-43
M-03	MarketOrder defaults outsideRth=True — extended-hours wide-spread fills	trader/trading/trading_runtime.py:836-837, proposal.py:47
M-04	STOP_LOSS exit path leaves entry live if SL leg fails to place	trader/trading/trading_runtime.py:1028-1073
M-05	connected_event double-fires on reconnect → duplicate subscriptions + double reqAllOpenOrders	trader/trading/trading_runtime.py:529-534
M-06	No PDT-rule tracking — Reg-T 4-trades-in-5-days violation risk for sub-$25K margin accounts	repo-wide (no implementation)

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Cluster B — IPC Security (2 P0s) — exploitable today on non-loopback Docker deployments

ID	Title	File:Line
M-07	ZMQ RPC dispatch resolves methods via bare getattr with no _is_rpc_method whitelist — any co-resident process can call arbitrary attribute chains on the trader instance	trader/messaging/clientserver.py:473-475
M-08	_safe_dill_loads policy defaults OFF (MMR_DILL_STRICT=1 not set) — full RCE via crafted msgpack EXT_OBJECT payload from any process that can reach the ZMQ socket	trader/messaging/clientserver.py:83-95

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Immediate recommendations

M-07 and M-08 are the highest urgency — they are exploitable on any deployment that doesn't restrict the ZMQ socket to strict loopback. The M-07 fix is one line:

assert getattr(callable_obj, '_is_rpc_method', False), f"Not an RPC method: {method_name}"

For M-08, setting MMR_DILL_STRICT=1 in the environment closes the deserialization vector immediately without a code change.

M-01 and M-02 are the most operationally dangerous for real-money use — a validator that always returns True means no order sanity check fires before submission.

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We will publish our full sanitized writeup on or after 2026-06-05. If you patch before then, we'll note it in the published report. Happy to answer questions or share additional detail on any finding.

— Bell Operations LLC (provisional) | trading-bot security audit service